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To what extent can machines and computers take over from people? Will they 
render us all redundant? This research answers these questions, using ’the 
machinery of medicine’ as a vehicle for the investigations.
Designers of smart machines utilise an algorithmic model of knowledge. This 
raises questions for sociologists who stress the enculturational model of 
knowledge and the importance of the tacit component of skilled performance. 
How effective is the algorithmic approach to medical knowledge and practice?
I have adopted an ’insider’ approach in order to highlight the practical issues of 
the usefulness of medical machines, their ’competence’ in the eyes of the staff 
that use them, and the contribution of these staff to the efficient functioning of 
the machines.
The fieldwork shows that the machinery of medicine relies on behaviour-specific 
action, and functions best in ’microworlds’. Problems arise when machines are 
assigned to wider world tasks that have been inappropriately reduced to a 
microworld format. I conclude that human digitization and repair allows 
microworld machines to fit into the social world of situated action. I explain 
where and how medical machines offer most benefit, consider whether they 
should be used by inexperienced staff, and I suggest where designers should 
concentrate their efforts. The research shows that the notion of a ’post-physician 
era’ is misplaced: Machines cannot approach the broad aspects of medical 
practice, and the human role remains essential to the appropriate use of medical 
machines.
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1GENERAL INTRODUCTION
"In gadget-mad Japan, they have buildings that th ink ... The NEC
building [in Tokyo] is apparently the most intelligent in the world" (1)
The idea of a ’thinking building’ shows how far images of intelligent 
machines and smart computers intrude into our lives. In the developed 
societies of the late twentieth century, machines are everywhere. At one end 
of the spectrum they are employed to do regimented or straightforward tasks 
- on factory assembly lines and at supermarket check-outs. At the other end 
of the spectrum machines are used for more complex operations - they 
manoeuvre aeroplanes by autopilot and facilitate high speed, large scale 
calculations and communications. In this mechanised environment the image 
that the machines present is one of relentless motion and tireless, near­
perfect operation.
Winston and Prendergast (1984) tell us that "The primary goal of AI 
[Artificial Intelligence] is to make machines smarter." (p 1). The ever- 
improved versions of the kinds of machines mentioned above suggest that the 
designers are achieving a degree of success. The age of the computer is with 
us and the influence of the machines continues to expand. There are 
hundreds of computers that seem to do what were once considered ’human’ 
tasks. Researchers strive to make machines that relieve us of more and more 
of our time-consuming tasks. Machines have influenced all sectors of society 
from leisure and pleasure to finance, travel and education (see Winograd and 
Flores, 1986, chapter 1). Medicine and health care has not escaped - as 
Koenig (1988) points out, "The landscape of modern health care is filled with 
machines." (p. 465)
2The practical expansion in the influence and scope of computers has been 
accompanied by heated debates about the nature of computer capability, the 
limit of this capability and the future of AI. Philosophers, psychologists, 
sociologists, natural scientists and engineers have all contributed to these 
debates. In addition, the production of allegedly expert computers that 
threaten to encroach upon professional boundaries has aroused interest 
amongst human experts from a diverse range of occupations.
Analyses of the potential of AI have been conducted largely through 
theoretical debate. Supporters of the ideals of the AI community, such as 
Feigenbaum and McCorduck (1984), and Maxmen (1976,1987) have made 
bold predictions about what computers will achieve. Sceptics have countered 
these claims, pointing out what computers can’t do (see Dreyfus 1972,1992) 
and what computers ought not to do (Weizenbaum 1976). Some writers have 
attempted to explain computer successes to date, analysing what computers 
can do and why they can do it (Collins 1990). Others have chosen either to 
take a pragmatic stance or to adopt a mobile position, changing their views as 
the area has matured (eg. Schwartz 1970; Schwartz Patel and Szolovits 1987; 
Szolovits 1982).
The debate is largely inconclusive, but the rhetoric serves to underline the 
differences that exist between proponents and opponents of AI. Much energy 
has also been invested in debating questions of intelligence - whether 
machines can be ’intelligent’ and whether we should grant them ’intelligence’ 
when they perform jobs that humans once did. But little attention has been 
given to practical investigations of machines that are doing what were 
previously regarded as human jobs. A practical investigation offers a means 
of circumventing the issue of whether the machine is intelligent, by asking 
instead, how well does the machine do what it is designed to do, and how
3does it do this? Whether or not the machine is ’intelligent’ is irrelevant if it 
performs in a satisfactory manner.
This thesis presents such a practical analysis using medical computers as a 
vehicle for the investigations. There are two reasons behind the choice of 
medical machines: First, within the medical world there are both simple 
devices and more complex computers. Second, a variety of approaches to 
mechanical decision making that AI researchers have devised are 
represented in medical machines. Rule based systems as well as computers 
that combine rules with specific knowledge about the field in question have 
been introduced. So the field offers opportunities for analysing several 
different types of machines that are believed to be ’successful’ - thus Forsyth 
says, "The most significant thing about expert systems is that they are highly 
successful: already there are systems that can out-perform skilled humans at 
medical diagnosis.” (1984 p. 9) These knowledge based systems, or ’expert 
systems’ are currently the most popular type of machine in practical medical 
settings (2). Medicine is, then, a fertile field for looking at the practical issues 
surrounding machine use (3). The field studies in this research show how 
machines are used, their usefulness, the kind of tasks they are allowed to 
undertake and the effect their introduction has on the human workers 
involved. The discussions and arguments arising from these case studies will 
be presented in a manner that will, I hope, allow an informed reappraisal of 
current positions and debates.
The major objectives of this study are:
(1) To assess current theories about the extent to which machines can be 
used to do human tasks.
(2) To investigate the concept of machines performing human tasks using 
case studies from the medical world.
4(3) To offer a critical reappraisal of current theories and present new 
information.
Before presenting the case studies, a review of the literature in the area will 
be presented. The structure of the thesis is as follows:
Section 1 - chapters 1-4 - will present the background to the field, dealing 
with theoretical, historical and practical issues raised in the literature. This 
section sets the scene for the empirical research.
Chapter 1 provides an outline of Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK). 
The evolution of SSK is described, the SSK conception of the nature of 
scientific knowledge is explained and the thrust of new ideas within SSK 
outlined. How SSK relates to the area of AI, and the bearing that the new 
radical strand within SSK has on AI is then discussed.
In chapter 2 the growth of AI, and how the direction of research within the 
field has evolved is described. AI in medicine is singled out as the case under 
scrutiny and the available literature reviewed. This chapter illustrates how 
the problems facing AI researchers generally are reflected in attempts to 
produce machines to do human tasks in medicine.
Chapter 3 completes the literature review with attention to another practical 
issue raised in the literature: The effects of technological advances and the 
implications for the human workforce have always been an emotive issue.
For all workers, from the Luddites to the Toyota workers of the 1990s, the 
introduction of technology has posed a threat to autonomy, skill, status and 
to employment. In this chapter Braverman’s deskilling thesis is reviewed and 
alternative interpretations assessed: Other writers suggest that the extent of
5deskilling is far more limited than Braverman’s pessimistic account forecasts. 
At this point, the link between the notion of deskilling and the growth of 
computerisation is made, and various theories concerning what computers 
and smart machines can and cannot do are set out.
In chapter 4 the specific points raised by the three sections of the literature 
review are summarised and the questions that the case studies need to 
address are set out. These questions replace the ’hypothesis’ that is often 
formulated for testing at the early stages of research. Instead the questions 
will address the difference between the SSK conception of knowledge as 
social and the alternative ideas implicit in the AI paradigm, through a 
practical programme of investigations. What happens in practice when 
computers are employed to do human jobs in health care settings is the 
major issue. The case study material will allow a practical reappraisal of 
current theories, and the chance to contribute to the debate from a different 
angle. At the end of chapter 4 the methodology used for this research is 
outlined. Why this method was adopted, how it was implemented, the 
problems of qualitative research of this nature and the fieldwork 
practicalities are explained.
Section 2 - chapters 5-9 - reports on the practical elements of the thesis.
Each of these chapter is designed to provide the background to a specific 
case study, a description of the particular machine involved, an outline of the 
findings and an analysis of these findings in relation to the questions raised in 
chapter 4.
Chapter 5 gives details of a computer designed to interview and diagnose 
patients with dyspepsia (GLADYS). In chapter 6 a computer that diagnoses 
jaundiced patients on the basis of clinical information (SOLUBILE) is
6described. Chapter 7 gives details of the study of the automatic blood 
pressure measuring machine. In chapter 8 the investigation into the 
interpretive electrocardiogram machine is presented and chapter 9 is 
concerned with specific applications of the ’Dynamic Hospital Information 
System’ (HELP) in use at the ’Latter Day Saints Hospital’ (LDS) in Salt 
Lake City.
Section 3 - chapter 10 - is the conclusion of the thesis. Here I summarise the 
findings of the five case studies and using this information I make suggestions 
about the extent to which computers contribute to medical practice, where 
computers will be most useful, the role of the staff and their contribution to 
the new working practices. The way that this practical investigation has 
contributed to the field is explained. Conclusions about the usefulness of 
current theories are presented; a new practical way of looking at the issues 
will have been fully explored and the implications of the findings for all the 
staff involved is explained. Suggestions for the improved use and application 
of machines in medicine are set out and the direction that further studies 
should take in order to advance the discussion is outlined.
7FOOTNOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION
1. Margolis (1993).
2. Neural networks, hailed as the next step after expert systems, remain at the 
research front. Few, if any, examples of neural nets being used in practical 
settings can be found. There are none deployed in medical settings at the 
time of writing.
3. Aside from the variety and apparent availability of machines to study, this 
area is a fertile field in which to pursue this investigation because of the 
nature of my expertise in the area. This is explained in more detail in the 
methodology section of chapter 4.
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8CHAPTER 1 - THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
MEETS ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
1. INTRODUCTION
The past quarter century has seen the establishment of the Sociology of 
Scientific Knowledge (SSK) as a distinct discipline. Areas as diverse as the 
history of science, philosophy, the sociology of knowledge and the sociology of 
science have contributed to the development of SSK. In this chapter I describe 
the evolution of SSK and the various methodological positions that have been 
put forward. Then the link between Artificial Intelligence (AI) and SSK is made 
clear. The expanding influence of Artificial Intelligence and smart machines 
offers a fundamental challenge to SSK and in view of this, I explain why a 
’sociology of machines’ is justified.
1.1 The Evolution of Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
Historically science has been held in high esteem and generally regarded as a 
reflection of objective truth and fact. This ’rationalist’ or received view 
positioned science beyond the remit of sociologists of knowledge, who were 
traditionally limited to the analysis of false or irrational beliefs. As Woolgar 
(1985) pointed out, "While science was generally regarded as exotic and esoteric, 
it was neither necessary nor desirable for the sociologist to penetrate the content 
of science." (p. 559). Woolgar (1988) suggests that the rational view of science is 
inextricably linked to what he terms ’essentialism’. Essentialist views are based 
on the idea of science as a tangible object - exhibiting features that are 
characteristic of an ’actual’ existing science. Woolgar presents nominalism as an 
alternative to essentialism. Nominalism is based on the notion that the search for 
a definition of science is futile because science is variable - philosophically,
9culturally and historically. It is continually changing, being re-negotiated and re­
classified by the involved scientists. The characteristics of scientific knowledge 
are thus more dependent on the practices of the people involved, than on the 
characteristics of science itself. As interest in the practices and social relations of 
scientists grew and it became accepted that these social factors influence what is 
counted as ’scientific’ at any time, the sociology of science became established as 
a means of investigating the social relationships (1). Writers such as Merton were 
amongst the first to approach this area (2).
The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge grew from the sociology of science, but 
its genesis required another major step forward: Rather than concentrating on 
the social relations between scientists, ’SSKers’ look - from a sociological 
perspective - at the nature of scientific knowledge and the way it is produced, 
disseminated, maintained and passed on within the scientific community. As long 
ago as 1967, Medawar urged those interested in understanding science to look at 
what scientists do in their research (p. 151), and take note of the social dynamics 
at work. To study these influences in action, close attention to scientific practice 
itself is required.
Kuhn (1962) was one of the first to present ideas which suggested that science is 
a ’social’ practice. Kuhn argues that knowledge production and transfer depend 
on two factors - paradigms and exemplars. ’Paradigms’ mediate what is regarded 
as ’fact’. In order to become part of the science community, allegiance to the 
dominant paradigm is necessary. This is achieved by interaction with and 
immersion into the social/scientfic group. In this way, the frameworks referred to 
inside the group are passed on to newcomers. ’Exemplars’ are previously 
experienced concrete examples which act as judges over the structure of our 
world view. Kuhn maintains that there is no simple objective knowledge of the 
world, but that accumulation and transfer of knowledge depends upon paradigms
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and exemplars. Kuhn’s work, along with the earlier work of Polanyi (eg, Grene 
ed, 1969) illustrates the craftsmanlike character of scientific work and 
emphasises the social influences shaping the outcome of scientific experiment.
This emphasis on the role of experience and reference to shared ideas, or 
frameworks of a paradigm, bears a resemblance to the Wittgensteinian concept 
of a ’form of life’ (1958) (3). Winch (1958) also utilised the concept of a form of 
life. He maintained that we come to know what we know and we act as we do 
because we share a common form of life. Within a form of life, knowing and 
doing cannot be separated. This applies to the science form of life, as much as to 
any other form of life.
From these ideas, it became clear that science, like all other bodies of 
knowledge, is amenable to sociological analysis and that "the historical course of 
development in any field of science has a significant social component." (Ziman 
1984, p. 103) By highlighting the social nature of accomplishments in 
mathematics, physics and the like, ’SSKers’ hoped to show that the 
epistemological supremacy of science is mythical. The case studies chosen in the 
early days of SSK were typically hard cases of science such as mathematics 
(Bloor 1973) and physics (Collins 1975). The sociologists involved set out to 
demonstrate that the apparent objectivity of all science is a function of social 
processes (4). According to Barnes (1974), the study of scientific knowledge also 
assists the general quest for a sociological understanding of the nature of 
knowledge as a whole (p. viii).
1.2 The Relativist view replaces The Rationalist view of Science
Studying the production of scientific knowledge sociologically is at odds with the 
rationalist or received view of science, which treats the social aspects of science
11
production in a much less thoroughgoing way. SSK demands that the received 
view of science be abandoned in favour of a more relativist stance. The 
distinction between social and scientific is to be erased. The relativist position 
holds that what is ,true, and ’real’ varies from place to place and from time to 
time. Commitment to relativism permits sociological analysis of what were 
previously seen as ’true’ facts - ie, scientific facts, because there are no true facts 
independent of the social world.
1.3 SSK and the Nature of Knowledge
Within SSK a general theory about the nature of knowledge, which 
complements the relativistic view of the world, evolved. SSK maintains that 
knowledge is held within a group, and is the property of the collectivity rather 
than the individual. New discoveries are made and knowledge becomes 
acceptable through processes of social consensus. Maintaining knowledge and 
transferring it to others are also social processes, involving collective and 
consensual decisions. The idea of private knowledge, with each individual 
holding a store of knowledge or a bank of individualised facts is rejected. 
Individuals gain understanding and knowledge as they are socialised into a group 
and a form of life and take on board the cultural assumptions and frameworks. 
Socialisation, which is the process of learning to perceive the world in terms of a 
culture lies at the root of all understanding (Lipscombe, 1990 p. 93). We learn by 
being socialised into a form of life, not merely by being instructed. Collins (1985) 
calls this the enculturational model of learning (p. 57).
Rudwick (1985) suggests: "the new scientific knowledge produced in most 
episodes of scientific research practice ... should not be treated only or primarily 
as the creative achievement of one or a few outstanding individuals. It should be 
regarded rather as the outcome of processes of interaction within a group or cast
12
list that included, in their diverse roles, not only star performers but also minor 
actors and walk on parts.1 (p. 15) (5).
This idea, that scientific knowledge is produced through processes of interaction 
and negotiation is highlighted by work in SSK which deals with scientific 
controversies. These studies stress the role of ’social construction’ in scientific 
discovery, and show how closure of debates about the existence or otherwise of 
phenomenon is achieved (6).
Collins and Pinch (1993) describe several scientific episodes in order to 
highlight the messy character of scientific discovery. They stress that science 
rarely produces clear-cut conclusions, and that acceptable ’facts’ are produced 
through social negotiation which leads to consensus about the nature of 
acceptable outcomes. Mackenzie’s study (1989) of missile accuracy testing 
stresses the importance of the ’testing’ phase in the social construction of ’facts’ 
about science and technology. He states that it is during testing that "it is decided 
whether artefacts ’work’, how well they work and what their characteristics are" 
(p. 411), and that this phase has a major influence on the knowledge produced.
Other studies emphasise the importance of social practices, social interaction 
and negotiation in what is deemed an adequate or acceptable representation or 
fact in the medical world:
Pasveer (forthcoming) discusses the "rendering practices" employed by X ray 
workers in the early twentieth century who "set out to actively fabricate the 
content of the [X ray] pictures", so that they were seen to represent the organ or 
the body. Using the lung and pulmonary tuberculosis as an example she 
describes how a shadow on a photographic plate was made to relate to the object 
transradiated, and how the precise clinical content of an X ray was determined
13
by the creation of likenesses between X ray shadows and ascultated sounds and 
dissected lungs. She suggests that "an ever increasing self-sufficiency of the 
shadow pictures” emerged as a result of the practices and procedures employed 
by X ray workers. Brante and Hallberg (1991) use a different medical example - 
the ’concept of death’ debate - to highlight the social interaction which closed the 
controversy and lead to the construction and adoption of a new definition of 
’death’ in Sweden in 1988. In a similar medical vein, Anderson (1992) suggests 
that the decision whether or not to use computerised diagnostics at a Melbourne 
hospital, was reached through a process of social negotiation - the stronger group 
in the hospital emerging triumphant and rejecting the technology (see chapter 4).
The influence of social constructivist thinking is widespread. The relevance of 
these kinds of analysis to this study is to highlight the importance of social 
processes of negotiation to the acceptance or rejection of something - whether it 
is a fact or a piece of technology. This will be fully discussed in my conclusion.
2. METHODOLOGY IN SSK
The debate in SSK now concerns the most appropriate way to do sociology of 
scientific knowledge. Which methodology is best? Many alternative views have 
surfaced, and can be overwhelming for newcomers to the field (Collins, 1983). 
Here I will describe the original position as set out by Bloor (1976), and some 
contemporary variations on his theme.
2.1 Bloor and The Strong Program
David Bloor (1976) took knowledge to mean all the collective beliefs that 
people hold and live by. Bloor’s ’strong program’ for SSK, which is an 
amalgamation of older ideas about how sociologists should approach the
14
explanation of scientific beliefs, stresses that an account of the nature of 
scientific knowledge is best achieved using the scientific method itself. Bloor 
(1976) set out four tenets which SSK should adhere to:
(1) SSK should be concerned with causality, and concentrate on the social and 
other conditions which cause all beliefs or states of knowledge.
(2) SSK must be impartial with respect to divisions between ’true’ and ’false’ 
beliefs, rational or irrational beliefs and successful or unsuccessful beliefs. By 
explaining both sides of these dichotomies SSK will illustrate how the perception 
of something as true or false is part of the phenomenon to be studied.
(3) SSK must be symmetrical and use the same types of explanation for true and 
false beliefs.
(4) SSK must be reflexive and its explanations must apply to sociology itself.
The range of methodological positions in contemporary SSK is based largely on 
the extent to which Bloor’s four tenets are supported. These are summarised 
below (7).
2.2 The Edinburgh School
Barnes (1974) approaches the study of scientific knowledge in a similar way to 
Bloor, acknowledging the social aspects of scientific knowledge and rejecting the 
received view of science. Barnes uses an instrumental account of knowledge 
production, claiming that "the process whereby knowledge is evaluated involves 
continuing reference to shared goals and interests" (1983, p. 44). He stresses that 
scientific communities and institutions have a vested interest in their own 
perpetuation, and these interests influence the production of what is deemed to
15
be ’scientific knowledge’. So, science is theoretical knowledge that is subject to 
social influences. The position occupied by Bloor and Barnes is commonly 
referred to in the literature as the Edinburgh school.
2.3 The Empirical Program of Relativism
The empirical relativist position is exemplified by Collins. This programme 
ideally consist of three stages. Collins (1981b) outlines these: The first stage is 
the identification of local interpretative flexibility of science, which prevents 
experimentation from being decisive. The second stage of the program is the 
description of the devices used to limit interpretative flexibility, and thus ensure 
closure of controversial debates. The third stage in the program will be an 
attempt to relate the constraining mechanisms to the wider social and political 
structure. Collins sets out his ideas about how to go about doing SSK within 
these guide-lines (Collins 1981a). He accepts parts of the strong program - but 
suggests that tenets 1 and 4 - causality and reflexivity - detract from the main 
thrust of the program. He is especially critical of reflexivity which "can lead to 
paralyzing difficulties" (p. 215). He does not see reflexivity as an issue for 
sociologists of scientific knowledge - it should be assigned to a sociologist of 
sociologists of scientific knowledge. Reflexivity only creates a ’regress of 
sociologies’. Collins suggests that "the natural world needs to be approached in a 
relativistic way, but this does not imply that the social world be approached in 
this way." (1981a, p. 216) His prescription is to "treat the social world as real and 
as something about which we can have sound data." (1981a, p. 216-217) He thus 
dismisses reflexivity, his line being, I am doing sociology, anyone can do 
sociology on me, but I do not have to do sociology on myself.
For Collins the vital parts of Bloor’s framework are symmetry and impartiality. 
He fuses these two concepts together to form his ’Radical Program’. The radical
16
program demands that no decision of what is a true or a false belief is made in 
advance, and terms such as true, rational, successful and progressive are not used 
in explanations. The investigators’ views on such things are suspended, in true 
relativist fashion. They are urged to think like sceptics in order to achieve a 
strangeness that allows them to treat all views in the same way.
More recently, Collins has argued that relativism does not accept any 
epistemological stance as correct. Extending Berger (1963), his methodological 
relativism allows ’meta-alternation’ between positions according to the purpose 
at hand. In 1992 Collins and Yearley were still involved in this debate, insisting 
that scientists should be naive realists and sociologists should be social realists. 
Sociologists should choose the best epistemology for the task at hand. This is the 
best way to sort out the relationships in the knowledge producing world, and 
assess science for what it is. For theorists who stress the importance of reflexivity, 
Collins’s position is problematic:
2.4 Discourse Analysis and New Literary Forms
Woolgar and Ashmore are two prominent supporters of the reflexive line. They 
state (1988) that one of the first moves in the reflexive direction within sociology 
was Discourse Analysis, and that prior to this, reflexivity had been treated as 
inherent but uninteresting by Barnes and Bloor, and had been actively opposed 
by Collins. Discourse analysts concentrate on analysing what people say rather 
than what they do. Those involved (eg. Gilbert and Mulkay 1984; Mulkay 1985) 
seek to illuminate the processes used by sociologists to construct sociology from 
interview data. This disclosure of the representations used by sociologists was 
designed to encourage reflexive self-awareness (8).
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Of late, discourse analysis has been superseded within sociology (although it is 
still popular in psychology) and other reflexivists have attempted to deconstruct 
the methods of SSK to a greater extent: ’New literary forms’ advocate multi- 
authorship in texts so as to avoid authority and misrepresentation. This method 
presents all sides of any argument as though from the viewpoint of an outsider. 
The suggestion is that new literary forms will lead to new means of exploring old 
questions of knowledge and epistemology.
An example of the ’new literary form’ of discourse can be found in the 
concluding chapter of Ashmore, Mulkay and Pinch’s book (1989). This book 
analyses the attempt at a practical application of a social science to a specific 
area of social life (in this case the application of health economics to NHS 
administrative problems). The book concentrates on the "paradoxical and 
multivocal" nature of the social world and the "complex and constantly changing 
concatenation of voices and versions" that constitute it (p. 190). The authors 
recognise that social science has to operate in this social world, but that neither 
sociologists nor health economists can offer more that a partial account of the 
processes under study because of the "interpretative multiplicity of the social 
world" (p. 7). In keeping with this view, multivocal conclusions to the book are 
presented - an economists’, a sociologists’ and a lay person’s reading of their text 
are set out, and through these the authors show the variations of accounts of one 
phenomenon that are available.
This analysis of the formal methods used by health economists attempting to 
solve practical problems in the NHS pinpoints three specific strategies that 
health economists use in an attempt to influence the inherently ’irrational’ 
processes of the NHS. These are (i) educative strategies which replace common 
sense ideas with elegant economic principles (see also Mulkay, Pinch and 
Ashmore 1987), (ii) direct intervention in the NHS and (iii) participation by
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health economists in public debate. Ashmore et al highlight specific formal 
techniques used by health economists in the 1980s to "raise the level of 
operational rationality in the NHS" (p. 197) - Quality of Life measurements, 
Clinical budgeting and Option Appraisal. In chapter 10,1 compare their 
criticisms of such formal methods of problem solving with may own critique of 
the formal methods underlying AL
More radical reflexivists such as Woolgar press the reflexive point still further 
than discourse analysts:
2.5 Woolgar and Reflexivitv
Woolgar stresses how vital reflexivity is for SSK (eg. Woolgar 1988). He is 
critical of Bloor, on the grounds that the strong programme is contaminated by 
essentialism, and that the concept of rules for sociological analysis is 
unacceptable. Rules are merely post-hoc justifications and rationalisations of 
action, so why should they lead to a particular kind of sociology? More crucially, 
Woolgar is sceptical of Bloor’s description of the strong program as ’scientific’, as 
this assumes the nature of the scientific method before it is known what that 
method is or whether it exists. Woolgar takes the nominalist line - science is 
undefinable.
The crux of the issue is in Woolgar’s culmination of the discussion of 
representation. Representation is "the means by which we generate images of the 
object ’out there’" (Woolgar 1988, p. 30) and this is at the heart of essentialism. 
Representation sustains science and the attempts of others to study science. We 
can never be sure if a representation adequately reflects an object and he 
suggests that the problems of the object/representation connection are 
unavoidable in the long term, even if they can be managed in the short term.
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(1988, p. 32/33 - The methodological horrors of indexicality, inconcludability and 
reflexivity). Woolgar stresses that "A critical appraisal of the idea of science must 
challenge the very idea of representation. In particular, we need to realise the 
extent to which our own efforts [as social scientists] are themselves beholden to 
the ideology of representation" (p. 36).
According to Woolgar, even progressive sociological accounts of scientific 
knowledge largely fail to take the bull by the horns and challenge representation. 
So far, all that has been done is that scientific representation has been replaced 
by sociological and literary representation. Woolgar’s view is that SSK has not 
gone far enough. A reflexive exploration of sociologists’ own practices and a 
challenge to their representations is now necessary, so that SSK can approach 
deeper questions about knowledge production. Woolgar and Ashmore (1988) 
sum this up, saying "the growing confidence with which scholars have argued that 
natural science is a social construct is now accompanied by growing interest in 
the consequences of applying this same argument to knowledge generated by the 
social sciences" (p. 1) (9).
The reflexivists stress the need for equivalence in treatment of work done by 
sociologists and those whom they investigate - scientists. Woolgar’s answer to the 
problem of representation is to reverse the traditional idea that an object exists 
prior to its representation. He asks us to consider the idea that objects are 
constituted through their discovery and representation - not merely revealed by 
their discovery. Inverting the traditional relationship neatly disposes of the 
essentialist idea that objects exist out there to be discovered. Woolgar applies the 
inversion idea to the relationship between scientific knowledge and the natural 
world. In place of the belief that scientific knowledge arises from the natural 
world, he stresses the alternative, that the natural world arises from scientific 
knowledge.
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2.6 The Actant Networkers
Aside from the relativist and reflexive stances, another philosophically radical 
branch of theory has emerged: Callon and Latour (1992), have presented the 
Actant Network theory. They propose a radical extension of symmetiy beyond 
Bloor’s usage. Not only should true and false beliefs be treated equally, but all 
dichotomies should be given the symmetrical treatment. They challenge the 
notion of a distinction between nature and society (as referred to by Collins and 
Yearley, 1992), because the divide was created by us and so ought to be 
disregarded. Instead they advocate treating human and non-human "actants’ in 
science production in the same way, and designating agency to both, in order to 
illustrate the co-operation of society and nature. Humans are thus removed from 
the central position they occupied in Bloor’s version of symmetry. Latour and 
Woolgar used this idea in their 1979 study when they assigned agency to 
scientists’ inscription devices. More recently, the French inspired version of 
radical symmetry draws no distinction between objects that have been created 
and those occurring naturally. Eg, Callon (1986) grants agency and power to 
scallops, Latour and Johnson (1988) to door closers. In order to assess the power 
of non-human actants, Latour suggests that we use a counterfactual method, and 
imagine the situation if the non-human actant was not present. We can then 
measure the complicity of non-human actants (10).
In contemporary SSK the debate over epistemology remains as lively as ever, yet 
seems inconclusive. A divide exists between supporters of reflexivity and radical 
symmetry on one side and relativists of the Collins/Yearley mode on the other.
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3. DISCUSSION
It is not clear whether reflexivity enhances the quality and insight of sociological 
investigation. Challenging representation is tantamount to challenging the 
foundations of our taken-for-granted way of carrying on. Representation is 
everywhere.
Language and communication are based on common understandings of 
representations of things in the world. Every time Woolgar indulges in written 
work, is he not taking on board an understanding of the representations of the 
readers of his texts? Giving every viewpoint an airing so as to diminish the 
authority of a single author - as the new literary form of writing does - is non 
productive. No conclusions are reached and with every voice under the control of 
one writer, distortion is inevitable. Perhaps we cannot leave representation 
behind.
Reflexivity and critical analysis of the methods of sociology seem to be an ever 
decreasing circle. Ignoring the problem of sociologists’ reliance on 
representation, as Collins does, will not solve it. Neither, it seems, does 
confronting the problem. Collins’s belief in compartmentalising SSK separately 
from science, and treating the two disciplines differently, causes reflexivists much 
distress. Exactly what does he mean when he says that the social world is 
something about which we have sound data? And if reflexivity is, in effect, a 
regress into sociologies of sociologies that leads nowhere, why is the initial 
investigation of scientific knowledge of interest to sociologists?
The various positions and hotly defended epistemological stances are seemingly 
irreconcilable. The self-defeating nature of reflexive analysis is easy to see. But
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so too is the desire amongst reflexive thinkers to utilise their preferred methods 
in an analysis of themselves.
4. WHAT THIS MEANS FOR SSK IN RELATION TO Al
The link between SSK and Al is not immediately obvious. The notion of a 
’sociology of machines’ can appear counter-intuitive (Woolgar 1985, p. 558), and 
the justification for broadening the scope of sociology so that it includes Al and 
machines, needs to be clarified.
The Al phenomenon is important to sociology for three distinct reasons. Two of 
these were set out by Woolgar (1985):
Firstly, it offers the opportunity to extend the scope of SSK by applying it 
directly to the sociology of machines.
Secondly, it offers an opportunity for assessing one of the basic cornerstones of 
SSK - that knowledge is a social possession, held by a group rather than an 
individual, and which is obtained as a by-product of immersion into a form of 
life. Al puts forward the idea of an isolated form of knowledge and reasoning in 
an unsocialised machine. How can an isolated mechanical artefact access human 
understandings? It does not have the benefit of socialisation, or the accumulated 
cultural assumptions and frameworks that socialised humans do. In short, if the 
SSK conception of knowledge is correct, then Al cannot work. A ’sociology of 
machines’ is a means of investigating these issues (Woolgar, 1985).
The third reason for looking at Al from a sociological stand-point has emerged 
since Woolgar put forward his reasons for pursuing the field. Clearly the 
boundaries of symmetry in SSK have been pushed back by the reflexive stream of
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thought. The culmination of the actant network approach is the idea that non­
human actants be granted authority and agency. In essence, this symmetries-away 
the distinction between human and non-human. This is a boost to the proponents 
of Al who have long since implied that the distinction can be transcended. 
Looking at machines and computers will illustrate the feasibility or otherwise of 
erasing the distinction.
Beyond this, the field studies will illustrate the processes by which machines and 
computers participate in the form of life within medical establishments. 
Socialisation and enculturation are presented by SSK as essential to mutual 
understanding and integration into social groups. Does experience with medical 
machines in medical environments cast doubt over this fundamental claim in 
SSK?
A study of the practicalities of Al machines in action will contribute directly to 
the SSK debates, and hopefully inject new life into the discussion. Many of the 
philosophical and sociological questions about the nature and location of human 
knowledge can be illuminated by a study of Artificial Intelligence. Collins 
summed up this idea in 1985 when he said "the pigeons of philosophical 
scepticism and phenomenology are quietly coming home to roost in the nest of 
Artificial Intelligence." (p. 20).
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 1
1. Although at this time they confined their investigations to the relations 
between scientists, and were, in effect, 'sociologists of scientists'. (Woolgar, 1985) 
The nature of the knowledge produced remained beyond the scope of their 
sociological investigations.
2. Merton’s work spans forty years of sociology of science. His 1952 essay 
outlines why the sociology of science took so long to emerge from traditional 
sociology of knowledge. This essay appears in a 1972 book of collected pieces 
written by Merton from 1937 onwards. The book, edited by Storer, offers a 
wideranging account of the sociology of science.
3. SSK is often upheld as the empirical application of Wittgenstein's later 
philosophy.
4. Some theorists have feared that the intention of SSK is to change science 
rather than to illuminate the nature of science. This view is still held by some - 
eg, see Wolpert, 1992.
5. Gooding (1990) also stresses social aspects of scientific practice that are often 
neglected: His account concentrates on the agency of observers, how their 
observations are influened by interactions with one another, and he highlights 
the overlap of social and cognitive elements of scientific work (p. xii-xiii).
6. Eg, see the special edition of Social Studies of Science, Februmy 1981, volume 
11 no. 1. Here, work by Travis, Collins, Pickering, Harvey and Pinch clarifies the 
social constructionists’ perspective.
7. The most recent analysis of various positions can be found in Pickering (ed) 
1992.
8. According to the relativist camp, represented here by Collins and Yearley, the 
problem with discourse analysis was that it saw itself as invulnerable to its own 
critique, when in fact all knowledge making is vulnerable to the methods of SSK 
(Collins and Yearley, 1992, p. 304).
9. Collins and Yearley (1992) also criticise this stance. Reflexive thought 
highlights the omnipresence of the problem of representation. But as this 
problem cannot be solved, what use is there in highlighting it? Reflexivity is not a 
direct route to truth about the social world - just as SSK is not a direct route to 
nature. They support meta-alternation and compartmentalisation as a more 
suitable approach.
10. Collins and Yearley’s response to this is that blurring the social/natural 
divide in this way ignores advances that have been made in the sociological study 
of artificial intelligence which draw attention to the difference between social 
things and natural things. Furthermore, resorting to empirical scientific accounts 
to measure the complicity of non-human actors goes against the grain of 
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CHAPTER 2 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF AT AND ITS 
APPLICATION TO MEDICAL PROBLEMS
l.INTRODUCTION
The field of Artificial Intelligence is confused by different definitions of 
the term Al, which arise from the different objectives and philosophical 
foundations of the researchers and writers involved. For example, Searle 
(1981) draws a distinction between weak Al and strong Al (1), whereas 
Clark (1989) suggests that conventional wisdom has divided the Al field 
into technological Al and psychological Al (also called cognitive science) 
(2).
In this chapter I will describe different approaches that have been 
adopted by Al researchers, so as to sketch out the history of Al and its 
progress toward the goal of making machines smarter (Winston and 
Prendergast, 1984). The introduction of Al techniques to the medical field 
is then described and the various reactions to these introductions are set 
out.
1.1 The Evolution of Artificial Intelligence
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1984) suggest that the roots of Al can be traced to 
the time of Plato and Aristotle. More recently Alan Turing is generally 
regarded as the father of modern computer design - van Rijsbergen (1985, 
p. 282) says that Turing (1936) was the first to define on paper what we 
now know as a general purpose computer. The first working electronic 
computers appeared after the second world war. Subsequently, branches 
of research within Al evolved as the field matured. Dreyfus and Dreyfus
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(1988) relate the history of the field since the mid 1950s using three 
distinct historical periods as the framework for their review:
l . l i  1955-1965 Connectionism and Symbolic AT
The first period ran from 1955 until 1965, and saw two research 
directions emerging: The first of these modelled the ’hardware’ of the 
brain, simulating the interactions between neurones. This ’connectionist’ 
approach drew on neuroscience rather than philosophy. One of the 
earliest proponents was Rosenblatt. His framework was based on a 
holistic view of knowledge and the world, and the aim was to automate 
the procedures by which networks of neurones in the brain learn to 
discriminate patterns and respond to them. His efforts concentrated on 
producing a ’neural network’ device called Perceptron. The early 
successes of Perceptron led Rosenblatt on to suggest that connectionist or 
’parallel distributed processing’ (PDP) systems can have original ideas, 
generate their own abilities and learn (see Rosenblatt, 1962).
The other research approach was based on a view of a computer as a 
system for representing the world and manipulating mental symbols. 
Solving problems was the aim, as this was seen as the basis of intelligence. 
This approach grew from a rationalist tradition in philosophy based on 
the idea that manipulating symbols by rules will produce intelligent 
behaviour. The most famous workers in this branch of early Al were 
Newell and Simon who produced the General Problem Solver (GPS) 
program in 1956.
Connectionism and symbolic information processing both flourished 
initially. These approaches fell into Clark’s category of cognitive science -
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both aimed to produce systems to do human tasks, and they both aimed to 
model the psychological processes of the mind. The differences arose 
because each camp had different ideas about the nature of those human 
psychological states and processes, and how the mind works. Neural nets 
needed to do a great deal of computing in order to solve even simple 
problems, and because the available computing power was limited, it was 
only possible to speculate on their usefulness. Symbolic Al, on the other 
hand, appeared to be solving useful problems and by the early 1970s 
symbolic Al was at the forefront of research, overshadowing the 
connectionist approach (3).
However, the problems inherent in this model were soon realised: 
Human problem solving is not based on a few straightforward principles 
and rules, but is more complex and context related. Dreyfus (1972) 
suggests that symbolic Al was based on four mistaken assumptions. First, 
that biologically, the brain operates via a computer-like system of on/off 
switches, and that the mind processes information according to rules. 
Second, that all knowledge can be articulated and formulated as rules. 
Third, that the world can be analysed in terms of context-free discrete 
pieces, and finally, that background can be represented explicitly. He calls 
these assumptions the psychological, epistemological, ontological and 
metaphysical assumptions. They have survived in modern western culture 
because of a widespread adherence to rationalistic Platonic philosophy, 
that reduces all reasoning to rules and the world to atomic facts.
The question of whether humans operate according to a set of rules is a 
vexed one. Ideas in SSK suggest that the basis of human understanding 
and action is more complex than this. Predicting a rule for how a human 
will react is not possible in an open system because such a wide range of
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options are open. We can retrospectively suggest the rule that guided any 
action, but this is not necessarily be the rule that did guide it. It certainly 
is not a description of how the future performance of the same act will 
proceed. That people do follow rules is clear when they break a rule - but 
we cannot articulate those rules. Rules do not contain the rules of their 
own application, so it may be that the apparently rule breaking incident 
was the application of a new rule. The rules of human conduct cannot be 
specified in advance because human conduct proceeds according to 
mutual understandings of each other, of the world and of the context and 
circumstance of problems. This is all gained through shared social 
foundations and participation in the socialisation process. Suchman
(1987) stresses these issues, and says that "The coherence of situated 
action is tied in essential ways not to individual predispositions on 
conventional rules but to local interactions contingent on actor’s 
particular circumstances." (p. 27/28)
1.1 ii 1965-1975 The Microworld and the Real World
The second development period, 1965-1975, was characterised by 
attempts to represent the wider context and circumstances of problems 
into programs. ’Microworlds’ (eg, Winograd 1972) were centre stage. 
Microworlds are sub-sets of the real world, where everything is specified 
in advance. The idea was to move from the particulars of the microworld 
to the general level of the wider world. But this proved more difficult than 
had been anticipated. Essential aspects of the real world, against which 
human activities gain meaning, were missing from microworlds. In 
Haugeland’s terms (1985), the questions of Al were eliminated in 
microworlds, because the domains were stripped of anything requiring wit 
or understanding (p. 190).
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According to Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1988) "Cognitive simulation and 
microworlds were characterised by an attempt to avoid the problem of 
commonsense knowledge by seeing how much could be done with as little 
knowledge as possible." (p. 32). If the field was to progress from this 
juncture the problem of ’commonsense knowledge’ had to be approached. 
The base of meanings available to people has to be made available to the 
program. It was felt that this approach, rather than more rules, should 
enable the programs to approach changing situations as people do.
l.liii 1975 onwards - Commonsense and Background
During the third stage the Al workers have concerned themselves with 
the commonsense knowledge problem. ’Scripts’ (Schank and Abelson, 
1977) and ’Frames’ (Minsky, 1974) were the first developments in this 
phase. Schank and Riesbeck (1981) offer a description of these kind of 
programs: the designers were attempting to incorporate information 
about background features into the programs, using a data structure with 
various slots which represented various features and interactions of the 
everyday world. A script is filled with objects, rules for how the objects 
relate and possible actions that can be taken by objects. The relationships 
represented between the objects are stereotypical.
But human life isn’t quite like this. The scripts and frames were more 
shallow than human understandings are. Furthermore, problems of 
incorporating every eventuality into a script or frame were overwhelming. 
The researchers simply could not anticipate all possible scenes and 
scenarios in advance. Attention turned next to expert systems.
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1.2 Expert Systems
Expert systems are comparable to microworlds and scripts and frames, 
insofar as they are designed to operate in sub-sets of the world. Expert 
systems are built on the premise that heuristic searches will be more 
effective if specific knowledge about the domain is made available to the 
program. This knowledge, when held by people, is based on accessible 
information about the domain and on practical experience gained within 
the domain. The task facing the designers of expert systems, or IKBS - 
’Intelligent Knowledge Based Systems’(4), is to access the specific 
knowledge and incorporate it into programs. This job of "mining those 
jewels of information" (Feigenbaum and McCorduck, 1984) from the 
human experts, falls to knowledge engineers.
1.2i Definitions o f Expert Systems
The definition of an expert system is not universally agreed upon. Collins 
gives a broad two-part definition: An expert system is a computer 
program that is based on the knowledge of human experts and designed 
to replace those experts in social interactions (Collins 1987,1990).
Lipscombe (1990) offers further enlightenment, explaining that expert 
systems have three characteristics that distinguish them from other Al 
programs. These are:
1) Utility - they are conceived and designed to be useful to humans as 
tools.
2) Performance - they are designed to achieve high levels of practical 
performance.
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3) They are transparent, which means that their rules bases can be 
understood by people who are not computer literate.
Madsen et al (1991) give a broader definition of expert systems as 
"computer systems which can evaluate information and make decisions in 
a manner simulating a human expert." (p. 121/122) (5). Another 
definition is given by Winston and Prendergast (1984), who say that "An 
expert system is a computer program that behaves like a human expert in 
some useful ways." (p. 6).
The argument for expert systems is that computerising human knowledge 
means that the expert system programs will display reasoning based on 
knowledge which is superior to reasoning based on more formal methods, 
in three ways:
(1) Most solutions to real problems have a social rather than a 
mathematical basis,
(2) Humans reach their level of performance via knowledge, so machines 
should mimic this technique,
(3) Codifying and distributing knowledge to a wider audience is a useful 
endeavour in itself (see Lipscombe 1990, p. 41).
7.2// How Widespread are Expert Systems?
Reports of the extent of the development and deployment of expert 
systems differ greatly. Discrepancies in the literature are widespread. For 
example, in a paper in Science (1983), Duda and Shortliffe stated that 
only four expert systems were in regular use. In contrast to this Woolgar
(1988) points to the inherent optimism of reports such as that by Resnick
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et al (1982) who suggested that nearly fifty expert systems had been built. 
Buchanan (1986), a keen supporter of expert systems, reckons that about 
sixty systems had been moved from development laboratories to field 
trials and routine use by 1986. He suggested that the possibilities for Al 
are endless and that the working applications - ie, expert systems 
applications - are continually expanding.
In the next section I explain the history of Al and expert system 
applications in medicine, and describe the various reactions to these 
applications.
2. INTRODUCING COMPUTERS INTO MEDICINE
Originally, computers in medicine were treated as general information 
processing devices, useful for storage and retrieval of data. Gradually, 
suggestions that the statistical and mathematical prowess of computers 
should also be applied to the practical aspects of medicine and diagnosis 
was raised (eg. Fox and Alvey, 1983). It seems that from the 1950s some 
writers (eg. Meehl, 1954) considered statistical approaches to be superior 
to clinical judgement - procedures such as Bayesian analysis allowed 
complex decisions to be approached mathematically. Some physicians 
became interested in computers in the belief that doctors require 
assistance in some areas of clinical decision making. Using computers was 
seen as a way of improving the structure of medicine by making it fully 
formal, and of facilitating the automation of many tasks (Lipscombe, 
1990).
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2.1 The Perceived Need For Computers
In his 1970 paper, Schwartz declared that a shortage of physicians, their 
geographical maldistribution and a broad societal commitment to 
extending health care were problems that could not be remedied unless 
new approaches to health care were developed. One of these new 
approaches would inevitably be the use of computers that were integrated 
into the medical system, that could take on some of the duties of the 
physicians and other medical staff (p. 1257).
Other writers recognised that the continued growth of medical 
knowledge meant that doctors could not be expected to remember the 
sheer quantity of relationships and concepts involved in clinical medicine. 
Their performance can never be 100% accurate: de Dombal (1979) 
suggests that because people view doctors as decision makers and healers, 
expectations of doctors capabilities are usually far too high, de Dombal 
explains that doctors use heuristics, algorithms and a pay-off-versus-error 
consideration when making decisions. They acquire information, analyse 
that information and make management decisions - how well they do 
these things depends on their experience, and their ability to decide 
whether a patient is telling the truth. The doctor allocates a patient to a 
problem class and discriminates amongst the diseases in that class in 
order to make a diagnosis. This is a complicated procedure, and not all 
doctors are good at all stages: All in all, an incoherent approach is 
evident, and a need for computerised assistance for clinicians is evident. 
Many researchers in both the computing and the clinical fields believed 
that computers which could do diagnosis would be the answer to these 
problems: "When the electronic digital computer first appeared it was
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widely supposed that one of the first and easiest tasks in medicine would 
be to have the computer do diagnosis” (de Dombal, 1979, p. 37).
2.2 Early Methods Adopted
In an analysis of the history of Al in medicine, and of how machines have 
moved into the medical environment, Shortliffe, Buchanan and 
Fiegenbaum (1979) outline seven major ways in which computers have 
been used in medical problem solving: Clinical algorithms, data bank 
analysis, mathematical models of physical processes, statistical pattern 
matching techniques, Bayesian statistical approaches, decision theory 
approaches and finally symbolic reasoning approaches. Characterising this 
progression is a shift is from pure observational data to the use of high 
level symbolic knowledge - computers eventually producing judgemental 
as well as numerical advice. The last paradigm - symbolic reasoning 
techniques - uses qualitative judgements and inference techniques as well 
as statistical methods. The attention of the program is focussed on vital 
bits of the problem, by heuristics which reflect practical knowledge. This 
is believed to be superior to decision analysis because real (human) 
clinical judgement is also based on knowledge, experience and rules of 
thumb. The move toward the adoption of symbolic reasoning shows that 
early medical systems, based solely on mathematical and statistical 
techniques and branching logic and rules, were not integrated into general 
medical use on a large scale (Lipscombe, 1990). The shift to more 
qualitative techniques mirrors the developments in Al generally, where 
rule based programs were replaced by microworlds and then expert 
systems, in an effort to incorporate more background knowledge and 
understandings into programs.
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2.3 The Move To Symbolic Approaches
Gorry’s paper (1973) explains in detail why, in medical Al, the 
progression from statistical approaches to symbolic methods was made. 
He describes a statistics based computer programme designed to act as a 
consultant. The program was not designed to work in the same way as a 
human, but used mathematical techniques and decision analysis. Gorry 
explains that "Before a computer can be used to significant advantage in 
analysing diagnostic and treatment strategies, however, precise 
procedures must be formulated for the means of inference required to 
deduce the clinical state of the patient from observed signs and symptoms 
and a formalised capability must be developed for the prediction and 
assessment of possible therapeutic measures. In other words, the problem 
of performing diagnostic inference and weighting therapeutic strategies 
must be reduced to a problem of computation" (p. 46). The area of Renal 
failure was finally chosen as a suitable region in which to test this 
machine. The results were impressive, the machine duplicating the 
decisions of the experts in over 90% of the cases presented to it.
Yet Gorry was dissatisfied with the approach. He recognised that the 
trial was biased in favour of the machine, in such a way that it could 
achieve high accuracy by undertaking a ’search’ of its data base. The rigid 
disease definitions, the number of diseases and the types of tests available 
all fitted into a search technique, that was amenable to a computational 
approach. In real situations doctors avoid large searches by using 
experience-based heuristics. The machine could not deal with the 
complexity of real cases, for example where two diseases presented 
simultaneously. These cases are not as sharply defined as the ones chosen 
for the trial. These shortcomings could be rectified by minor changes to
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the program, but how many minor changes would be necessary, and how 
could the areas in which changes needed to be made, be identified? If the 
machine was to be of any practical use a major change in the direction of 
the research was necessary.
Gorry advocated a shift to systems that incorporate ’concepts* of disease 
in their programs. Concepts are defined as the central, problem-specific 
ideas in terms of which experts organise their knowledge. He recognised 
that concepts may be numerous and that each one may be based on 
assumptions of enormous knowledge about the world. However, he 
thought it unnecessary for the program to have extensive knowledge 
about the real world, because of the precise nature of medical language in 
which the knowledge of the program could be expressed. In conclusion, 
he acknowledged that there will be cases where the program will lack 
knowledge relevant to a particular clinical situation, and as such it should 
offer suggestions to the clinician, rather than make pronouncements. 
Gorry’s paper is important in advocating a shift to techniques involving 
practical knowledge of diseases.
Schwartz, Patil and Szolovits (1987) also catalogue the approaches used 
in Al in medicine since the 1970s. They explain the problems of pure rule- 
based systems and pattern matching systems, and the progression to the 
point where pathophysiologic reasoning was incorporated into programs. 
They recognise that adding this knowledge will improve the performance 
of systems, but will also increase the computational task. The way forward 
is presented as a combination of new methods of incorporating 
pathophysiologic knowledge with some of the older methods that have 
been largely discarded. Schwartz, Patil and Szolovits realised that major 
technical and intellectual problems still had to be solved before reliable
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programs would be produced. But their prediction was that by the year 
2000 a range of programs would be available that would assist physicians 
(1987, p. 687).
In the same way, Szolovits, Patil and Schwartz (1988) pointed out the 
limitations of programs that rely on mainly mathematical and statistical 
techniques. They also advocated the use of new Al type programs that, 
above all, could explain how conclusions have been reached. The authors 
saw this as critically important for the time "when expert systems become 
available for day-to-day use" (p. 85).
The early confidence in symbol manipulation procedures which 
processed discrete pieces of information according to rules gradually 
waned. It was realised that the notion of representing facts about the 
world by symbols, and the relationships between symbols by rules in order 
to produce a useful system, was ill founded. The influence of early Al 
workers like Newell and Simon decreased as the shift to symbolic 
reasoning techniques occurred. The next move was to expert systems 
which incorporated rules of thumb and pathophysiological reasoning in 
programs. Since the earliest days of expert system development the 
medical arena has been promoted as their main area of application. The 
alleged achievements of expert systems have been widely publicised - eg. 
Wright and Bourne (1988) pointed out the successes saying that "The 
most successful applications... have been in chemical and geological data 
analysis, computer system configuration, structural engineering and 
medical diagnosis." (p. 19). Similarly, Feigenbaum and McCorduck (1984) 
stated that "Expert systems have demonstrated that a computer is capable 
of the same kinds of intelligent behaviour as a physician making a 
diagnosis" (p. 32), and that "perhaps the largest single group of expert
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systems is centered in medicine." (p. 87) The medical world is a favourite 
site for expert system development and application. Knowledge engineers 
liaise with medical practitioners and encode their practical knowledge in 
medical expert systems. One of the most important issues associated with 
this process is, how much knowledge do the programs need in order to 
function appropriately?
2.4 How Much Knowledge Do Programs Need?
In the conclusion of his paper, Gorry (1973) forecast that medical 
programs would probably not need detailed knowledge of the wider 
world. This raises the question where does medicine end and the (real) 
world begin? Where should the line between the two be drawn? Can a 
computer program make decisions about specific medical abnormalities 
without a foundation of knowledge about medicine generally and the 
wider non-medical world? Can medicine, or sub-specialities within 
medicine be treated as microworlds?
2.4i The Medical Funnel
Blois (1980) discusses these issues in an illuminating paper. He utilises 
the concept of a funnel to represent the processes occurring between the 
first doctor-patient encounter and the formulation of a working diagnosis. 
The first stages in this process fall into the wide end of the funnel - 
position A. This is when the doctor first encounters the patient and the 
range of possible diagnoses is greatest. At this point the span of 
comprehension that the physician must exercise to make sense of the 
situation is very broad. Medical judgement, an acquaintance with the 
world and a grasp of commonsense issues are all required. "Clinical
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judgement counts for little unless it rests on a firm base of ordinary 
human judgement" (p. 193), states Blois. The field of possibilities open to 
the doctor becomes progressively smaller as the patient-doctor interaction 
continues and more information becomes available. The doctor narrows 
down the range of potential disorders, and the funnel narrows to a point, 
which Blois calls point B.
Blois argues that the most demanding part of the process is at point A, 
where the range of possibilities open to the doctor is greatest, and where 
a wide range of cognitive skills are required to select relevant facts and 
narrow down the domain. When the problem has been sufficiently 
sharpened by this process, so that it lies in the narrow end of the funnel 
near region B, different skills are needed to complete the diagnosis. 
Expert knowledge or a mere calculation may do the trick and finish the 
job.
Blois suggests that all medical tasks can be performed using judgement 
and some can be performed using computation. The parts which can be 
done by computation are at point B in the funnel. This is where 
computers will perform well. But the performance of computers decreases 
toward point A, since the necessity for wider cognitive prowess increases 
as the width of the funnel increases. In summary, Blois says that "a great 
deal of human information processing must take place before the job is 
turned over to the computer" (1980, p. 194). If a computer were to be 
utilised at the beginning of the process the programmer would have to 
find a way of representing a whole wider world of possibilities, which is 
not at present a feasible proposition. The nature of the situations 
encountered at point A where the whole world has to be confronted is
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different to the situation at point B where the human structuring of the 
problem has already taken place.
2.4ii Misunderstanding Diagnosis
Presumably, Gorry, in saying that the program need have little 
knowledge of the wider world is arguing the feasibility of computers that 
can perform near point B. This is not a full performance of the process of 
diagnosis, but is merely the performance of a small part of that overall 
task. As Blois pointed out (1986) "Making a diagnosis and designing or 
running a diagnostic program are different kinds of things" (p. 225). Blois 
(1986) also explains how the term ’diagnosis’ has been misunderstood by 
the developers of early diagnostic programs. The common view is of 
diagnosis as a single cognitive act, comprised of making a selection 
between clear cut alternatives. Indeed, in some instances it can be this 
simple. However, physicians use the term to refer to other different 
processes - diagnosis may mean the process of distinguishing between 
classes of disease, it may be the initial starting point for symptomatic 
treatment, or it may be the abstract process of choosing a disease that 
best fits the individual disease attributes identified. Diagnosis can be 
highly complex, whereas diagnostic programs perform limited tasks. Blois 
stressed that "In the case of diagnosis and diagnostic programs I would 
suggest that a far too simplistic view of what physicians mean by diagnosis 
has been taken, and that some of the programs developed have been 
carried out on models of diagnosis which are overly simple" (p. 227). As a 
result, most early programs were written on the assumption that the 
program will be able to perform the whole job, and that the physician has 
little to contribute to the diagnostic process (6).
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In a reply to Blois’s article, Fogel (1980) pin-points two other areas in 
which he says a doctor’s conduct is beyond that which a computer can 
reproduce: assessing non-verbal communication cues, and assessing the 
effect of human relations between the doctor and the patient, on the 
patient’s presentation. Both areas demand the use of cognitive skills 
beyond the medical field, and hence lie nearer point A  than point B in 
Blois’ diagram. Barnett (1982) makes a similar point. He suggests that the 
greatest weakness of computer technology in medicine is that computers 
do not have the capacities of wisdom and understanding that a doctor has, 
which arise from an understanding and experience of everyday human 
existence - point A type faculties.
Blois displays a healthy awareness of the problems associated with the 
use of computers in clinical medicine. He continuously attempts to 
demarcate the tasks that computers can reliably be left to do, and apart 
from separating judgemental tasks from computational tasks, he 
distinguishes between low level descriptions consisting of mostly 
arithmetic terms, and high level descriptions involving clinical concepts 
and issues. He maintains that low level descriptions are more readily 
computerised than high level descriptions (1983,1988). He presents 
science as divided into vertical levels - the disciplines nearest the bottom 
of the hierarchy are most amenable to simplistic mathematical 
description, whereas medicine, which is at the top of the hierarchy is less 
amenable to simple description because multiple levels of association and 
cross-hierarchical explanations at various scientific levels are involved. He 
does not envisage complex clinical concepts as suitable for a 
computational approach because they cross so many hierarchical 
boundaries. As an example he cited the DENDRAL system (eg. see 
Buchanan, 1986) which he said, worked well in trials because it functions
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in a low level domain - molecular chemistry - and works directly on low 
level ’hard' science data input. On the other hand INTERNIST (eg. see 
Miller et al, 1986) relies on the physician acting as interpreter between 
high level input data of a complex nature - smells and observations for 
example, and the input to the machine. Blois is not completely pessimistic 
about the value of computers in medicine and recognises the potential for 
computers to assist physicians in some areas of medicine (7).
The evolution of AI in medical settings and the appearance of expert 
systems has produced a wide range of reactions in the literature. These 
are summarised in section 3, and the necessity for an investigation to 
clarify the current state of play is then justified.
3. REACTIONS TO THESE DEVELOPMENTS
In 1970 Schwartz’s comments epitomised the expectancy of the era when 
he stated that "Computing science will probably exert its major effects [in 
medicine] by augmenting and, in some cases, largely replacing the 
intellectual functions of the physician" (p. 1257).
Schwartz cited the use of computers for ECG analysis and patient history 
taking as successful examples of the type of things computers could 
achieve. According to Schwartz’s analysis, computers would render 
doctors redundant in two ways - firstly by actively taking over traditional 
physician tasks. He went so far as to suggest that intricate jobs such as 
anaesthesia administration could in principle be handed over to a 
computer. Secondly, computers would enable less skilled paramedical 
staff to perform new tasks and thus encroach into the domain of the 
doctor. Paramedics would be guided by the computer, the in-built
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instructions ensuring that these less qualified staff did not exceed their 
capabilities. Physicians would thus be free to concentrate on the ’uniquely 
human’ aspects of their jobs.
Maxmen (1976) takes the same stance, saying "I advocate and predict 
that in the 21st century doctors will be rendered obsolete by the 
collaboration between the computer and a new breed of health care 
professionals - the m edic... I maintain that the emergence of a post 
physician era will be feasible, desirable and inevitable." (p. viii). He goes 
on to explain the role of the medic: "Under this system computers would 
render most of the technical diagnostic and treatment decisions currently 
being made by physicians, while medics, a hitherto unknown type of 
health care professional, would provide the supportive and some of the 
technical tasks currently being performed by doctors." (p. 7). The upshot 
of these predictions would be that "Because a medic-computer symbiosis 
would usurp all of the tasks presently assigned to physicians, doctors 
would be rendered obsolete." (p. 7).
In the 1970s, Schwartz and Maxmen’s ideas represented those at one end 
of the spectrum - the optimist’s end. They saw computers taking over all 
manner of tasks as they moved into medicine in earnest.
Schwartz concentrated on the probable effects of introducing diagnostic 
computers: Problems would arise if computers were used to appraise 
doctors, or if computers became too advanced for junior staff to use. 
Centralisation of knowledge in programs could damage the market place 
of medical ideas, programmers may adopt an autocratic role and the 
emphasis in medical education would alter. Nowhere in his paper does 
Schwartz discuss the feasibility of computers doing diagnosis and other
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human tasks. It is taken for granted that such an advance is possible, and 
the revolution in health care technology is taken as given. Using 
computers is presented as an inevitable step. The concept of some 
processes in medicine being unsuitable for a computational approach is 
not discussed. Only the problems of incorrect programming and system 
breakdown due to power failure are mentioned. Schwartz's opinion at 
that time was that 'The power of the information sciences is such that it 
will, without doubt alter the face of medicine and we can ill afford to 
ignore this impending reality" (p. 1263/4). A revolution was pending, the 
full effects of which would materialise by the end of the century.
In 1987, more than a decade after his first prediction, Maxmen reiterated 
his claim that the post physician era was inevitable (Maxmen, 1987, p. 
109).
3.1 Optimism gives wav to Pessimism
By 1987, though, Schwartz, in collaboration with two colleagues, seemed 
to be wavering: Szolovits, Patil and Schwartz (1988) were aware that 
systems which were designed to simulate expert reasoning had not led to 
clinically useful programs. These authors still expressed confidence, 
suggesting that programs would eventually develop into more than 
diagnostic implements, and be used to plan therapy. But despondency was 
in the air - Schwartz, Patil and Szolovits said in 1987 "After hearing for 
several decades that computers will soon be able to assist with difficult 
diagnoses, the practising physician may well wonder why the revolution 
has not occurred... few, if any, programs currently have active roles as 
consultants to physicians" (p. 685). They recognised that "it has become 
increasingly apparent that major intellectual and technical problems must
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be solved before we can produce truly reliable consulting programs" (p. 
687). By the late 1980s, the early optimism seemed had given way to a 
barely concealed pessimism.
Van Der Lei, (1991) adds further weight to this pessimism: 'There is no 
evidence that the capabilities of computers will ever approach those of 
human beings in dealing with unexpected circumstances, in understanding 
patients in their social context, in integrating the often complex and 
confounding presentation of a disease into a coherent pattern, or in 
dealing with ethical issues." (p. 1508).
The initial expectancy did evaporate and the confident prediction that a 
"revolution" was imminent seemed to dematerialise. Potthoff et al (1988) 
went as far as to say that "The speculation that computers can replace the 
reasoning of skilled physicians in the foreseeable future is obviously 
highly unrealistic." (p. 125) It became clear that "The optimistic 
expectation of 20 years ago that computer technology would also come to 
play an important part in clinical decisions has not been realized, and 
there are few if any situations in which computers are being routinely 
used to assist in either medical diagnosis or the choice of therapy" 
(Barnett, 1982, p 493).
3.2 Renewed Interest
However, since the late 1980s, interest in research and development into 
the use of computers in medicine has not declined in the way that this 
pessimism would suggest. In 1987, the Index Medicus listed 41 entries 
under the heading ’Expert Systems’. This increased to 93 entries in 1989, 
104 entries in 1990,101 in 1991 and 104 entries under this heading in
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1992. Interest in the field is still running high. In 1992 the Milroy Lecture, 
delivered to the Royal College of Physicians of London, was based on the 
usefulness of computerised decision analysis in medicine. The authors, 
Lilford and Thornton, suggest that decision analysis is "the most 
threatening [development of formal logic in medicine] as it seeks to 
replace, or at least augment, clinical judgement by means of a formal 
model." (p. 401). They conclude that there is space for decision analysis in 
medicine, in devising treatment policy, in research in medical ethics and 
in deciding how to distribute scarce resources. Thornton, Lilford and 
Johnson (1992) also promote the use of decision analysis in medicine. 
They implicitly suggest that some parts of medicine are amenable to 
representation in a computer program.
It is clear that manufacturers, computer scientists and some medical 
professionals are still interested in developing computerised machines for 
use in various areas of medicine. The failures of the past two decades, 
together with the apparent dearth of systems in clinical settings has not 
dampened this enthusiasm. The Index Medicus list of Expert Systems for 
the first five months of 1993 includes papers on expert systems that are 
designed to diagnose focal bone lesions, epileptic discharges and 
cutaneous melanoma. Also listed are papers dealing with the use of 
expert systems for the prediction of protein localisations sites in 
eukaryotic cells, for use in optometry and histopathology, for teaching 
nursing diagnosis and many papers on expert system evaluation. With 
interest running high, and research and development continuing, this field 
remains an exciting area for investigation. My interest is in machines 
which perform tasks that previously fell in the human domain, and which 
do the job in ways that are useful in that particular medical context (8).
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3.3 What Is Medicine’?
There are obviously problems associated with the notion of machines to 
do human jobs in medicine. These can be reduced to different beliefs 
about the specific nature of medical knowledge: Is medicine a series of 
inter-related ’facts’ that are context free? Or is it affected by external (to 
medicine) influences, and by circumstances and patient-specific factors?
Is medicine a collection of discrete indisputable facts or is it a social 
practice?
Opinion is divided. Engelhardt (1974), takes the latter view, concluding 
that "there are no simple, pure facts in medicine, but that all facts appear 
in and are influenced by contexts of expectation and value." (p 225) SSK 
would argue that medicine is a social practice, just as science is. Maxmen 
clearly see things differently. His belief in the imminent replacement of 
the physician grows from a view of medicine as completely formalisable 
and programmable.
3.4 Clarifying the Confusion
The field is characterised by confusion and conflicting claims: The SSK 
view of knowledge is challenged by computers that appear to do medical 
tasks. The computers have no grounding in medical socialisation. The 
designers have attempted to ’microworld-off bits of medicine as required. 
Does this strategy work? The problems of adapting socially gained 
medical knowledge into computerisable format cannot have escaped the 
attention of the designers and the users of these devices. How do they 
deal with these problems? This practical study of the current situation is 
designed to clarify the evident confusion.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2
1. Both are aimed at computer simulation of human cognitive capacities. 
For weak AI the value of the computer is as a tool for the study of the 
mind. In strong AI the computer is not only a tool for studying the mind, 
but it is also considered to have cognitive states - if a computer is given 
the correct program that describes mental processes, then thought will be 
caused. Searle concentrated on the problems of strong AI, accepting the 
aims of weak AI. Although this acceptance of the notion of using an 
artefact to illuminate the features of cognition is puzzling: Would the 
supporters of this view argue that building a paper flying device 
illuminates the mechanisms of flying? Does a flying paper plane tell us 
anything about the intricacies of a humming bird’s abilities to fly, hover 
and land? Or does a model of a bridge tell us how that bridge is likely to 
behave in practice? The recent experience of the bay bridge in San 
Fransisco, as well as the inaccuracies of many weather forecasts suggests 
that this kind of ’scale model’ approach is flawed.
2. For technological AI, the aim is to build machines that simulate the 
input and output profile of a person doing a task. For those working in 
this field within AI there is no intention to model the mind, only to mirror 
human performance. For psychological AI, or cognitive science, the aim is 
again to get a machine to do a human task and to do it in a way that 
models human performance. The aim is to build a model of psychological 
states or processes - a model of the mind.
3. How the ’debate’ about which research program should continue was 
’closed’ is an interesting story. Lipscombe (1990) discusses this episode 
and suggests that connectionism was sabotaged by Minsky and Papert - 
two researchers from the opposite camp - in their book ’Perceptrons’ 
(1969). Olazaran (1991) also examines this closure episode. He suggests 
that events were more complex, and that Rosenblatt’s own book (1962) 
pointed out the problems of the connectionist approach, seven years 
before Minsky and Papert. So he was largely responsible for the lack of 
enthusiasm for his own branch of research.
4. Both names, expert systems and intelligent knowledge based systems, 
are misleading. ’Expert system’ implies expert level performance.
Whether this is achieved remains to be seen. The term expert system also 
exacerbates the computer’s ’placebo power’ (Wyatt, 1991), which can 
encourage inexperienced doctors to invest too much confidence in the 
advice of the ’expert’ computer. TKBS’ on the other hand, suggests a level 
of performance equitable with ’intelligent’ human performance. 
Intelligence is an ill-defined concept, to be treated with caution.
5. It is not entirely clear whether Madsen means that the outcome 
simulates a human’s outcome, or whether the computer method of 
producing the outcome simulates the methods used by a human.
6. In a similar vein, Paul Atkinson pointed out how popular public 
perception of diagnosis is fundamentally flawed. It is often assumed to be 
an individual act, a decision made by one expert qualified to decide. 
Research shows that diagnosis is very much an interactive process, 
involving consultations between experts within medicine. The outcome is 
often the product of informed discussion between several participants. 
(Personal conversation, July 1992)
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7. Blois was involved in the development of the RECONSIDER project 
(See Blois et al, 1981). This was a computer program designed for use as 
a diagnostic aid rather than a diagnostic program. Its purpose was to list 
all diseases that a physician should think of given a particular list of 
clinical findings. It was not designed for making specific, full-scale, 
accurate diagnoses.
8. In view of this Winston and Prendergast’s definition of an expert system 
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CHAPTER 3 ■ COMPUTERISATION AND DESKILLLING?
1. INTRODUCTION
What are the likely effects of the introduction of computers into the work 
place? Will they prompt the development of a workforce with new skills - 
programmers and fault finders? Or will a dissatisfied, displaced and 
deskilled pool of workers emerge? The deskilling debate is vital: If 
deskilling is inevitable, is the use of machines advisable? If ’tacit’ skill 
(Polanyi, 1962) is a barrier to automation how do we explain computer 
achievements to date? In this chapter Braverman’s theory is presented as 
the seminal work in the ’deskilling’ camp. In contrast to this, recent work 
which highlights ’tacit’ skill is set out. Finally, various attempts to explain 
the extent to which computers can replace humans are summarised.
1.1 The ’Deskilling* Theory
Braverman (1974) argues that the driving force behind technological 
change is the capitalist search for increased profit, production and 
control. Capitalism tightens control over workers by increasing 
mechanisation and the automation of production, thus removing their 
skill and initiative. Crucial to the deskilling theory is the increased 
’rationalisation’ of the labour process. Taylor first presented this idea 
(1947) in the Scientific Management Thesis. There are two aims to this 
thesis - first, deskill job content by fragmenting tasks into simple 
operations with guide-lines for the quickest mode of operation, and 
second, concentrate conception and planning of tasks in the hands of 
management. Separating conception from execution in this way gives 
management a monopoly of the ’brain work’ and denies workers control.
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The rationalisation and control that Braverman described reflect Taylor’s 
vision.
Most of Braverman’s ideas have been criticised: his description of the 
working class (1); his simplistic account of the implementation of 
scientific management (2); his suggestion that deskilling causes a 
’proletarianisation’ of the workforce (3) and his definitions of skilled and 
unskilled work (4).
2. CONTEMPORARY CRITICISMS OF BRAVERMAN
More recently, empirical studies, mostly within industrial sociology, have 
offered new ways of looking at the concept of ’skill’. These contemporary 
contributions to the deskilling debate concentrate on types and 
distribution of skill at the workplace and the notion of a tacit dimension 
to skill.
2.1 The Distribution of Skill
Jones (1990) challenges Braverman’s view that computers will replace 
skilled human workers and cause an overall deskilling of the workforce. 
He points to the influence of trade union tactics which can interrupt the 
introduction of automation, and he draws attention to the uneven 
distribution of skills amongst workers: A programmer has different levels 
of skill and knowledge to a machinist, yet both are essential for the 
introduction and smooth running of computers. In Jones’s case study "the 
programmer had to ensure that every single instruction to cover the most 
minute occurrence had been written into the program" (Jones, 1990, p. 6). 
To do this effectively, programmers consult with machinists. This
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cooperation is vital during programming, and when practical malfunctions 
have to be rectified. The different kinds of skilled workers remain 
essential even in highly automated factories.
2.2 Separating Conception and Execution
Separating conception from execution to isolate all the ’brain work’ is a 
fundamental part of Braverman’s theory. Jones tackles this, drawing 
attention to the ’brain work’ required by all workers as they plan for and 
perform their jobs. He suggests that no jobs require zero conceptual 
abilities - manual jobs demand a multitude of small conceptual decisions, 
whilst conceptual or intellectual jobs demand a knowledge of manual 
abilities. Jones’s analysis implies that treating execution tasks as 
computerisable, because they require no conceptual ability, is misguided. 
This is not the place to draw a line separating the tasks that computers 
can do from those that they cannot do.
2.3 Tacit Knowledge
Jones (1983) explains the tacit knowledge concept: Acquiring knowledge 
inevitably requires learning by doing. Learning through speech or 
instruction is insufficient as it ignores aspects which are not articulated by 
practitioners. This is the tacit knowledge aspect. Because tacit knowledge 
cannot be articulated it cannot be prospectively formulated into rules. 
Since computers work using articulated rules of human conduct, it follows 
that computers will not have access to tacit knowledge and will not display 
tacit skills. Here Jones is drawing on the work of Polanyi (1962) who 
introduced the term ’tacit knowledge’. Collins (1985) says that tacit 
knowledge is what we know by virtue of our participation in a form of life
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(p. 77). Again, it is clear that computers are excluded from gaining tacit 
knowledge because they do not participate in our form of life. Automated 
factories are based on "A view of knowledge in which all human thought 
and action can be logically described in a formalized language, and in 
which all conceivable activities are predictable” (Gullers, 1988, p. 37). 
This ignores the tacit dimension and inarticulable skills of people.
Jones’s work shows that workers and the tacit skills they hold are 
indispensable in a well run workplace. The ’unacknowledged tinkerings’ 
and the minor modifications at the point of production are essential if the 
cognitive disjunctures between programmers and manual workers are to 
be smoothed. Braverman did not recognise that the cooperation of 
workers, whose jobs are supposedly automated, is essential at the 
workplace.
2.4 Working Knowledge. Practical knowledge. Knowledge of familiarity 
and Propositional knowledge
Other writers have referred to the ’tacit’ dimension using different terms: 
Kusterer (1978) studied two groups of workers - machinists in a paper 
cone factory and bank clerks. He suggests that there is no such thing as an 
’unskilled’ job. He identifies ’working knowledge’, which is divided into
(1) basic working knowledge - exercised constantly with no conscious 
effort, and (2) supplementary working knowledge - used periodically and 
consciously applied to unexpected problems. Kusterer says that ”what 
managers, social scientists, and even many workers themselves do not 
realise is the extent of supplementary knowledge that is also necessary"
(p. 45/6). Supplementary working knowledge is the know-how, 
judgement, and responsibility that is a necessary ’hidden extra’, required
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occasionally. To avoid mistakes in these jobs, "it is not enough to simply 
know the rules and procedures" (p. 85) - supplementary working 
knowledge is also essential. Kusterer concludes that successful production 
"depends firmly on the know-how of workers and on their willingness to 
use that know-how to guide their collective work" (p. 188). Only people 
amass supplementary working knowledge - it is not accessible to 
computers. This fits in with Jones's assertion (1983) that "the primary 
element of craft skill which has always been largely tacit knowledge can 
never be completely absorbed into a formal system of representation, 
instruction and control" (p. 9).
Kusterer’s division hinges on the idea that basic working knowledge 
requires no conscious effort, whereas supplementary knowledge requires 
conscious thought and effort. The implication is that using basic working 
knowledge does not require ’know how’ or skill, and is easier to 
mechanise (5).
Noble (1984) pursues a similar point. He discusses the difficulties of 
transforming activities into machine-readable terms: He says that 
anticipating every possible variation in tools, machines, machine 
performance or conditions cannot be done prospectively. "Of course" he 
says, "such contingencies are routinely dealt with by machinists and 
machine operators relying upon their skills and accumulated experience 
with just such challenges" (p. 344). This is a reference to tacit skill, which 
is evident in all jobs (6).
Gullers (1988) explores the same issues. He describes skill as a 
combination of practical knowledge, knowledge of familiarity and 
propositional knowledge. Propositional knowledge is the type available in
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books. On its own such knowledge is impotent. For understanding to 
arise, it must be combined with practical knowledge and knowledge of 
familiarity. Knowledge of familiarity is like tacit knowledge - it cannot be 
articulated and absorbed into a system accessible to computers. Goranzon 
(1988) follows the same framework in his discussion.
All of these analyses of human activity suggest that a component exists 
which cannot be described verbally. This component arises from 
experience, know-how and practice. The essential point is that this aspect 
of skill is involved in the execution of all jobs. Braverman’s theory is that 
the practical part of all human tasks can be stripped of all skill as the task 
is divided into many small constituent parts, and conception is separated 
from execution. Separating conception and execution so that ’skilled’ and 
’unskilled’ categories emerge is problematic if tacit skill is acknowledged.
2.5 Removing the Tacit Dimension
However, Rolfe (1990) makes an interesting point. She states that "jobs 
involving judgement and decision making are less compatible with 
computerisation, and jobs which involve processing large batches of 
similar information are more adaptable to computerised techniques and 
deskilling" (p. 109). It seems that for tasks involving judgement and 
decision making, the tacit component is vital, whereas for tasks such as 
’processing large batches of similar information’, the tacit dimension is 
less important. To a certain extent it can be ’formalised out’ without loss 
to the performance of the task. However, because tacit knowledge is so 
important for most jobs, the range of tasks that computers can accomplish 
is small, and so "important gaps remain between the potential of [flexible 
manufacturing systems] and their operational reality" (Jones, 1989, p. 49).
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Rolfe (1986) presents the same idea: In this study she concluded that 
insurance underwriting clerks were deskilled by technology and their 
numbers were reduced by two thirds, whereas senior underwriters were 
not replaced by machines. Rolfe maintains that the lower level clerks 
were deskilled by computerisation. But it is important to note that 
standardisation of the tasks and a new division of labour between lower 
level clerks and senior underwriters, occurred prior to the 
computerisation. Lower level clerks were assigned only routine policies, 
and a manager at the firm stated that ’zombies’ could do this work, as it is 
’merely a process’. Senior underwriters, on the other hand, dealt with 
more complex unusual cases. The different jobs were organised into these 
categories prior to automation. Clearly "The two processes of 
standardisation and computerisation are not separate; in order to achieve 
maximum efficiency, standardisation of the process is required" (Rolfe, 
1986, p. 43). So the low level clerks were not deskilled by computerisation 
- their jobs were reorganised so that the tacit knowledge was no longer 
essential, and could largely be ’organised out’. This rendered the job 
suitable for automation. The reorganisation came prior to the 
automation.
Rolfe also studied Ordnance Survey draughters. Here she did not detect 
deskilling, or replacement of workers by computers. The nature of the job 
meant that tacit skills could not be ’organised-out’ by a restructuring of 
the task. The draughting procedures were not amenable to total 
standardisation, and thus defied computerisation.
It emerges from this that the potential for computerisation of any task is 
a function of our ability to restructure and regiment it to such an extent
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that the tacit requirements can be removed without substantial loss to the 
performance of the task.
3. BACK TO BRAVERMAN
Braverman says deskilling occurs as technology advances and 
computerisation increases. But this discussion suggests that because 
computers and automatic machines have no access to tacit skill they are 
ill-equiped to take over many human jobs. Only in cases where work is 
already organised in a routine, predictable way so that the tacit skill has 
been removed, can a machine can be expected to perform the task 
adequately. An important point is that such tasks are uncommon, and this 
is why such things as workerless factories are rare. When a task is 
structured in a suitable way, a machine can be programmed to mimic the 
human performing the task. This idea has been explored by Collins (1990) 
in his attempt to set out what computers can and cannot do, whilst other 
theorists have looked for different ways of explaining the issue:
4. DIFFERENT WAYS OF EXPLAINING WHAT COMPUTERS CAN 
AND CANNOT DO
4.1 Drevfus and The Knowledge Barrier
Dreyfus (1972) describes four types of human activity. The first two types 
can be described exhaustively, and are independent of situational 
influences. The third category is an extension of this, and incorporates 
self-contained problems independent of external context. Type 3 
problems are of a greater magnitude, and although fully describable in 
theory, they are not so in practice - an often cited example is the game of
60
chess. Dreyfus expected to see good progress in the computer simulation 
of areas one and two, and some advances in reproducing category three 
activities, because they are all ’formal’ activities. Area four is of a 
different order. It covers all activities which are dependent on the 
situation and context in which they occur for their meaning. Area four 
covers ’informal’ activity and is not suitable for computation. The barrier 
between the formal and the informal is the stumbling block for 
computers. Collins (1990) referred to this divide as the ’Knowledge 
Barrier’.
4.2 The Development of Human Expertise
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) offer a variation on this theme. Computers 
should not be applied to tasks demanding expertise. They present 
expertise as the product of a 5-stage process (see also Dreyfus 1987, 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1984) - novice, advanced beginner, competent 
performer, proficient performer and expert. The model can be summed 
up as follows: "The novice and advanced beginner exercise no judgement, 
the competent performer judges by means of conscious deliberation, and 
those who are proficient or expert make judgements based upon their 
prior concrete experiences in a manner that defies explanation" (p. 36). 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus suggest that machines cannot function like experts 
because they lack involvement, holistic understanding, expertise and 
intuition. If this theory is to fit in with Dreyfus’s ’4 kinds of activity’ model, 
expert performance must be a level 4, informal activity, dependent on 
situation and context. Computers should be limited to tasks requiring 
’calculation’ and excluded from tasks involving ’judgement’ (7).
61
4.3 Limited Domains
Winograd and Flores (1986) suggest that building an account of human 
cognition in a computer program is only possible in areas where the 
background of the domain in question can be fully articulated (p. 75). 
They see some areas as well circumscribed, and some domains ’limited’ 
enough for programs to be effective (8). Winograd and Flores see 
computerisation as possible within these limited domains which are thus 
fully specifiable. Computers would flounder if applied to wider world 
tasks where context and background factors are essential parts of the 
problem.
4.4 Collins and Types of Human Action
Collins (1990) rejects Dreyfus’s knowledge barrier, insisting that dividing 
the world into formal and informal tasks does not explain achievements 
that computers have already made in the ’formal’ sphere. The knowledge 
barrier makes formal tasks look too easy, and if a knowledge barrier did 
exist it would be continually moving. Collins maintains that all activity is 
social, shaped by social interaction and language; SSK has shown how 
social influences affect all aspects of the world, including science and 
mathematics (which would lie on the formal side of the barrier). How a 
computer can be successful in any area of human activity needs to be 
explained. Collins’s position is that there is only one type of knowledge in 
the world, and any apparent division is made by us as we deal with the 
knowledge. The paradox of isolated, unsocialised computers that 
somehow perform well amongst people operating within a form of life is 
what Collins tries to explain.
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Collins begins with the distinction between action and behaviour. Acts 
are guided by intentions, behaviour is unintentional (Searle, 1984).
Collins extends ’behaviour’ to include the physical counterpart of an 
action. His example is a wink and a blink. A wink is an action guided by 
the intention to, say, indicate friendship. A blink by contrast is an 
involuntary movement of the eyelid - not an action at all, merely a bit of 
behaviour. His extension of the term behaviour means that the physical 
part of the action of winking (the blink-like movement of the eyelid) is 
also a behaviour. The behavioral counterpart of a wink is the same as a 
blink. Collins explains that
"(1) the same piece of behaviour may represent many different acts.
(2) the same act may be executed or (to use computer jargon) 
’'instantiated" by many different behaviours." (1990, p. 32)
People sometimes choose to carry out an action in the same way every 
time. They forego the option to instantiate it with any number of different 
behaviours. Collins terms this category of action ’behaviour-specific 
action’ as opposed to the usual kind of variable action which he calls 
’regular action’ He explains that "Behaviour-specific acts are acts that 
humans always try to instantiate with the same behaviour." (p. 33). An 
example is the conduct of assembly line workers abiding by Taylorist 
guide-lines on the best way to perform a specific operation. Observers 
cannot tell the difference between real action and behaviour because the 
visible behaviour is the same each time.
Behaviour-specific acts can be fully described according to rules which 
capture the behavioural coordinates of that act. These rules will then 
apply to all future performances of the particular behaviour-specific
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action under consideration. This is where behaviour-specific acts differ 
from regular acts. When humans engage in regular action a set of rules 
guiding the action can be formulated after the event, but these rules do 
not work as predictors of how the same act will be carried out in the 
future - the range of instantiation options open is too broad. Behaviour- 
specific acts are special because people have chosen to ignore the wide 
range of instantiation options. However, a behaviour-specific act is still an 
act, because at any time the person involved could choose to execute it 
with a different behaviour. The crucial point is that programming a 
computer with the coordinates that reproduce this repetitive behaviour- 
specific response is sufficient for that computer to reproduce the 
behaviour-specific action.
Collins points out that behaviour-specific action does not come easily to 
people, but takes practice. But even when people fail in their attempts, 
the behaviour-specific acts remain behaviour-specific because the essence 
of a behaviour-specific act is the intention to perform in a behaviour- 
specific way.
Collins applies his theory of behaviour-specific action to some of the 
mental acts we carry out. In just the same way as for physical acts, it is the 
mental aspect of behaviour-specific acts that machines are able to carry 
out.
Jones (1990) distinguishes between behaviour-specific acts and 
encultured actions which are comprehensible only within a form of life. 
Just like tacit skill, encultured action cannot be captured in a set of rules: 
’’the quality which determines whether a skill can be automated is whether 
it is already machine-like [ie, behaviour specific]; that is having the
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repetitive character of an algorithm. Encultured actions on the other hand 
do not have this character because the decisions and rules that make 
them up are only knowable by induction form the culture of a society or 
social group". (1990, p. 15)
To summarise: Machines can reproduce behaviour-specific actions. They 
cannot reproduce regular action that does not proceed according to a set 
of instructions. Collins is careful to emphasise the point that "The 
possibility of mimicking an act mechanically depends not on whether the 
rules of performance are interpreted self-consciously, but on whether the 
act has the potential to be performed in a behaviour-specific way." (p. 
217). Behaviour-specific action and regular human action can both be 
executed self-consciously or unself-consciously. The self-conscious/unself­
conscious distinction is subservient to the regular action/behaviour- 
specific action distinction.
5. REASSESSING ’DESKILLING*
In essence, Braverman’s deskilling account is based on the notion that 
automation rests on a separation of conception and execution, a division 
of tasks into skilled and unskilled, and the subsequent deskilling of the 
workforce. However, the identification of tacit elements of knowledge 
and skill suggest that execution is not devoid of skill. Separating 
conception from execution is problematic because of the tacit dimension. 
It seems that the potential for automation of a task depends on our ability 
to reorganise it so that the tacit component is removed and it can be 
performed in a regimented or behaviour-specific manner. Rather than 
deskilling occurring because of automation, automation can only proceed 
if we deskill our performance first (9).
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Some concern has been voiced about the treatment of human 
intelligence as something we can pour into a machine. Weizenbaum 
(1976) discourages this view of intelligence as a static, unalterable, 
culturally independent attribute, which can even be measured objectively 
by such things as IQ tests. He suggests we view intelligence as a multi­
faceted phenomenon that manifests itself in different ways relative to 
specific social and cultural conditions. Intelligence is not quantifiable or 
measurable on a linear scale, and debates about intelligence are sterile. In 
view of this he says there are good practical and philosophical reasons for 
moving on to empirical investigations into what computers are achieving.
One of the objectives of this research is to produce this kind of empirical 
work. A practical investigation of what is being achieved by computerised 
automatic machines is more important then whether they are ’intelligent’. 
If computers are acceptable to the people using them, it does not matter 
whether or not they are intelligent. Weizenbaum’s other concern, that the 
debate should be conducted in terms of what computers ’ought’ to be 
doing is less relevant - computers are already installed in various medical 
environments, and we cannot now indulge in debates about whether they 
ought to be there.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 3
1. Heather Rolfe (1990) suggests that his stance is too objective because 
his description of working class consciousness reflects only the conditions 
imposed by capital. The working class is presented as passive - merely a 
class in itself, rather than a class for itself. As a result Braverman ignores 
the possibility of individual or collective worker resistance to deskilling, 
either at the point of production or at the societal level. The capitalist 
class, by contrast, is presented as homogenous and unified in its 
objectives. Rolfe suggests that neither of these class descriptions is broad 
enough.
2. Braverman implicitly accepts that Taylorism is easily installed and 
widely used as the most effective means of instigating managerial control. 
But is the logic of Taylorism really the same as the logic of capitalism? 
Taylorism is aimed at increasing control. Capitalism is aimed at profit 
rather than directly at control, and it does not necessarily follow that 
management will sacrifice profit in favour of gaining control.
3. Proletarianisation implies that previously the workers were something 
other than proletarian. Braverman is using the craftworker as his 
benchmark for a skilled worker. But is this notion of an autonomus 
artisan, overly-romantic? Cooley (1988) suggests that some writers 
"believe that before the industrial revolution the populace spent its time 
dancing around maypoles in unspoilt meadows and writing sonnets in its 
spare time. It was never like that" (p. 127). Similarly with Braverman’s 
image of the craft worker. It was never like that, at least not for most 
workers, who were already proletarian, manual, domestic or farm 
workers.
4. Defining ’skilled’ work and ’deskilling’ is difficult. Rolfe (1990) shows 
that indirect measures of skill based on length of training and education 
are misleading. So too are direct measures of skill which use coordination 
of physical ana mental operations in each task. Linking skill to control as 
Braverman did is also problematic. He implied that reducing workers 
control over their jobs and separating conception from execution meant 
that workers were deskilled. But some workers with little control can be 
highly skilled.
5. This is where Kusterer’s analysis differs from Jones’s. Jones’s 
suggestion is that all tasks require tacit skill, and that skilled performance 
is often executed unselfconsciously. This would seem to be the case with 
highly skilled sports professionals participating in fast games. Squash 
players, for example, react less on the basis of conscious thought and 
more on the basis of unconscious reactions, perfected by hours of 
practice. Distinguishing between tasks that are unconsciously or 
consciously performed is drawing the line in the wrong place as far as the 
potential for automation is concerned.
6. A colourful passage in Noble’s book (1984), which is a long extract 
from an interview with a machinist shows how subtle and invisible the 
’tacit’ skills of the craftsman really are (p. 344-346).
7. Dreyfus and Dreyfus acknowledge that the designers of the 
RECONSIDER system (see chapter 2, and Blois et al, 1981) were on the 
’right track’. The role of this machine was assistant to the doctor, and it 
was not designed to perform ’expert’ level tasks.
67
8. Recognising specific infections and interpreting electrocardiograms are 
two areas in the medical field in which Winograd and Flores predicted 
successful computer application, because these areas are ’limited 
domains’.
9. Not all commentators are interested in this particular issue of computer 
capability. Eg, Weizenbaum (1976) takes a moral stance on the question 
of computer capability, suggesting that explorations of what a computer 
will be able to achieve, and what the limitations may be, are misguided. 
More concern should be directed toward the issue of what computers 
should be allowed to do. The question he pursued was, "What human 
objectives and purposes may not be appropriately delegated to 
computers" (p. 207). He was not concerned with the belief in AI circles 
that there are no tasks that cannot in principle be handed over to a 
computer. Neither was he interested in theoretical debates to the 
contrary. Rather, he makes the point that "Ultimately, a line dividing 
human and machine intelligence must be drawn" (p. 8), and where this 
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CHAPTER 4 - WHAT IS MISSING FROM THE CURRENT 
LITERATURE?
1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter the major points and problems raised in chapters 1,2 and 
3 are summarised, the direction of the empirical research is set out and 
the specific questions that the research will address are presented.
1.1 The Medical Form Of Life
As doctors, nurses and paramedics undergo training they absorb the 
norms of the medical society and become part of the social collectivity 
and form of life of the hospital. SSK applies as much to medicine as it 
does to science - medicine is shot through with social influences - 
diagnosing, treating and rehabilitating patients are all social processes. 
The influences on the way that medicine is performed are wide ranging - 
physician skill, availability of facilities, contacts in the field can all affect 
the treatment process. In the case of each patient, the equipment, the 
location, the disease, its presentation, degree of severity and history, as 
well as the patient’s circumstances and social situation all play a part. 
Doing medicine is a process that overlaps with being in the (wider) world. 
Supporters of AI suggest that these kinds of wider world details can be 
made explicit and formalised. For example, Slezak (1992), in his response 
to Collins’s 1990 book, supports the notion of all-encompassing 
formalisation (1). Designers of computers for the performance of medical 
staff jobs treat all the symptoms and signs of diseases as formalisable and 
all the physician strategies as specifiable. Clearly these positions are at
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odds with those taken by Sociologists of Scientific Knowledge. Looking at 
medical applications focuses the wider questions facing SSK to a specific 
form of life.
1.2 SSK. AI. Deskilling and Medicine
Working computers pose a problem for sociologists of scientific 
knowledge and for industrial sociologists. For SSK the problem is, if 
knowledge is gained through socialisation in the human collectivity, how 
can AI claim to put that human knowledge into an unsocialised machine? 
The problem for industrial sociologists is, if tacit skill is inarticulable, 
unspecifiable and necessary for the execution of most tasks, how can AI 
claim to be able to mechanise so much of what we do?
1.3 Explanations
1.3i Behaviour-Specific Action. Digitization and Repair
The theory of behaviour-specific action (chapter 3) is Collins’s answer to 
these questions. But Collins goes further than this in order to explain how 
machines fit into society. There are several strands to this argument: 
Collins suggests that very often machines that don’t really work look like 
machines that do work because the gaps between a machine’s 
performance and a person’s performance are filled in by people. We 
contribute to the machine’s level of acceptance by showing benevolence 
and smoothing over the machine’s mistakes. This human contribution 
occurs at both ends of any process that is automated. At the beginning, we 
contribute by providing the machine with an input it can deal with. Collins
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terms this ’digitization’. At the end, we take the machine’s output and we 
make it fit into the real world. This he terms ’repair’.
The concepts of digitization and repair are central to Collins’s thesis: He 
explains that digitization is a means of dividing things up into pre­
specified, exhaustive categories. No in-between categories are allowed. 
Within each category a degree of variation is tolerated by us, so, for 
example, we all accept every kind of letter Z  as fitting into the Z  category. 
The invariance of the Z  category is preserved as we learn to tolerate the 
variations within the category. When Collins suggests that we digitize the 
input to a machine he means that we fit the ambiguities of the world into 
specified categories that correspond with the program of the machine. 
Digitization turns the concerted action visible in the world into pre­
specified exhaustive categories of concerted behaviour. Computers can 
work in digitized worlds because the digitization process removes context 
related factors. Digitization is a social activity. It is not inherent in the 
stuff in the world and neither are the categories. Both the categories and 
the digitization are achieved by us.
The repair which occurs at the other end of the automation process is 
really digitization in reverse: When the unambiguous, concerted 
behaviour type of response of the machine is produced, we ’repair’ it, 
converting its concerted behaviour output into something that looks like 
concerted action, which humans in the world relate to and respond to.
In effect, the machine is sandwiched between layers of human 
involvement in the process of automation. The human, by displaying 
charity to the artefact allows it to become an acceptable part of the world 
of regular human action, even though it only performs behaviour-specific
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action. These ideas assign great importance to the role of humans and far 
less to the machines. Humans are responsible for structuring action and 
digitizing the world. Behaviour-specific action, charity, digitization and 
repair are Collins’s explanation of how machines that have not been 
socialised and do not participate in our form of life, become acceptable as 
pseudo members of society. Collins’s view is based on the form of life and 
socialisation argument, and his ideas about skill and expertise are based 
on shared foundations and shared understandings (2). However, problems 
with the theory of behaviour-specific action have been identified: Slezak 
(1992) suggests that the theory is weak because Collins fails to specify in 
advance of any analysis what exactly in the world of human activity is 
behaviour-specific action and what is regular action. If the theory is to be 
used to look at what machines are doing, this distinction should be made 
at the outset. This is the only way of determining whether a computer has 
crossed the dividing line, mimicked a human engaged in regular action 
and jeopardised the theory. However, the distinction between the two 
kinds of action - those which are carried out on different occasions ’in the 
same way’, and those which are carried out on different occasions ’in 
different ways’ is not straightforward. The original division between the 
two may be seen as too static. Collins and Kusch (in preparation) are 
attempting to clarify the issues and the complexity of the terms involved:
They point out that variability between successive instances of an action 
occurs in all kinds of action. We do not carry out any action identically 
each time. In cases of regular action the variability can be great because 
part of the intention behind a regular act (say of writing a love letter or 
greeting a person) is to produce a variety of instantiations. This variability 
is part of what the action means to the actor. Whereas in cases of 
behaviour-specific action, the degree of variability is less, since variability
73
is not part of the actors’ intention. A degree of variability is tolerated, and 
the actors remain indifferent to this variability - it is not part of what the 
action means to the actor. As an example, Collins and Kusch describe 
turning a door handle. This is a behaviour-specific action, yet a variety of 
acceptable instantiations exist to which the actor is indifferent. Because of 
this indifference, actors doing behaviour-specific action could limit their 
instantiations to just one method that gets the job done. The degree of 
variability that is tolerated is different for each behaviour-specific act. For 
example, more tolerance is allowed when opening doors than when 
swinging a golf club. But some variations always occur.
Close analysis of this discussion reveals two new issues: First, behaviour- 
specific action can be mimicked by a machine that reproduces any one of 
the instantiations which fall within the margin of tolerance of the actor. 
Second, deciding - by watching - whether a behaviour represents either a 
behaviour-specific act or a regular act is not possible. To make this 
distinction, it is necessary to know the intention of the actor and whether 
they are aiming for a reproduction of an earlier action. This demands a 
knowledge of the culture or form of life of the actor; with such cultural 
knowledge, assumptions about the intentions of groups within a form of 
life can sometimes be made, but making assumptions about individuals’ 
intentions is more difficult.
1.3H The Medical Funnel
Blois’ offers a slightly different explanation of the paradox of working 
computers. His medical funnel architecture is specifically designed to 
explain the kinds of tasks that automated medical devices can perform. 
Blois (1980) uses the funnel to represent the time from the first doctor-
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patient encounter to the formulation of a working diagnostic hypothesis 
(see chapter 2). The wide end of the funnel - point A - is the time of the 
first interaction, when the range of possible diagnoses is very broad, and 
the doctor uses a variety of clinical and wider world skill to approach the 
problem. Blois maintains that computers are not useful for this kind of 
task. Point B - the narrow end of the funnel - is reached when the 
problem has been narrowed down to specific details and where 
diagnosing the case requires the application of highly specialized medical 
knowledge, or a specific computation. At the narrow end of the funnel the 
problem has been reduced to a microworld format. No reference to the 
wider world, the context or to patient specific factors is necessary at this 
stage. Computers can be employed at this juncture because the problem 
has been sharpened to one that can be approached using a rule-based 
(behaviour-specific) strategy.
However, if computers are used at this stage, their output and their 
recommendations remain microworld-type recommendations. Until the 
output is assessed in the light of the particular patient under investigation, 
and analysed in the light of wider considerations, it makes little sense in 
the context of medical practice.
This is where I suggest an extension to Blois’s theory: The funnel 
architecture needs to be modified to a Venturi’ shape. The bottom half of 
the structure then represents the ’unsimplifying’ of the microworld- 
produced results into courses of action that make sense in the wider 
world. This new shape is shown in figure 4.1









The wider world of medicine, where regular action is used
Figure 4.1 - The 'Venturi’ architecture
Position C is reached when the decisions produced by the computer in 
the microworld of region B have been interpreted by a member of the 
medically qualified staff. At position C the influence of patient-specific 
and environmental influences have been introduced. Position C is where 
medical decisions join the wider world - it is like position A.
These two approaches to explaining what computers can do both 
emphasize the role of the human, and reflect a world influenced by 
human social activity. This fits in with the SSK promotion of the influence 
of social factors on all activity. On this basis, these two theories inform 
much of the analysis of the fieldwork which follows in section 2.
Is the selection of machines in medicine an appropriate arena for this 
investigation? There is confusion, both about the extent to which 
computers are used in medical environments, and the reasons behind the 
(apparently) low level of implementation:
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1.4 Computers in Medicine - Opinion Divided
In the 1970s, Schwartz (1970) and de Dombal (1979) offered reasons why 
physicians need computerised help with their work. These reasons apply 
equally well today, and the field still thrives (3). Reports of the production 
of expert systems appear in the clinical decision making literature at the 
rate of one every month (Taylor, 1990). So what is the state of play in 
practice? Is the approach of SSK or of AI taking precedence? In the 
medical literature, opinions differ widely about the impending or existing 
impact of computers in practice. To summarise:
In 1979 Szolovits and Pauker claimed that "over the next two decades, 
computers will undoubtedly play an important role in the practice of 
medicine." (p. 1224). Maxmen’s predictions of a ’post physician era’ (see 
chapter 2) are even more optimistic.
However, other observers see things in a different light. Although 
medicine is a fertile field for research, the number of working systems 
does not suggest great success: Rector (1984) draws attention to this 
paradox, pointing out the rarity of systems in use. Ostberg (1988) puts his 
views more forcefully, stating that "There is obviously a serious gap 
between claims and reality of expert system applications" (p. 175). 
Sorgaard (1991) also discusses the disparity between the many apparently 
successful expert system prototypes and the low number of expert systems 
in actual use. Kingsland (1986) suggests that only three AI systems were 
in clinical use in 1986. Yet he makes the prediction that genuinely useful 
systems will be produced in the next decade.
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Bearing in mind the research that is under way and the quantity of 
systems being developed (see the Index Medicus list), why are so few 
systems apparently failing to progress to the in-use stage? Are the 
problems of a philosophical and technological nature, tied up with the 
difficulties of assigning human knowledge to machines? Or are there 
more subtle social problems at the point of application of the new 
technologies? Is objection from medical staff in situ at the root of the 
apparent failure to install and run working systems?
1.4i A  Human Problem?
Some writers suggest that the barrier to computer implementation is a 
human one: Taylor (1990) discusses new medical technology, stating that 
"the obstacles to its implementation in the real world of clinical practice 
are still human ones rather than the limits of technology." (p. 139). 
Maxmen (1987) sees the problem as one of user resistance, and Potthoff 
et al (1988) point out that "developers are more generally enthusiastic 
than prospective users and affected parties who ... only show a limited 
optimism" (p. 132). A more recent analysis by Anderson (1992) takes the 
same line, suggesting that the problem is a human one. He considered the 
attempt to install computerised diagnostics at the Royal Melbourne 
hospital. He argues that the social organisation of the hospital, the 
dominant culture of traditional diagnosticians and their control over the 
grammar of diagnosis made computerised diagnosis institutionally 
unacceptable. The clinical scientists and computer experts who advocated 
a change to computerisation could not secure it, because they were the 
weaker group in the culture.
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1.4H Or a Philosophical and Technological Problem?
Other writers have emphasized different types of problems, more 
philosophical or technological in nature: Sutton (1989a, 1989b) stresses 
that the difficulties facing machines are more to do with their lack of deep 
knowledge which underlies all surgical procedures. It is this lack of 
knowledge that prevents machines from performing at an acceptable level 
(p. 85). Similarly, Van Der Lei (1991) sees technological and 
philosophical problems facing designers who hope to enable machines to 
face unexpected circumstances in medicine. Pelosi and Lewis (1989) see 
problems for designers who believe that machines can intrude into the 
area of patient interviewing. Machines do not have the ability to 
undertake interviews in the clinical setting because they cannot be given 
the depth of understanding of the situation that is necessary - another 
philosophical problem. The system introduced by de Dombal at Leeds 
(1972) is reported to have achieved a 91% accuracy in initial trials (1972). 
But in 1989 when it was reassessed in a wider geographical setting it 
achieved only 42-57% accuracy. This also suggests that the technology is 
at fault - the machine cannot cope with a broader base of patients. It 
detracts from the argument that human user resistance is the only 
problem.
The philosophical and technological problems seem to hinge on the idea 
that "in much of medicine there is no consensus that defines proper 
therapy." (Van Der Lei, 1991, p. 1507). So it is difficult to achieve 
consensus about what to program. Although Engelhardt (1974) was not 
engaged in this particular debate, his statement that there are no pure 
and simple facts in medicine adds weight to these arguing from the 
philosophical, technological limits position. Whether the problems facing
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AI in medicine are of this nature, or are more to do with human 
resistance is unclear. Forsythe (1992) offers an interesting conclusion: She 
says that users are often blamed for rejecting medical expert systems. But 
their rejection arises because the systems are built, designed and 
evaluated with scant attention to users’ views or the nature of the setting 
in which the users work. (p. 95) Her analysis shifts the blame for rejection, 
from the users to the designers.
Beyond this another debatable point arises - where is the best place to 
use computers if and when they are suitably programmed?
lA iii Where to Use Computers?
Opinions are divided about where in medicine computers would be best 
deployed. Some writers suggest that computers may be able to assist 
where "the problem is well bounded, which is computer talk to describe a 
problem for which large amounts of specialised knowledge may be 
needed, but not knowledge of the general world." (Nii, 1984, p. 111). A 
computer would not face unexpected circumstances if the problem were 
well bounded. Neither would it need to be equipped with knowledge of 
the wider world. By confining the computer to this kind of ’microworld’ 
environment - the middle section of the venturi - the major mechanical 
problems are avoided.
Feigenbaum and McCorduck (1984) support this notion. They draw an 
analogy with apprentices in craftwork who are soon made aware that 
exceptions to rules are as numerous as the rules, and that what they have 
to do is get to grips with the spirit of the rule. Expert systems, they 
acknowledge, cannot yet manage this, and they are thus better suited to
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problems that are well bounded, as Nii suggested. In these cases, applying 
rules is more important than understanding the spirit of the rule.
However, Feigenbaum and McCorduck also suggest that "Expert systems 
work particularly well when the thinking is mostly reasoning, not 
calculating - and that means most of the world’s work." (p. 87) Can expert 
systems be best suited to problems that are well bounded and at the same 
time work particularly well at ’most of the world’s work’? Does ’most of 
the world’s work’ occur in well bounded domains?
There is a further problem with Nii’s suggestion: How many well 
bounded domains exist in medicine? We come back to the question 
’where does medicine end and the real world begin?’ If Blois is correct, by 
the time the problem has been reduced to one that is well bounded, 
requiring only medical knowledge, the human involved has already done a 
great deal of work sorting out the real world influences. Whether an 
expert system to finish off the job would be required or welcomed is then 
doubtful.
The alternative view is put forward by Madsen (1991), an opthalmologist. 
He suggests that there are problems involved in designing expert systems - 
such as deciding how much extra world knowledge to give the machines.
In the light of such problems he believes that "The first patient care ESs 
[expert systems] to be used in optometry will be expert consultant systems 
for complex and/or unusual patient problems." (p. 120). The complex and 
unusual patient problems occur infrequently and when they do occur, the 
doctor may become engaged in solving a problem that she has not seen 
before. Solving this kind of problem requires a departure from run of the 
mill procedures, and the use of alternative strategies. This kind of 
problem solving does not take place within a microworld. Rather, it takes
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place at the boundary between medicine and the wider world. Capturing 
this kind of knowledge in an expert system forces the knowledge engineer 
to consider all the problems of representing wider world knowledge as 
well as more specific medical knowledge (4).
1.5 The Research Questions
Can machines be expected to intrude into all areas of medicine by small 
incremental steps? Or will the designers face problems? Most research in 
this area is theoretical - few researchers have considered the issue of 
computerisation in a real hospital setting from a practical point of view. 
An exception is Anderson’s study (1992). His view was from a 
doctors/insiders standpoint. However, there is a major flaw in his study. 
By accepting that the computer was suitable to do the job it was designed 
for, he failed to look closely enough at how well the computer performed 
in practice. Anderson accepts the results of a clinical trial which suggested 
the computer achieved a ’success rate’ of 69%, compared with physicians 
who achieved 42%. Anderson ignores the social influences at work in the 
interpretation of the trial result: In the trial, doctors were asked to make a 
diagnosis on information about patients they had neither seen nor 
examined. This is not what doctors usually do. Having accepted the study, 
Anderson was able to attribute the machine’s failure to the ’power 
balance’ within the hospital, and the possibility of the machine being 
unacceptable for other reasons was not investigated fully. Acceptability 
and competence of the machines has to be given more attention than was 
allowed by Anderson, and a grasp of the machine’s performance in the 
practical setting is vital. If it does not do what the staff require and expect, 
it will not fit into the social group. Then, several alternative explanations 
to that offered by Anderson may emerge as reasons for the rejection of
82
the new technology. Wyatt (1991) makes a similar mistake to Anderson. 
He suggests that "as with drugs, controlled clinical trials are the only way 
to assess their [decision aid’s] impact on doctors and patients” (p. 1434). 
On the contrary - clinical trials are not the only means of assessing the 
impact of computers on staff and patients. Investigating the performance, 
acceptability and ’fit’ of the systems in practice is another method. Yu et 
al (1979) recognise this point precisely. In their paper describing trials of 
the MYCIN system, they state that "The [trial] data demonstrate the 
program’s reliability. However, further investigations in a clinical 
environment are warranted. Questions concerning the program’s 
acceptability to practising physicians, its impact on patient care ... remain 
to be answered." (p. 1282)
Many questions remain unasked and unanswered. Deployment of 
medical systems has been less widespread than was initially forecast. 
However, there are enough systems in use to make this project necessary 
and feasible. The study reported here considers the role of staff dealing 
with computers and shows how well current machines fit into the social 
groups that they are a part of. The acceptability of the devices to the 
social group is of major importance in this research. Throughout the 
fieldwork the concepts of charity, digitization and repair are assessed as 
methods of fitting machines into the world of concerted action. The study 
considers the issue of where best to use medical computers. Are they best 
employed to perform behaviour-specific action or the ’bounded tasks’ Nii 
suggests, within microworld situations? Do medical staff need help in 
microworld type domains? Or are machines more likely to take on 
difficult tasks and unusual medical cases that demand wider knowledge 
and reasoning? My adaptation of Blois’s funnel is used to approach these
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questions. Can any behaviour-specific acts be identified, can any 
microworld tasks be isolated? How are microworlds created?
At present, no designers are attempting to make a mechanised general 
all-round physician - all systems are designed to operate within 
specialities. As such, all the systems are, to a greater or lesser degree, 
operating in a microworld within medicine. Is this in itself a feasible 
starting point? Specialised doctors (such as cardiologists, 
gastroenterologists or diabetologists, etc) recognise that consultation with 
colleagues from other specialities is often essential because very few 
patients fall squarely into one speciality. Are the designers making their 
first error by assuming that a system for, say dyspepsia (a condition falling 
in the gastroenterology speciality), can be developed without branching 
out into other areas of medicine? If there are problems associated with 
the introduction of machines, do they arise from philosophical or 
technical limitations, or are they more to do with human objections to 
new technology?
The research presented here was conceived and carried out in order to 
approach these questions from a practical perspective. The cases selected 
are machines in use in medical settings.
2. METHODOLOGY
The major factor influencing the methodological choice for this research 
was the necessity to look at developments from an insider’s point of view. 
This is the best means of assessing the practical performance of the 
machines and their position regarding the social group and the social 
setting. Berger (1963) pointed out that "Sociology is not a practice, but an
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attempt to understand." (p. 15). I was concerned with gaining an 
understanding of the processes and actions occurring within the chosen 
field.
Debates about methodological choice, suitability and reliability are wide 
ranging but ultimately inconclusive. Here I will outline the rationale 
behind my choice and the advantages and disadvantages of that choice for 
this research.
2.1 Choice of Method
In 1984, Collins described participant comprehension as one type of 
participant observation. The essence of participant comprehension is 
maximum interaction with the members of the group under scrutiny. The 
aim is to become a ’native* member, overcome initial incompetences and 
gradually internalise the way of life of the group members. Socialisation 
into the form of life is necessary. Ideally, native competence is achieved as 
the researcher becomes accepted as a member of the group. The result is 
that the researcher’s (or member’s) own perceptions of the situation are 
as valid as those of any other member. The researcher is able to 
understand accounts offered by other members, and to formulate her own 
accounts.
Participant comprehension is the method that lies easiest with a view of 
human interaction in which perceptions, categorisations and rules are 
taken for granted within a social group. These things cannot be described, 
but are held in common by each individual within a form of life.
Becoming a native of that form of life is the only means of accessing these 
taken for granted essentials.
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There are difficulties associated with doing participant comprehension 
and gaining native competence. These difficulties can be to do with being 
a full time sociologist and finding the time to devote to pursuing native 
competence in another field. Other difficulties are to do with having 
competences that are acceptable within a group of sociologists, but 
untypical of the group under scrutiny. Beyond this, sociologists are 
outsiders unless they choose to investigate another group of sociologists. 
It is also difficult to know if or when native competence has been 
achieved. Finally, transferring perceptions gained as a native into terms 
acceptable to non-natives and other sociologists is a major hurdle.
Collins positions ideal participant comprehension at the end of a 
continuum of participant observation. At the other end of the continuum 
is unobtrusive observation. Any deviation from ideal participant 
comprehension will place the researcher somewhere else on the 
continuum. Any position is justifiable, provided the choices and 
compromises made are explained.
2.2 Participant Comprehension in this research
Gaining native competence in medical settings involves two processes: 
Gaining a general understanding of the medical form of life. By this, I 
mean knowing how to behave, dress and speak within any medical setting. 
This includes understanding procedures such as sterility in operating 
theatres, what to touch and where to stand. It also means grasping the 
hierarchical nature of staff grades, and taking on board the various 
degrees of deference shown to different members of staff. This type of
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competence allows the sociologist to blend into the hospital setting, and 
appear to know exactly what she is doing.
The other type of competence depends on the specific department in 
which the research is being conducted. If a cardiology department is the 
host, a knowledge of basic cardiac procedures and terminology will assist 
in achieving competence. Similarly, in a diabetic clinic a knowledge of 
blood sugar levels is needed, and for investigations in a gastroenterology 
department it is advisable to know an endoscope from a colonoscope. 
These more specific competences are less essential than the general 
competences outlined above.
I was especially well placed regarding native competence: I have wide 
experience of working in many NHS hospitals and a private clinic. I am 
more at ease in NHS settings (eg, see Hartland, 1990a), and undertook all 
the British case studies in NHS hospitals. My experience provided ready 
made native competence at the general level. I attempted to acquire 
specific competences relevant to each department as I proceeded through 
the empirical work. The extent of these specific native competences 
varied with each case study. It was greatest in the studies of the 
interpretive electrocardiograph machine and the automatic blood 
pressure measuring machine. It was rapidly gained in the gastroenterology 
department - this was largely due to the patience of the nurses and the 
senior registrar in the department who devoted much of his time to 
assisting me. Long explanations were also provided by a close friend, also 
a senior registrar in gastroenterology. Gaining specific competences in the 
area of jaundice diagnosis was more difficult, and in Utah, time 
constraints were the major problem. But in all the studies, my general 
level of familiarity with the medical world was invaluable.
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2.3 Compromises Made
The ideals of participant comprehension were fulfilled in many respects. 
Most of the compromises I made were to do with time constraints, as it 
can be impossible to achieve native competence in a short time - it often 
occurs towards the end of the research (Halfpenny, 1979). When I could 
not achieve full participant comprehension and native competence, 
extended taped conversations were undertaken. These offer an 
approximation of native understanding, provided background research 
and investigations are completed beforehand. Adequate preparation is 
essential if the researcher is to present herself as an interested and 
knowledgeable contributor to the interactions. This is the only way to gain 
useful insights. It becomes clear when native understandings and 
frameworks have been internalised by the researcher, as she becomes 
able to distinguish between truth and lies on the one hand and jokes on 
the other. This is the case in ideal participant comprehension and during 
taped conversations.
The logistics of the fieldwork varied slightly in each case. This is shown in 
the fieldwork reports in section 2. In each case I undertook as much 
participation as possible, and supplemented this with conversations and 
interviews, observation and discussion.
Converting my native understandings into accounts acceptable to 
sociologists and lay people has been attempted by using colourful 
illustrations and notable quotations gathered during the fieldwork, to 
make my points. My examples have not been chosen randomly, but in a 
way best suited to conveying the understandings I gained within the
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medical form of life. To critics who feel that presenting selected 
quotations constitutes a bias in the report, I make the following 
suggestion: My findings are replicable by anyone with the time and 
motivation to undertake similar participatory studies. They must, 
however, be prepared to develop the same native competences as I did, 
before making any comparisons with my results.
The next section of the thesis presents the five major case studies. My 
writing has involved some retrospective rearrangement of events so that 
each study is presented in the same way. The structure of these empirical 
chapters will be as follows: A brief explanation of medical terms and 
procedures relevant to each study is presented in order to familiarises the 
reader and clarify the background issues. A description of the machine 
and its purpose is then given. Following this, the empirical findings are 
presented in relation to the issues for investigation and the unasked 
questions outlined above. To summarise, these issues are: How well do 
various machines ’fit’ into the medical social setting? What is the role of 
the skilled human workers, and how relevant are the notions of 
digitization and repair? Where best does each machine fit into medicine, 
where in Blois’s funnel does it work best? Is it only reproducing 
behaviour-specific action? Is the machine hindered because it is not 
designed to cross speciality boundaries? These preliminary observations 
will be drawn together in the summary chapter (chapter 10) where an 
attempt will be made to decide whether the barrier to the adoption of AI 
in medicine is a technological and philosophical one, or a human one.
The results of the study will add to the literature covering skills, 
automation of skills, deskilling, AI and SSK. The findings will fill the 
practical gap in the theoretical literature on AI in medicine. The optimum
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areas in which computers should be applied in medicine and the kinds of 
jobs they can do best will be discussed. The conclusions about the extent 
to which medical tasks can be computerised should inform the AI debate 
at a wider level.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 4
1. Slezak uses the example of cookbook recipes. These, he says are not 
fully explicit and neglect a myriad of explicit details. But, he says, "these 
[details] could, nevertheless, be made explicit." (p. 188).
2. Collins clashes with Dreyfus on many of the issues here. Although both 
adhere to the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, the two authors hold 
different views about how socially constructed the world is. Dreyfus 
(1992) argues that if a domain has a structure that we can formalise, then 
a computer will be able to perform within that domain. If we do not know 
the structure of the domain, we will not be able to represent the structure 
in a computer, and computers will not succeed in that domain. The 
structure of a domain is a matter of how the world is; it is not something 
we influence. Collins disputes this. Furthermore, in their discussion of the 
acquisition of expertise (see chapter 3) Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) 
dismiss the notion of a computer performing at expert level because of 
the intuitive, holistic methods employed by people making decisions at 
this level. Collins suggests that the Dreyfus brothers’ description of 
expertise ignores the social and collective nature of expertise which is 
gamed through socialisation in a form of life.
3. The graph in figure 4.2 shows what has happened to the number of
Eublications in the area of ’Good Old Fashioned AI’, (which is defined ere by Evans (1993) as expert systems and knowledge based systems). 
The number of papers increased steadily up until 1990 and then 
maintained a stable rate. Evans presents this as evidence of the high level 
of research activity in the areas of expert systems and knowledge based 
systems. The major area of application of these kinds of systems is the 
medical field, so it seems reasonable to suggest that the activity in the 
medical expert system field is still running high.
4. There are two problems involved in suggesting that expert systems will 
work best at complex, unusual problems: The first problem is that the 
relevant unusual problem has to be included in the database, which is less 
likely the more rare the case is. The second problem is that if unusual 
cases are included in the database they may be offered as diagnoses far 
too often. (See chapter 5 for a more detailed explanation of this point 
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CHAPTER 5 - THE GLASGOW DYSPEPSIA SYSTEM 
(GLADYS)
1. BACKGROUND. PROCEDURES AND MEDICAL TERMS
This case study involves investigations into a computer designed to 
engage in a consultation with a dyspeptic patient, analyse the patient’s 
symptoms and produce a list of possible diagnoses and a management 
strategy. Dyspepsia is "the general term for any symptoms concerning the 
alimentary tract, notably recurring or persistant pain or discomfort of the 
abdomen." (D H  publication, 1990, p. 8). The Concise Oxford dictionary 
defines dyspepsia as "indigestion". A  more infomative definition can be 
found in the Dorlands Pocket Medical Dictionary which states that 
dyspepsia is "Impairment of the power or function of digestion; usually 
applied to epigastric discomfort after meals" (22 edition).
Dyspepsia is a very common complaint - between 4 and 5 % of all 
patients presenting at GP surgeries give dyspepsia as their reason for 
attendance. Of these 3 million patients, 10% - or 300,000 patients - are 
referred to the hospital Gastroenterology (GI) services for diagnosis and 
further investigation. Of those referred, 40-50% are eventually found to 
have a non-organic basis to their dyspepsia (Dunwoodie, 1987). One of 
the reasons for these unnecessary referrals is the danger associated with 
under-diagnosis: Since the underlying cause of the symptoms can be 
straightforward, or in some cases can be serious ulcers or carcinomas 
(Crean et al 1982), GPs often take a ’better safe than sorry’ approach, in 
order not to miss any serious problems. It has been suggested that 
"diagnosing the patient that presents with dyspesptic symptoms can be 
difficult, time-consuming and expensive. The causes of dyspepsia are
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many and may overlap, definitive signs are few, and the path to accurate 
diagnosis is beset with potential pitfalls." (Smith Kline and French 
laboratories publication, 1988, p. 1). It is not a condition dismissed lightly 
by GPs.
In hospital GI clinics invasive tests such as endoscopy and barium meal 
followed by an X ray are used to determine the cause of the symptoms. 
But prior to these tests doctors should embark on a vigorous history 
taking that covers the occurrence and severity of the patient’s symptoms. 
This is essential because the one characteristic that unites all dyspepsia 
cases is that the symptomatic history is of great importance (Knill-Jones, 
Dunwoodie and Crean, 1985, p. 204). Knill-Jones stresses this point, 
stating that "Symptoms are most important in the diagnosis and 
management of patients with Gastro intestinal disorders, in particular for 
those who present with symptoms falling under the broad heading of 
"dyspepsia."" (1986, p. 216). The best source of symptomatic information 
is the patients themselves. But the easy availability of test facilities can 
lead physicians away from the tedious and time-consuming task of 
accurate history taking and symptom analysis. Requesting a variety of 
tests is much quicker and easier than extracting a history and it has been 
suggested that this route is often ignored - that doctors do not appear to 
fully appreciate the value of carefully questioning their patients.
2. THE COMPUTERISED MACHINE
An objective in the era of cost cutting is to reduce unnecessary referrals 
made by GPs and thus reduce the number of unnecessary tests 
subsequently performed by hospital physicians. More rational theraputive, 
investigative and referral procedures are required (Knill-Jones, 1987),
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and one method of achieving this is by ensuring systematic and thorough 
initial history taking and symptom analysis at GP level. A computerised 
system for patient interrogation, ’GLADYS’ - the Glasgow system for 
Dyspepsia - has been designed, which extracts a symptomatic history 
directly from a dyspeptic patient. GLADYS gathers the symptoms and 
various pieces of other patient-specific data through a series of questions 
which the patient answers using a specially designed keyboard (figure 
5.1). At the end of the interrogation GLADYS produces a paper print out 
that lists the most likely diagnoses and decisions about the most 
appropriate management. It is, then, designed to perform two functions 
previously undertaken by doctors - history taking and diagnosis/treatment 
decisions. GLADYS has evolved over 20 years under the direction of 
physicians at the Glasgow Southern General Hospital and the University 













POSSIBLY NO POSSIBLY YES
Figure 5.1
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2.1 The Design of The Machine.
The GLADYS data base was compiled by a process of review of existing 
diagnosed patients. The information collected on each patient included 
interview and examination findings, endoscopy results, symptoms and 
final diagnoses. As many as 400 pieces of information on each of 1200 
patients were included in the original database. This is still being 
expanded. The information was used to calculate the weight of evidence 
that a particular symptom or finding contributes to the presence or 
absence of a disease. Before the weighting system was perfected, several 
problems had to be overcome: First the patient population had to be 
identified using an exact definition of the disease. The definition of 
dyspepsia used was "Episodic, persistant or recurrent abdominal pain or 
discomfort, or any other symptom referrable to the alimentary tract 
except rectal bleeding and jaundice as the main symptom." (Knill-Jones, 
1987). An explicit definition of each symptom also had to be used when 
compiling the data set. These two processes were designed to ensure that 
the area was well-defined and the data collected in a reasonably 
reproducible manner. For each case used, the final diagnosis had to be 
ascertained. This is an especially difficult task - some patients have more 
than one disease, and the level of certainty about the final diagnosis(es) 
can be possible, probable or certain.
Finally, the weights or scores were evaluated numerically and analysed 
according to a version of Bayes theory. Simple Bayesian analysis was not 
acceptable because it assumes independence of symptoms, which is not 
always the case in dysepsia. Instead, a process called ’logistic 
discrimination’ was used with Bayes, which allows for symptoms that are 
dependent, and does not produce overly optimistic estimates (Knill-Jones,
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1987). This mathematical approach was originally suggested by Card 
(1967) and in 1987 Dunwoodie stated that "although we seldom define 
and present evidence in this way, this is the path we follow in diagnosing" 
(p 162). McCartney (1987) also stressed the mathematical nature of the 
diagnostic process used by doctors, stating that it "bears a remarkably 
close resemblance to successive applications of Bayes theorem." (p. 1329).
The proponents of this ’weights of evidence’ approach conclude that in 
areas where a deductive formula is insufficient but where extensive data is 
available, it is the most suitable approach. It has the advantage of 
overcoming many of the problems of purely statistical techniques whilst 
providing a valid probabilitstic output. In their analysis, Spiegelhalter and 
Knill-Jones (1984) suggest that dyspepsia is a restricted domain, where a 
large quantity of data is available, so it is a suitable area for the weights of 
evidence strategy.
Dyspepsia diagnosis was chosen for computerisation because it is an ill- 
defined area with overlapping causes, and because there are few 
definitive signs, and a wide range of diseases are possible (Dunwoodie 
1987, Knill-Jones, Dunwoodie and Crean 1985). The DTI (1990), and 
Crean (1988), suggest that GLADYS’S greatest utility is achieved in 
difficult cases or cases where a number of diagnoses are possible.
GLADYS’S printout offers a list of diagnoses, attaching a level of 
probability to each of these. GLADYS also selects one of these diagnoses 
as the ’top management decision’. This does not necessarily correspond to 
the diagnosis with the highest probability, but the top management 
decision is the diagnosis that the computer considers to be in need of
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most urgent attention. A sample GLADYS print out is shown in figure 5.2 
(p. 133/134).
It is claimed in the DTI document that a majority of patients prefer the 
machine to a normal consultation - they can spend 30 minutes with the 
computer as opposed to 6 or 7 minutes with a doctor. It is also suggested 
that patients are franker when dealing with the machine (1). Smith Kline 
and French (1988) state that patients respond well to GLADYS, and 
Dunwoodie (1987) specified that 82% had a favourable attitude to the 
machine, with 40% of patients preferring it to a doctor. The fieldwork will 
show how useful these figures are.
‘ Four levels at which GLADYS can be described as ’in use’ are set out by 
the DTI authors:
Level 1, as a means of gathering more information for the data base.
Level 2, being used in parallel with a specialist for development and 
improvement of design.
Level 3, in trial, which involves using it in operational form with an 
awareness that it is not fully proven.
Level 4, Used in its fully operational form without additional specialist 
assessment.
GLADYS is being used in Glasgow at levels 1, 2 and 3. Two other 
outpatient departments and a GPs surgery in Scotland are using it at level 
three. Beyond this, eight other UK hospitals are using it on a trial basis 
(level 3). One of these hospitals is in South Wales where the fieldwork for 
this study was conducted. GLADYS has been used in the outpatient 
Gastroenterology clinic at this hospital for about 18 months.
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3. THE FIELDWORK
The fieldwork developed into three components:
1: Interaction with the patients using the computer, and with the 
computer (with myself acting as a phoney patient) was undertaken.
2: Contact was made with doctors and nurses involved with the clinic and 
the computer.
3: The third part of the fieldwork was involvement in the comparison of 
the computer’s performance with that of the doctors. For this stage, a 
final doctor’s diagnosis is required, and comparisons with the computer 
diagnoses are made. The idea is that mistakes and anomolies will be 
sorted out by the designers and then the symptomatic weights of evidence 
of a Welsh sample incorporated into the data base. This part of the 
fieldwork raises issues more to do with the mistakes the computer makes, 
and the reasons for these mistakes.
This three part strategy was adopted to see how well GLADYS functions 
in a practical setting.
My initial approaches to the consultant gastroenterologist at Cardiff 
explained my objectives, outlined my links with the Cardiff hospital and 
my acquaintance with the procedures involved and other staff known to 
both of us. Such an informal, ’back door’ approach, mentioning previous 
experience in hospitals and other contacts, works well with medical 
professionals who are willing to by-pass bureaucratic access procedures if 
they feel that you are sufficiently familiar with the general medical form
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of life. I was invited to visit the clinic, talk to patients and staff, use the 
computer and generally take part in the clinic. My contact was to be the 
Senior Registrar on the gastroenterology firm. My level of specific 
competences and understandings of Gastroenterlogy increased as I began 
spending time in the department. I supplemented this with informal 
conversations with gastroenterologist friends and I undertook some basic 
reading.
3.1 Practical Use
GLADYS is switched on and set up by the nurses. They also explain the 
study and the procedure to the patients and generally oversee the smooth 
running of the computer in the clinic setting.
The computer requires basic information on each patient - age, hospital 
number, sex and marital status. The nurse explains how to operate the 
keyboard to input the ’yes’, ’no' and ’don’t understand’ responses, and how 
to key in responses when the computer offers a range of alternatives. The 
nurse sits in on the first few questions, then normally leaves the clinic 
room.
My first encounter with GLADYS was in a mock consultation where I 
took the role of the patient. The questions are arranged in ten sections - 
introduction, primary symptoms, pain, bowel, heartburn, nausea, appetite, 
wind, weight and general. Top level questions are asked in each section 
and if answers are confirmatory, deeper level questions are asked. 350 
questions are available, about a quarter of which are answered in each 
case. A reading age of 12-14 is assumed and the text is displayed at a 
controlled speed so as not to overwhelm the patient. My first reaction was
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that the questions were irritatingly long winded. Enquiries were made 
about family history - have your father, mother, uncle, aunt, brother,
sister, son or daughter ever h a d  o r  ? By the time the second
condition was presented, I had forgotten the list of relatives I was 
supposed to consider. There were questions about when things occured - 
before breakfast or in the morning after breakfast - what if you don’t eat 
breakfast, I wondered. Because I did not have a real complaint, my 
consultation became more and more confused as I gave incompatible and 
unsuitable responses. I then decided to look instead at real patients with 
real complaints using the machine.
The nurses seijd in a selection of patients to use the computer. Not all 
the patients were deemed ’suitable’. The staff explained that they chose 
those who appeared best able to deal with the machine - not too old and 
definitely not those appearing confused:
"We try to pick suitable patients age wise. Its questions can be very 
confusing to patients. It usually takes half an hour to an hour, it 
really depends on the patient."
The consultant had suggested the same in his invitation letter to me, when 
he said that
"the more intelligent ones deal with it in 10-15 minutes but some of 
the others need help and may take up to 40 minutes."
The nurses do not explain the difference between the possibly, probably, 
and certainly options for yes and no responses. This, it was feared, would 
confuse the average patient:
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"Possibly and probably, how do you define the difference between 
those two? We just find it totally confuses the patients and they 
don’t know which one to press"
It also took more time, and as the nurse explained,
"He [the consultant] likes four patients on here in a morning. I 
mean, we get all age groups in here, we don’t only get youngsters".
So, responses are not differentiated into probably or possibly or certainly, 
and any of the three can be selected for yes and no. The patients are left 
to use GLADYS in the knowledge that they will have a ’proper’ 
consultation with a physician afterwards.
During my observation of patients using GLADYS, two major problems 
were immediately apparent. First, the patients continually sought 
interpretation of the computer’s questions, asking me to explain: For 
example, GLADYS’S first question concerns the patient’s main symptom, 
asking them to select from a list of 6 possibilities. Typical responses to this 
request that were aimed at me were,
"Well, more than one of these are the main symptom, what shall I 
do?", or,
"The answer to this is a bit tricky, what do you think I should say?".
Most patients were anxious about misinterpreting the questions and 
turned to me for advice. When the screen showed a diagram and asked
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the patient to indicate which numbered position on the diagram their own 
pain corresponded to, one woman pointed to her middle and asked me 
where I thought it was on the diagram. It soon became clear why the 
nurse had left the room. The patients were looking for human 
intervention and assurance throughout the interrogation. One nurse 
explained that to achieve smooth running in the clinic
"The best way is when you are sitting in there to help them. But 
that’s not a nursing job."
Besides, they did not have sufficient staff on duty for this.
The second problem was that most patients wanted to expand their 
answers and felt frustrated at being confined to a ’yes’ or ’no’ response. 
One patient explained that if a doctor had asked him the question that the 
machine posed about the benefits of a particular diet, he would explain 
that
"at the start it did good, but after that it didn’t matter. But I can’t 
get that across by saying yes or no."
GLADYS requires yes or no responses; these were often not the natural 
answers for the patient. They felt unable to interact with the computer 
and the one way communication left patients feeling that they had not 
conveyed sufficient accurate information to the machine:
"It asks you questions, and it’s all black and white, yes or no"
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complained one man. I enquired whether he had conveyed all he felt to 
be relevant. He was vehement in his response:
"Oh no, definitely not. I mean a human could get more out of you. 
You could come in here on an off day and get fed up pushing these 
buttons whereas a doctor would say why are you looking that way 
today, are you OK? A machine can’t ask that."
Some patients complained that the machine failed to ask them what they 
felt to be important questions.
"It just doesn’t ask proper questions." (2)
Another woman was more distressed - she said
"It doesn’t ask you if you have had gallstones. I have had my 
gallbladder out, but it didn’t ask me that, so this interview doesn’t 
show what I am really like."
As the sessions progressed, the nurses allowed me to give the initial 
instructions to the patients. I decided to explain the relevance of the 
possibly, probably and certainly buttons to see if this would lessen 
frustration. The first patient appeared to understand my explanation and 
began the consultation. The machine asked if she ever had heartburn and 
she spoke, to herself, ’oh yes’, and pressed the ’probably yes’ key. When I 
asked her why she didn’t use ’certainly yes’, her reply was
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"Well I don’t know if it is heartburn. It’s never been diagnosed as 
heartburn, I just assumed it was, I’ve had Brufen for it. The doctor 
doesn’t tell me why he’s given me Brufen he just gives it to me."
She was sure that she had heartburn, but this had never been confirmed 
medically. As she was unable to explain this to GLADYS, she chose to 
answer in what she considered a more accurate form. Clearly the notion 
of ’probably’ is ambiguous here.
A third, related problem came to light as I talked with the patients about 
GLADYS. Many of them felt that the questions ’drove’ their responses - if 
a confirmatory response to a high level question was given, it was 
followed up with more questions on the same theme. When a woman was 
asked whether she had difficulty swallowing, she said,
"Well, I don’t have trouble swallowing but I suppose everyone gets 
food stuck and has problems sometimes, don’t they?"
She answered yes. GLADYS duly followed up on this response with a 
deeper level question on the same topic. At this point the patient became 
concerned -
"Oh no, now it is asking how long I have had this problem. I didn’t 
think that I had a problem. I really have messed it up now, I’ll be 
afraid to say yes again."
When asked if the pain was on the left, a patient said to me,
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"It is difficult, is my pain on the left? Or on the right? I think it is in 
the middle."
I suggested that if it wasn’t on the left she should say no. The next 
question followed up on this, and the patient turned to me and said,
"Are they asking about the same pain, because I get pains all over, 
every day"!
There was no way of responding with ’sometimes’ or ’occasionally’, which 
all patients expressed a desire to do. These qualifiers may have helped 
some patients give what they considered to be better answers, but many 
other patients would still not have been satisfied. They continually 
referred to the differences between this and a consultation with a real 
doctor, where they felt they could ’explain things fully’.
The use of words like ’often’ and ’discomfort’ in questions also caused 
confusion - "what exactly do they mean by this?" was a common enquiry. 
When asked about the time of onset of the problem many people are 
unsure, and unable to say whether it was six months, a year or a year and 
a half ago. One patient wanted to say that it was when Iraq invaded 
Kuwait, but this, unfortunately, was not an option. Similarly, the question 
’do you belch more than a normal person?’ caused concern:
"How am I supposed to know how much a normal person belches?"
I was asked. Patients did not feel comfortable interpreting the questions 
themselves. My interpretation, opinion or advice was sought whenever
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these problems arose. The nurse later told me that the clinics I attended 
were the quietest from the nurses* point of view. She said
"This isn’t normally how it is run, because we haven’t been 
bothered by the patients, they would normally have been coming 
out to us and asking all the time."
My presence relieved the nurses of the burden of dealing with incessant 
queries.
!
Dunwoodie’s estimate that 40% of patients prefer it to a real doctor is 
not confirmed by my experience. It is unclear whether the patients that 
' Dunwoodie is referring to were assisted by nurses when answering the 
questions. Patients are frustrated when asked to give yes or no answers 
when they would normally give a discursive verbal description. But are the 
patients’ concerns unfounded? Is GLADYS able to make useful diagnoses 
and management suggestions even though the patients are dissatisfied 
with the consultation? Does GLADYS perform in a way that is 
comparable with, and acceptable to, doctors?
i
3.2 The Comparisons Between Doctors and GLADYS
The senior registrar was in charge of the evaluation of the system and the 
comparison of GLADYS’S diagnoses with those of the physicians. The 
doctor’s initial diagnosis and final diagnosis, and the computer diagnosis 
were to be noted on an evaluation form which would eventually be 
returned to the developers (see figure 5.3, overleaf). My involvement in 
this comparison phase was intended to highlight the extent of the 
acceptability! of the system’s diagnoses and decisions, and provide an
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opportunity for the doctor to explain differences between human and 
computer decisions (3).
I paired GLADYS’S print outs with the relevant set of patient notes, I 
entered patient identification data onto the evaluation forms and sifted 
through the notes (4). As the doctor looked for the final Gastroenterology 
diagnoses, we chatted about any differences between that and 
GLADYS’S decisions. He tried to explain why the doctors in question had 
made the decisions they had, what caused any differences between that 
and GLADYS’S decision, and why the doctor was right, or in some cases, 
wrong.
These sessions were relaxed (5) and from my point of view, very 
informative. The doctor was interested in all my questions, which perhaps 
offered him a new perspective and a different way of looking at the 
information we had before us. In many cases the computer’s decision 
matched that of the doctor. However, in several of the thirty six cases the 
computer gave a different diagnosis or management decision to the 
physician. Six of these are described below:
3.2i - Case 1:
In this case, the initial decision made by the GP and the hospital doctor 
was that the patient suffered from biliary colic. Biliary colic signifies the 
presence of gallstones and the doctor explained,
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"She has got gallstones and somebody sensibly has taken her 
gallbladder out."
GLADYS’S list of diagnoses were that there was insufficient evidence 
(.7) followed by irritable bowel syndrome, or IBS (.12) and progressive 
alcohol problem (.11). Why did the computer fail to recognise this 
patient’s problem as biliary colic?
Was it because the patient was young, and biliary colic is unusual in 
young people? The doctor dismissed this:
"No, quite a lot of people in their twenties get it. It [the computer] 
has screwed up there."
He was surprised at the machine missing this diagnosis - reading her 
notes, nobody had had any difficulty with the diagnosis. The case was 
medically straightforward, and her history of one and a half years of 
episodic lower chest pain discomfort fitted the diagnosis of gallstones. 
GLADYS had placed gastric ulcer, oesophageal disease, obstructive 
bowel disease, duodenal ulcer, nervous dyspepsia, alcohol problem and 
IBS all above gallstones. Gallstones was so far down its list of suggestions 
that it had a probability value of 1313:1 against.
In an attempt to explain the error the doctor suggested that
"She may just be one of these people who has trouble - there is 
always the possibility that she put in duff answers."
I l l
In fact there was nothing about this patient to indicate computer 
illiteracy or that she may be "completely naff', as the doctor put it. The 
willingness of the doctor to put the blame on the patient rather than on 
the computer is interesting (6).
Had GLADYS produced this decision in a GP’s surgery and the GP had 
followed the advice given, the patient would have become one of the 40% 
of 'saved’ referrals. The top management decision was ’insufficient 
evidence’. The patient would still be walking around, with both her pain 
and her gallstones.
3.2ii - Case 2:
Here the doctor’s diagnosis was of oesophageal spasm. Apparently this is 
quite a rare syndrome. According to the literature (eg. Smith Kline and 
French 1988; Crean 1988; Dunwoodie 1987) it is in these unusual cases 
rather than the run of the mill cases that GLADYS will be of most use. In 
this case GLADYS’S list of diagnoses was, probable duodenal ulcer (.68)
- this was also the top management decision - IBS (.60) and organic bowel 
disease (.16). The doctor pointed out that the idea of GLADYS being of 
most use in rare cases
"assumes that the rare cases are in the data base. But usually you 
can spot something that is rare because it just doesn’t ring true."
He went on to explain that oesophageal spasm
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"is something that we come across occasionally, and mostly you are 
making a personality decision. This guy winds his oesophagus up 
and gets pain."
So in this case the physician’s diagnosis was based partly on personality 
assessment and partly on the feeling that the symptoms ’just didn’t ring 
true’.
The decisions of the GP and the hospital doctor were the same -
"Well he certainly hasn’t got a DU [duodenal ulcer]",
said the senior registrar I was working with. This patient had been given 
an X ray which showed that nothing else was wrong, so he was reassured 
and sent away. This was "Fantastically cheap" as the doctor pointed out. 
Had GLADYS’S advice been followed by a GP at the initial consultation 
phase, the possibility of a duodenal ulcer would have been investigated 
via endoscopy. The DTI estimate that this would have cost aproximately 
£150 (DTI publication, 1990, p. 10). This would have been an unnecessary 
referral to the hospital.
3.2iii - Case 3:
In this case GLADYS’S top management decision was possible organic 
bowel disease (.84). The clinic consultant had made a definite diagnosis of 
depression. This he treated successfully in so far as at her next visit the 
patient
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"has got better, she has put on one and a half kilos. And she is no 
longer reduced to tears."
Why did the machine confuse depression with organic bowel disease? 
The doctor explained
"The symptoms are very similar. A lot of depressed people have 
belly ache."
But why had the consultant involved been sure that it was not organic 
bowel disease?
"First, because he has spent such a long time looking after patients 
and also he [the consultant] is good at recognising depression and 
treating it. He is more experienced with the treatment of 
depression, one of the few clinicians - Gastroenterologists - who 
are actually brave enough to do that - he makes a positive 
diagnosis that this is depression and he treats it."
If the diagnosis of organic bowel disease had been followed up the 
patient would have undergone various unnecessary tests, and her 
depression would have remained untreated. But the doctor’s experience 
told him that this was not a physical problem and he acted accordingly.
3.2iv - Case 4:
The doctor’s initial and final diagnosis were of definite hepatitis -
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"Everybody knows that this person has got hepatitis because that’s 
what the referral letter says. What did GLADYS say... It says 
organic bowel disease, ha ha ha."
This patient had a liver disorder and was not a typical dyspeptic patient. 
But as the doctor pointed out,
"maybe having viral hepatitis gives you the symptoms that may well 
look like organic bowel disease - losing your appetite and feeling 
rotten."
How then, I asked, did he know that it was not organic bowel disease if 
the symptoms are similar to those shown in this case of hepatitis?
"Because they are due to hepatitis"
"But how do you know that?" I persisted.
"Coz feeling sick and vomiting and going yellow are all part of it, 
but this [GLADYS] isn’t designed to pick up on the going yellow."
This was the crux of the matter. The patient had a liver and jaundice 
problem and was from a domain external to dyspepsia. Part of the health 
professional’s role is to choose suitable patients from the correct domain. 
The doctor or nurse should only assign to the computer patients suffering 
from dyspepsia. The doctor looked at it slightly differently:
"Yes, but if I already know what is the matter with the patient how 
is the machine going to help me?"
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3.2v - Case 5:
Here the doctor’s decision was of recurring duodenal ulcer. GLADYS’S 
top management decision was of gastric ulcer (.24), although it suggested 
duodenal ulcer at .75. Apparently gastric ulcers and duodenal ulcers are 
difficult to distinguish between on clinical grounds and doctors often do 
not attempt it.
GLADYS recognised gastric ulcer as being more in need of urgent 
attention than duodenal ulcer, and recommended that the patient be 
referred for treatment of gastric ulcer. This would have involved various 
tests and an endoscopy at the hospital.
The doctor’s management strategy was much different: on the basis of his 
experience of the patient, knowledge of the history and perception of the 
patient’s habits, he chose an alternative course. The Senior Registrar 
explained:
"The GP said this guy had a duodenal ulcer diagnosed by a barium 
meal ten years ago and every now and then his symptoms recur, 
does he need an endoscopy? Probably not because the symptoms 
recur every now and again and he smokes and he drinks... this 
man is a plonker who drinks and smokes too much. He smokes 
fifteen fags a day and drinks aproximately a bottle of vodka a 
week, and in that situation sticking an endoscope down someone 
isn’t really going to help."
He believed that this man should have been told
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"Look you have had this problem for ten years, you don’t really 
look after yourself, you are actively making it worse. You have got 
to be kidding."
What eventually happened was that the man was managed clinically - no 
tests were done, and he was sent home.
In this case the diagnostic decision of the computer and the doctor was 
basically the same - ulcer, either gastric or duodenal. But the computer’s 
advice to refer for tests for gastric ulcer was not appropriate in the light of 
the patient’s habits and attitude. More important was to convince the 
patient that changing his lifestyle would improve his condition. Here it is 
evident that the computer may make the same diagnositic decision as the 
doctor, but this is just one stage in the overall treatment procedure. The 
management decision relies on the sensative reaction of the physician to 
other factors. The decisions made in the case of a ’well behaved patient’ 
will be different from those made in the case of a patient who breaks the 
rules of acceptable conduct. The doctor’s ability to make this kind of 
management decision is a basic medical skill.
3.2vi - Case 6:
The doctor’s initial diagnosis was peptic ulcer. The patient was treated 
with drugs and when reviewed after ten weeks, was found to have normal 
endoscopy results. The patient had not returned to the hospital during the 
following sixteen months and the assumption was that the drugs had 
worked and the problem had been resolved. GLADYS’S suggestions were 
- as the doctor described it -
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"Stop being irritated and, [also] it can’t decide."
He meant that the top management decision was ’counsel for nervous 
dyspepsia’, and ’insufficient evidence’ was top of its list of probabilities. 
This is an instance where the doctor decided on drugs and tests, whereas 
the computer advised counselling.
The reason for this difference was that the patient was a hospital 
employee. When dealing with members of staff the doctor felt that it was 
important to reassure them thoroughly - they are affected by the 
environment in which they work, and often feel that their symptoms 
signify the worst. The doctor felt that counselling would have been both 
inappropriate and insufficient - it would not have solved the medical 
problem and he did not believe that it would have settled the patient’s 
mind. But was a desire to put the patient at ease the only reason that the 
drugs were given and the endoscopy done? Was there a clinical need to 
do that test? The doctor felt that there was:
"I think he had quite convincing symptoms for pain that got better
with treatment."
It is evident that the computer did not reach the same conclusion as the 
doctor. Whether the doctor made an accurate diagnosis of peptic ulcer is 
difficult to ascertain, since the drugs apparently cleared up the problem 
(if it existed) before the tests were done. However, this case shows once 
again that management decisions are based on cues that the computer has 
no access to - in this case, the fact that the patient was an employee and 
required complete reassurance that nothing serious was wrong.
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When discussing the evaluation of the computer system, Knill-Jones, 
Dunwoodie and Crean (1985) who are closely involved with the 
GLADYS development, state that "the evaluation (therefore) has to be 
done in terms of [management] decisions made rather than diagnostic 
accuracy." (p209). In five of the six examples given here, the management 
decision made and the most probable diagnosis produced by the 
computer both differed from that given by the doctor. In the other 
example (case 5), the diagnosis was the same but GLADYS and the 
doctor chose different management options. Whether we choose to look 
at diagnoses made or management strategies, differences between the 
doctor and the computer are clearly evident.
4. DISCUSSION
Of the thirty six patients we looked at, there were ten cases where 
GLADYS and the doctor offered the same diagnosis and the same 
management decision. In these cases, GLADYS was able to reproduce 
diagnoses that counted as accurate, and choose management options that 
doctors also choose. So a computerised approach based on symptomatic 
evidence and probabilities can sometimes produce acceptable results. But 
there were sixteen cases where the diagnoses and the management 
decisions given by GLADYS both differed from those given by the doctor. 
There were also ten cases where the doctor’s diagnosis appeared on 
GLADYS’S list but GLADYS’S management decision was different to 
that given by the doctor.
There are several ways of explaining these ten cases: First, the doctor’s 
preferred diagnosis may have been given such a low probability by
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GLADYS that it did not figure as a contender for GLADYS’S top 
management decision (as in case 1). Secondly, GLADYS may have 
offered a diagnosis at a high probability, which the doctor did not suggest 
at all. This computer diagnosis would then be much more likely to appear 
as GLADYS’S top management decision. Thirdly, the doctor’s 
management decision may have been based on considerations aside from 
the actual diagnosis - the patient’s lifestyle or personal circumstances (as 
in cases 2,5 and 6). These are factors that the computer does not assess 
when making management suggestions.
These ten cases highlight two important points about the GLADYS 
system. First, if the doctor’s diagnosis is included on GLADYS’S list, it 
does not necessarily mean that the computer deemed it a ’likely’ 
diagnosis. Take example 1. GLADYS included the doctor’s diagnosis of 
gallstones at a probability of 1313:1 against. Clearly, gallstones was not a 
serious contender for top management decision. But, as the doctor 
pointed out, because GLADYS "is programmed to try and work out 
probabilities, it will always come up with something." GLADYS may offer 
a long list of diagnoses, some with a very low probability. In this way all 
eventualities are covered - the longer GLADYS’S list the more likely it is 
that the doctor’s diagnosis will appear on it somewhere. Compare this 
with a doctor dealing with a patient. The doctor does not produce a long 
list of possible diagnoses but is limited to one or two alternatives. 
GLADYS is not constrained by this limitation.
The second point is that doctors do not always make decisions about 
management in the same way that GLADYS does, even when both doctor 
and GLADYS are using the same diagnosis. Doctors take other factors 
besides the diagnosis into consideration - the patient’s social and personal
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circumstances, their lifestyle and habits all influence the management 
decision. The result is that patients with the same diagnosis may be 
managed differently and patients with different diagnoses can be 
managed in the same way. It depends on the judgement of the doctor.
This is echoed in an editorial in The Lancet (9 December 1989) which 
states that "Any practising clinician knows that different patients with the 
same disease differ in both the reaction to the disease and the response to 
various treatments. The good clinician learns to tailor his treatment to the 
individual patient, and, when the orthodox does not work, to use his 
knowledge of the ways of the body to design an unorthodox method that 
does." (p. 1371). GLADYS does not tailor its decisions to individual 
patients, and consequently often makes decisions that are at odds with 
those produced by doctors (7).
Judging by the comparisons we completed, it seems that GLADYS does 
not continously provide diagnoses or management decisions that 
physicians are happy to accept. In order to explain this, two issues need to 
be examined. First, the process of computerised consultation. What 
exactly is occurring? Is it flawed procedure, that leads to inappropriate 
decisions? Secondly, is GLADYS hindered in its decision making because 
its operations are confined to the limited domain of dyspepsia? The next 
secion discusses these possibilities in turn.
4.1 Problems with A Computerised Consultation?
My analsyis shows that the computer needs specific, or ’digitised’ answers 
to specific questions. Patients’ preferred answers were often more 
complex than the computer would allow. The computer works on a black 
and white, yes or no ’digitized’ input. Real patients have to do a great deal
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of work to convert their own human responses into this format. The staff 
were also caught up in this process of providing the computer with an 
input it understood - they initially chose the patients, ensuring that they 
fitted into the relevant medical domain (8). Then they chose the most 
suitable of these patients for interaction with GLADYS - not too old, not 
too young, not illiterate, not confused, not computer phobic etc. In effect 
this amounts to selection of a ’digitised’ patient in terms of suitability for 
GLADYS, in order to make things easier for the computer. The nurses 
assessed patients in terms of ’who will be able to answer the questions 
quickly and efficiently, without calling on a member of staff for help?’ 
What was to be avoided was a necessity for a ’domain expert’ (in this case 
a nurse) to intervene and fill in the gaps between the user’s (ie, the 
patient’s) knowledge and understanding and the system’s knowledge base. 
Careful selection of patients was intended to ensure that the users’ 
competence and the machine’s knowledge base were as close as possible. 
(See Collins, 1990, p. 101).
Staff intervention is also necessary after GLADYS makes its 
recommendations. The cases detailed above show that repair of 
GLADYS’S diagnoses and management decisions in individual cases is 
necessary if maldiagnoses and haphazard referrals are to be avoided. 
Collins suggests that it is human ’charity’ that helps to make up for 
machines’ deficiencies. We act charitably (9) as we digitise their input and 
repair their output. In this case, humans act on the real world and convert 
it into a formal sub-set that GLADYS can cope with. Then the formal 
output of GLADYS is reconverted - by humans - into terms and courses 
of action that make sense and are acceptable in the everyday human 
world. GLADYS’S contribution to the consultation process is interfaced 
between layers of human contribution.
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The concept of digitization - fitting the ambiguities in the world and in 
the patients’ answers into specified categories - is similar to the narrowing 
that occurs in the top half of the medical funnel: As the doctor conducts 
the consultation and formulates ideas using judgement, the narrow end of 
the funnel is gradually approached. At this narrow end, a ’computation’ is 
enough to complete the job. This metaphor resembles the narrowing 
down of responses into a form that GLADYS can use to complete the 
diagnosis task. The human work needed to do this moulding of input is 
essential if an artefact such as GLADYS is to blend into a social setting 
and if the gaps separating the world of the computer and the real world of 
medicine as to be bridged. But GLADYS does not blend flawlessly into 
the social scene. The mistakes and maldiagnoses occur because during the 
human/machine interaction, a reduction of the human world of 
dyspepsia, discomfort, symptoms and signs to a form that GLADYS can 
deal with is not always achieved.
4.2 A Confined World of Dyspepsia?
The Senior Registrar responsible for overseeing the evaluation of the 
computer in Cardiff offered some interesting observations about the 
machine, its methods, its area of application and its suitability. This 
doctor had little to do with the clinic use of GLADYS:
"Oh no, it drives me spastic, some of those questions. The best 
ones are the husbands and wives together saying ’No you don’t 
dear, oh yes I do.’"
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He felt that GLADYS is not sophisticated enough to deal with the area 
of dyspepsia because dyspepsia covers such a large area, and there are
"a lot of things that can be the matter with somebody that presents 
with dyspepsia".
The problem is that dyspepsia is a broad subject, whereas GLADYS is 
too limited. He said of GLADYS,
"It is not suitable here. It’s like asking the flight computer on a DC 
10 to mow your lawn for you. It is not what it is set up to do. So, it 
may do as good a job as the flight computer on the DC 10 would 
do on the lawn. It may be OK [to use a computer] if it is a discrete 
subject. Like jaundice maybe. But belly ache has such a variety of 
causes." (10)
The system demands input within defined boundaries. It is intended for 
use with patients in a certain category. The boundary of this category is 
drawn around ’dyspeptic patients’. Whether this discrete area exists in 
practical medicine is unclear. The Senior Registrar certainly doubted 
whether dyspepsia is discrete enough an area to be suitable for computer 
application. This would explain why GLADYS’S management decisions 
sometimes differ from those of doctors working with the same diagnosis. 
The doctor is not operating within a microworld, as GLADYS is, and 
often takes other wider factors into consideration when making 
management decisions.
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4.3 GLADYS’S Objectives Questioned
The fieldwork suggests that if GLADYS was used at GP level the 
number of cases referred and tests performed would alter. But how 
desirable is such a change in practice? The doctor at Cardiff spoke at 
length about the prime objective behind GLADYS, which is reduction of 
referal rates. He saw this objective as based on a simplistic idea of what a 
referal is for. He felt that in practice a GP may send a patient to the 
hospital for a variety of reasons. They may really need diagnostic 
assistance, they may need to be rid of a patient that is impossible to 
manage at their level - some patients have more respect for advice that 
comes from a ’specialist’. He estimated that in about half of the cases 
referred, the GPs know there is no serious medical problem with the 
patient.
"The reason for referal isn’t just this bland ’we want a diagnosis’, 
it’s ’we want a hand managing this smoking drinking bloke who 
won’t stop smoking and drinking despite me telling him to. You try 
and tell him to stop.’"
Similarly, in other cases, a patient may come in one day and say ’I’m fed 
up of this doctor, I wanna go to hospital and see a specialist’. The 
Registrar explained that
"It doesn’t matter what the computer says about this man having 
no chance of having anything the matter. If he comes along [to the 
GP] and says ’I’ve got this continual pain, sort it out’, most GPs 
with any sense will sort it out [refer it] because that’s what the 
person has come along for."
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The hospitals exist to offer a service to the GPs and it is not a case of the 
hospitals trying to reduce GP referrals.
His view of the purposes of a referral clashes with the traditional 
’rational’ view of much of medical decision making. Rational accounts 
stress the scientific basis of clinical judgement, and underplay other 
factors that influence decisions about diagnosis and other procedures, 
such as reasons for referral and discharge. The rational model assumes 
that medical practice proceeds according to laws and rules, in order to 
reach appropriate, ’correct’ decisions. As Gordon (1988) points out, "The 
claim that medicine is scientific serves almost as a "covering law" 
symbolising a universal, "objective" truth and legitimising the authority of 
the medical profession." (p. 259). Atkinson (1977,1988) describes how 
orthodox medicine is maintained and instilled in medical students. Their 
learning is guided and ’stage-managed’. The object of this is to subtly 
condition students into using recognised procedures and acceptable 
methods to produce recognised ’facts’ and acceptable conclusions. The 
same applies to GP referrals - the rationale behind a referral is often 
viewed in a similar rationalist light and ’scientific’ reasons for referrals are 
assumed. In theory, the acceptable reason that GPs refer patients to 
hospitals is because they need assistance with a diagnosis or because they 
cannot perform the necessary tests in the surgery. GLADYS has been 
developed on this assumption. The alternative reasons for referral - 
including those suggested above - are dismissed. In practice, deviations 
from these idealised procedures are evident. Gordon (1988) discusses the 
role of clinical judgement, intuition and informal criteria in decision 
making - it is a far cry from the rational road to truth. The Senior 
Registrar’s comments above suggest that reasons for GP referrals also 
wander from the rational road. Many unorthodox reasons for referral are
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evident and external social influences affect the process. As Wright and 
Treacher point out (1982, p. 7) medicine is permeated by social forces.
The doctor also felt that GLADYS’S probabilities were unhelpful 
because, as a doctor, at some stage he has to make a diagnosis one way or 
the other. He explained that
’’Odds in a sense don’t matter greatly. Even if there’s only a 1:20 
chance that you’ve got carcinoma of the stomach you’d like to 
know that you haven’t. I see our role in diagnosing all percent 
chance. Carcinoma of the stomach is very unusual in 20 year olds 
but missing it is a major disaster area for all concerned. If someone 
says ’but my computer says that there’s only a 1 in 100 chance’ it’s 
not a great consolation if you are the one."
GLADYS’S use of odds for and against certain diseases were, in his 
opinion, of little use in the real world of diagnosis. He used another 
theoretical example, of a computerised diagnosis for jaundice that 
suggested a 95% chance of cancer of the pancreas and a 5% chance of 
gallstones. In such a case he said,
"It doesn’t change what I am going to do because I have got to find 
out whether you have got gallstones or carcinoma".
His job was to decide what was an acceptably low level of risk. In many 
situations it is simply unacceptable not to know for sure, and further tests 
are essential. He pointed out that,
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"Yesterday we thought somebody might have two extremely rare 
diagnoses but both of them matter because they are extremely 
rare, they are very difficult to diagnose unless you think of them. 
Unless you think this person has got Addison’s disease or Wilson’s 
disease you certainly won’t diagnose it. But you have got to make 
sure thay haven’t because if you don’t diagnose it it is fatal and if 
you do diagnose it, it is 100% treatable."
So the rare cases must be included in the data base but this may be 
problematc if the data base is small, as the rare cases may be suggested 
too often.
5. SUMMARY
Clearly there is some doubt over whether the objectives of GLADYS’S 
designers are acceptable objectives from the point of view of medical 
staff. This is interesting, but not central to the research. How GLADYS 
fits into the medical world, how staff respond to it and how GLADYS as a 
case study relates to the issues oulined in chapter 4 is more important.
I have shown that GLADYS is hindered because the information it 
gleans from the computerised consultation is incomplete and because it is 
confined to the specific world of dyspepsia. This means it does not have 
access to influences originating outside this field. By contrast, doctors 
tackling the problems GLADYS is designed to tackle, utilise their 
knowledge of the medical and social world outside the dyspepsia field, at 
the consultation stage, the diagnostic stages and the management stage.
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GLADYS fits into the social setting as well as it does because of the 
effort made by the staff and patients. Human contributions are required 
in order to ease GLADYS into the social setting of the hospital. These 
human efforts narrow down, or digitize the world so that GLADYS only 
has to deal with specifics from that world. In Blois’s terms, GLADYS 
performs at the narrow end of the funnel (venturi) in the microworld of 
dyspepsia, and produces output in terms acceptable at the narrow end. 
The six cases analysed in detail show that this output is often 
unacceptable in the real world (at the wide end of the venturi) and human 
repair, interpretation and ’widening’ of the microworld type output, is 
necessary. The digitization, repair and adaptions made to the output in 
order to move it to area C in the venturi, show that human skill and 
judgement is essential when GLADYS is employed to undertake the job 
of dyspepsia diagnosis and management.
But still GLADYS is not an acceptable social prothesis - despite the 
efforts of the staff, it does not blend in well to the medical scene. 
GLADYS’S problems are technological problems, not human problems. 
The technological and philosophical difficulties of programming a 
computer to interview patients and produce consistently acceptable 
diagnoses and management decisions have been clearly shown.
Relating the findings of this study to the theory of behaviour-specific 
action requires an advance specification of what is behaviour-specific 
action and what is regular action in the area of dyspepsia diagnosis and 
management. Only then will it be apparent if a machine crosses this 
boundary and challenges the basis of the theory - that machines can only 
mimic people doing behaviour-specific action. In this case it would be 
necessary to show that GLADYS’S inconsistencies arise because it is
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doing the behaviour-specific action bits but failing on the regular action 
bits of this task. But separating these parts is difficult - our detailed case 
analyses were done in retrospect, using the patients’ written notes, and 
explanations of the diagnoses that the senior registrar provided after the 
event. He could guess which cases had been straightforward, but could 
not be expected to say whether they had involved behaviour-specific 
action or regular action on the part of the physician involved. We can see 
that in some cases where signs and symptoms are clear cut and 
indisputable it would seem that behaviour-specific action is sufficient to 
lead to a diagnosis and management decision. As one doctor pointed out, 
"many cases are pretty straightforward." In many other cases things seem 
to be less clear cut, as stressed by Knill-Jones, Dunwoodie and by Crean. 
In the more complex cases, judgement, intuition, experience, context- 
related factors, patient-related factors and social circumstances are all 
taken into consideration. This fits the description of regular human 
action.
As far as the theory of behaviour-specific action is concerned, I have 
neither validated it, nor rendered it invalid through this study. It seems 
that the best method of investigating whether machines are consistantly 
performing tasks that humans perform using behaviour-specific action is 
to isolate an area where behaviour specific action is regularly used. The 
senior registrar had suggested that diagnosing jaundice was more suitable 
for computerisation than diagnosing dyspepsia because:
"Jaundice is a more discrete, defined area and it uses laboratory 
tests quite a lo t ... and the other thing is the diagnoses are all ’hard’ 
diagnoses - gallstones, cancer of the pancreas, they are all proper 
diagnoses, for all clinicians."
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This implies that Jaundice diagnosis is more suited to a behaviour- 
specific approach than is dyspepsia diagnosis, and that its ’hard’ diagnoses 
are less influenced by factors from outside the microworld of jaundice.
The next case study was chosen with these considerations in mind. It 
involves a system known as SOLUBILE. This differs from GLADYS in 
several respects: SOLUBILE is designed to diagnose jaundiced patients, 
the intended user is the doctor rather than the patient, and the reasons 
that jaundice was chosen as an area are interestingly different to the 
reasons that dyspepsia was chosen as GLADYS, domain.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 4
1. This idea is also evident in Feigenbaum and McCorduck’s book (1984). 
They state that "Studies in England show that many humans were much 
more comfortable (and candid) with an examination by a computer 
terminal than with a human physician." (p. 117)
2. On my first visit two interesting questions were posed: First, GLADYS 
asked a man if he had ever been pregnant, then asked a woman if she 
smoked a pipe. The computer asks the sex of the patient early on, and 
these subsequent enquiries suggest a design weakness.
3. My initial task as ’assistant’ was to study the evaluation forms of the 
first dozen patients that had used the computer aproximately eighteen 
months earlier and retrieve these patients’ notes from the medical records 
department. Then the final diagnoses could be ascertained. After this the 
doctor would be able to complete the evaluation form by entering this 
final diagnosis and the computer diagnosis. I was shown the workings of 
the medical records department by a clerical officer, and I collected as 
many of the sets of notes as were available. Some were unavailable if they 
had been dispatched to another clinic or another hospital in the area. This 
was a dusty, time-consuming job, involving step ladders, tracer cards and a 
supermarket trolley to transport the notes.
4. Medical notes appear complicated and disordered to the uninitiated - 
outpatient notes are at the front of the file, with GP letters, test requests 
and results. Any inpatient notes are at the back of the file, sometimes 
reading from back to front, and sometimes meeting the outpatient notes 
somewhere near the middle of the file. My familiarity with the system 
enabled me to sift through the pages and help locate the section detailing 
the diagnosis.
5. We undertook the task on several consecutive Mondays in the staff 
coffee room of the Gastroenteroloy department. By this time I was well 
known and accepted in the department. We managed to analyse thirty six 
cases, which leaves the doctor with somewhere in the region of two 
hundred and seventy more to complete.
6 .1 will discuss this point further in my summary.
7. Two other useful examples which illustrate this point arose during the 
fieldwork: The first was a patient diagnosed by the doctors as having 
nervous dyspepsia. The Senior Registrar said: "A whinger, lots of 
symptoms, not much the matter with you. A worrier. IBS or nervous 
dyspepsia. What else can you call it." He was sure of this diagnosis, but 
the management decision did not reflect this diagnosis - he decided to 
perform an endoscopy in order to reassure this ’worrier’ that nothing was 
wrong with him. Similarly a patient with severe symptoms had undergone 
a barium meal test that was normal. The doctor had to decide whether to 
trust the result of this test - which is about 90% accurate - or perform 
more tests. The doctor was certain of the best action: "You have the 
difficulty of how much to believe the barium meal. In this case this guy 
here just drank too much. He’s got belly ache and goes around heaving. 
He’s got eight pints of Brains [Welsh beer] inside of him." So despite the 
symptoms, the doctor chose to believe the barium meal results, accept 
that this patient’s illness was alcohol related, and not initiate treatment 
for oesophageal pain. In this case GLADYS recognised the alcohol
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problem, yet the management decision it recommended was to treat 
oesophageal disease. Clearly humans often prioritise things differently to 
the computer in terms of management strategy.
8. Case 4 as an example, shows the problems that arise when a non­
dyspeptic patient is presented to GLADYS.
9. Two examples of a different kind of human ’charitability’ toward the 
machine arose during my discussions with the doctor evaluating 
GLADYS. As described above in case 1, the computer misdiagnosed a 
young woman with gallstones. Rather than accept that the machine had 
made a basic error the doctor attempted to charitably explain away the 
mistake, suggesting - with no evidence - that the misdiagnosis may have 
been the patient’s fault. She may have put ’duff answers’ into the machine. 
Again with a patient who, according to his written medical clinic notes, 
drank just two pints of beer each week. GLADYS suggested that this 
patient may have a progressive alcohol problem. The doctor pondered 
over this and eventually suggested that "He may well have told the 
computer something different to what he told us or he may have pressed 
the wrong button and instead of how much do you drink a day, [as 
GLADYS asks] he has said how much he drinks a week.” This degree of 
charity is especially surprising coming from this doctor who was less than 
whole-heartedly enthusiastic about GLADYS. The instinctive reaction 
seems to be to repair and charitably explain mistakes. It seems almost 
automatic. Doctors can generally detect ’duff answers’ and recognise 
when a patient is mistakenly stating his weekly alcohol consumption 
rather than his daily consumption. A computer does not possess the 
necessary social skills for this. These are abilities that humans have by 
virute of their understanding of other people, their socialisation in the 
world and their immersion in the human form of life and the medical 
form of life.
10. This suggestion, that a machine will ’work better somewhere else’, 
arose frequently during the fieldwork studies. Sceptics often felt the 
problem to be the choice of area of application, and did not appreciate 
that the problems may be more universal than this.
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Figure 5.2
GLADYS DATE OF COMPUTER INTERVIEW: 16-04-91
RECOMttENbe> ACTIONS, DIAGNOSES, AND SYMPTOMS FOR PATIENT NO: 614625
i>ectsioN 1 Possibly Organic Bowel Disease : Refer to Hosoital G.I. Service
OIA6WOS1S: Organic Bowel Disease
fop lO Symptoms -for the diagnosis
(t-52) Mucus 
(V4t5)No pellets
(+2S)Does not suffer from nerves 
(f-tS)No pain exac. from bowel action
P = 0.2900 < 2 TO ONE AGAINST)
f
Top lO Symptoms Against The Diagnosis
<-83)Age < 40 
<-33)Hi story > 6 months 
<-25)Episodic pain 
(-25)Const i oat i on
DECISION 2 Possibly Irritable Bowel Syndrome : Give IBS Treatment 
DIAGNOSIS: Irritable Bowel Syndrome P = 0.6300 ( 2 TO ONE ON)
NCflt *TH£ FOLLOWING SYMPTONS & WEIGHTS ARE FOR BOWEL CLASS '
-fop 10 Symotoms for the diagnosis Top 10 Symptoms Against The Diagnosis
(■* 209) Diarrhoea + pain 
(+139)Lower abdominal pain 
(tlOg)High fibre diet successful




?t2£p F em a le
(*l9)No night oaxn with relief 
(tt ft) Pointing sign - hand used
(—138)Diarrhoea oain not main oain
(—74)Antacid relieve pain now or in o;






PATIENT'S IDENTIFICATION: 614625 DATE OF COMPUTER INTERVIEW: 16-04-91
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
DIAGNOSTIC STATEMENTS APPROPRIATE SUGGESTED ACTIONS < I-f not already tak*\)
3 Possibly Organic Bowel Disease 
11 Possibly Irritable Bowel Syndrome
: Refer to Hospital G.I. Service 
: Give IBS Treatment
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
DISEASE ODDS
Irritable Bowel Syndrome 0.6347 2 TO ONE ON
Organic Bowel Disease 0.2880 2 TO ONE AGAINST
Insufficient Evidence 0.2194 4 TO ONE AGAINST
Nervous Dyspepsia 0.0980 9 TO ONE AGAINST
Duodenal Ulcer Disease 0.0390 25 TO ONE AGAINST
Progressive Alcohol Problem 0.0145 68 TO ONE AGAINST
Gastric Carcinoma <.01 171 TO ONE AGAINST
Gastric Ulcer Disease <-01 270 TO ONE AGAINST
Simple Oesophageal Disease <.01 533 TO ONE AGAINST
Choi elithiasis <.01 1043 TO ONE AGAINST
Severe Oesophageal Disease <.01 2440 TO ONE AGAINST
*** THE IRRITABLE BOWEL SYNDROME MAY BE LOGICALLY IMPLIED, IBS SCORE <= 6 1
PATIENT NO: 614625 SYMPTOMS PRESENT
Food makes pain worse 
P d t r t  relief -from vomiting 
£arly reoletion after meals 
No f amily history ulcer 
No pain exac. from bowel action 
MUCUS
E p i s o d i c  oain 
feorbOCygMi 'excessive'
Paifl relie-f -from bowel action 
High -fibre diet successful 
Lo m cT abdominal pain 
Pain rel ieved by -food/mi lk 
Self“induced vomiting
pain with relief absent/rare 
No Tagamet prescribed 
VoA«M;i<’tC| in previous episodes
Belch relieyes pain
Eat < 15 mins after vomitir
No night pain with relief
Does not suffer from nerves
No pellets
No daily pain
Antacids relieve pain now
Constipation
Diarrhoea + pain
Pointing sign — hand used
No attacks of pain
Antacids relieve now or in
Smokes < 25 /day
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CHAPTER 6 - THE SOLUBILE SYSTEM FOR DIAGNOSING 
JAUNDICE
1. BACKGROUND. PROCEDURES AND MEDICAL TERMS
SOLUBILE is a computer system designed to make a diagnoses on 
jaundiced patients. Jaundice describes the yellowing of the skin, sclera and 
excretions that occurs when there is excess billirubin in the blood, and a build 
up of deposited bile pigments. Jaundice is recognised as a symptom of liver 
disease, as it is the liver which secretes bile and the pigment billirubin. 
Generally, a billirubin of more than 20ijmol/litre of blood is taken as an 
indication that the patient is clinically jaundiced, the ’normal’ range being 3- 
13*^nol/litre. The distinct yellow colour of the skin and eyes is easy to see.
The Consultant Gastroenterologist responsible for devising the SOLUBILE 
program offered the following broad explanation of why he had chosen 
jaundice as the area of application:
"Because I see that there are certain areas where doctors are bad at 
making diagnoses. And where it is obvious to me that computers 
would be good, and jaundice is one of the fields. Because in jaundice 
there is a lot of data a lot of which is quite ’hard’. So for instance a lot 
of the biochemical data is quite hard data. The serum billirubin is the 
serum billirubin is the serum billirubin and there is nothing that the 
doctor or patient can do to screw that up. I specifically chose jaundice 
because A: it is well encapsulated diagnosis-wise and B: it has a lot of 
mathematical and numerical data which is obviously ideal for the 
computer."
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He elaborated on what he called the ’well encapsulated nature’ of the field 
of jaundice diagnosis:
"this [area] is relatively small and well encapsulated. We use only 
twenty two diagnoses here. In the whole of medicine there must be 
thousands of diagnoses. Twenty two we chose as being a sensible 
number. It is a reasonable number clinically to provide a range of 
options and it is not so few that it is clinically meaningless, and it is 
not so many that it is a nightmare."
He also felt that doctors could be ’educated’ by a machine in this field. It 
allows them to learn why a given disease is deemed more likely than an 
alternative and why some tests are more rewarding in terms of the 
information they yield. The consultant felt that sometimes doctors forget to 
ask essential questions during consultations, and using the system should 
teach them to automatically ask the important questions:
"It enhances the clinical skills because although we are taught in 
medical school to do all these things, when you come to enter things 
into the computer you realise that you have left out a whole load of 
things. It has an educational role and I think that it is all part of trying 
to give the junior doctors ownership of the process."
2. THE COMPUTERISED MACHINE
Unlike GLADYS, SOLUBILE was not designed for interviewing the patient 
directly. SOLUBILE gets its information from the doctor who has examined 
and interviewed the patient and performed the preliminary tests. The 
designer felt that
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"Taking a history is a nightmare for computers",
and rather than have the system wrestle with consultations he designed it to 
manipulate specific pieces of discrete information - either numerical values 
or answers to specific questions (see table 1 overleaf). SOLUBILE presents a 
series of screens to the user, with requests for these forty seven different 
pieces of information about each patient. The doctor provides as many of 
these ’parameters’ as possible, on the basis of the patient’s history, 
examination and test results.
The computer diagnosis is based on the notion that diseases causing 
jaundice are characterised by the symptoms they normally produce. A 
probability for each disease being present can thus be calculated from an 
analysis of the symptoms and signs. The computer evaluates the information 
using Bayes theorem and produces a list of differential diagnoses, chosen 
from the twenty two alternatives that have been programmed into 
SOLUBILE.
The three goals of the designers of the program were to create a system that 
was
1. Easy to use, with a friendly interface and all input and output in plain 
language.
2. For it to produce useful recommendations about the most beneficial tests 
to perform, as well as a diagnosis.
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TA BLE I
PA RA M ETER S T H A T  C A N  BE U SED  BY ‘SO L U B IL E ’ IN  ITS D IFFE R E N TIA L  DIAG N O SIS
H i s t o r y
Age o f the patient (in years)?
Sex o f  the patient (M ale/Fem ale)?
H as the patient suffered from  m arked abdom inal pain in this illness (Y es/N o)
D uration o f  jaundice (in weeks)?
W hat is the duration  o f  the p atien t’s itching (weeks) (answer 0  if no  itching)?
W eight loss (kg in last 3 m onths)?
H as the patient suffered appetite  loss in this illness (Y es/N o)?
H as the patient had pale stools during this illness (Y es/N o)?
H as the patient had dark urine during this illness (Y es/N o)?
W hich category o f drugs, if  any, has the patien t taken in the past 3 m onths (Type ‘list’ for the drug lists)/ 
W hat was the p atien t’s a lcohol usage in the last year (g per day/G uidance)?
H as the patient been jaundiced  in the past (Y es/N o)?
H as the patient com e in to  con tact w ith jaundice (Y es/N o)?
Previous history o f  biliary surgery (Y es/N o)?
Previous history o f  cancer (Y es/N o)?
Previous history o f  biliary colic (Y es/N o)?
Previous history o f recent transfusions o r in travenous d rug  abuse (Y es/N o)?
E x a m i n a t i o n
W hat is the  size o f  the p a tien t’s liver palpable below the ribs (in cm)?
Is the patien t’s spleen palpable (Y es/N o)?
Does the patient have palm ar erythem a (Y es/N o)?
Does the spider have spider naevi (Y es/N o)?
Does the patient have D upuytren’s contractures (Y es/N o)?
Does the patient have ascites (Y es/N o)?
W hat was the patien t’s tem peratu re (orally at adm ission, °C)?
Does the patient have encephalopathy (Y es/N o)?
Does the patient have a  peripheral neuropathy (Y es/N o)?
Does the patient have signs o f  cerebellar disease (Y es/N o)?
Does the patient have peripheral oedem a (Y es/N o)?
I n v e s t i g a t i o n s  
H b (g/d l)?
MCV (fl)?
W hite cell count?
Platelet count?
Reticulocytes (% )?
Pro throm bin  ratio?
Is any urine bilirubin present (Y es/N o)?
Is any urine urobilirubin p resent (Y es/N o)?
Bilirubin (^mol/1)?
AST (I.U ./l)?
YG PT (I.U ./l)?
Alkaline phosphatase ( I .U ./l)?
A lbum en (g/1)?
Amylase ( I.U ./l)?
Does an u ltrasound show d ilated  ducts (Y es/N o)?
HBsAg +  ve (Y es/N o)?
Sm ooth muscle antibodies +  ve (Y es/N o)?
A ntim itochondrial an tibodies + v e  (Y es/N o)?
A Jpha-foeto-protein >  100 I .U ./ l  (Y es/N o)?
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3. For the system to be mathematically rigorous so that it requires minimal 
subjective user input, and remains accurate even with a small data base. (See 
Newman et al, 1988).
The first two objectives were aimed at making the system attractive and 
acceptable to users. The third objective arose from a desire to apply Bayes 
theorem more rigorously and thoroughly than previous programs had. 
(Newman et al, 1988, p. 183).
2.1 The Design Of The Machine
The original database was compiled from the case notes of 345 patients with 
a serum billirubin of greater than 20/^mol/litre, for whom a definite 
pathological diagnosis was available. As many of the 47 parameters that were 
available were entered in each case.
"None of its data is based on consultant knowledge or textbook 
knowledge",
explained the consultant who masterminded the system.
When patient information is presented to the system it performs the 
mathematical analysis swiftly (details in Newman et al, 1988 p. 179-182): The 
designer explained that
"It takes about four-and-a-half seconds on average to go through the 
maths. And it gives you the top five and their probabilities. And as a 
general rule what we have found is that if the probability is greater 
than 90% the chances of it being right are very high."
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Details of all 47 parameters may not be available for every patient, and 
"SOLUBILE has been written to diagnose (and to learn) from whatever 
information is given to it, it is not necessary to enter values for every 
parameter." (Newman et al, 1988, p. 176). SOLUBILE also indicates which 
presently unavailable parameter or test result would increase the accuracy of 
the diagnosis, and to what new level of probability.
So as to help the user understand the rationale behind the diagnosis it is 
possible to ask the computer which parameters were most influential in the 
diagnostic choice. Comparisons between any two of the computers diagnoses, 
or between a computer diagnosis and a doctors alternative diagnosis can be 
made, to show why the computer considered one diagnosis more likely than 
another. Figure 6.1 (page 166) shows a SOLUBILE diagnosis sheet. The first 
section lists the five most likely diagnoses with probabilities. In this example, 
the second section is a comparison of the top two possibilities, alcoholic 
cirrhosis and pancreatic carcinoma. The third section lists those presently 
unavailable test results that would increase the level of certainty of the 
diagnosis.
The designer felt that this mathematical strategy was suitable, saying,
"Jaundice is a straightforward, confined field, and what a doctor 
should do [to diagnose a case of jaundice] is to do what Bayes theory 
does, on specific bits of information."
The junior doctors on the gastroenterology firm (1) also seemed to accept 
that diagnosing jaundiced patients is a straightforward procedure, amenable 
to an algorithmic approach. One of the doctors explained:
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"It is actually, a relatively mechanical thing. If you get this result then 
it is this type and when you get this result it is this type. It is quite a 
clear cut thing."
The most junior doctor on the team offered her opinion, saying
"I think, even as a houseofficer [HO], a junior member of staff, a 
jaundiced patient is a straightforward patient to deal with. I don’t 
think there is any problem with diagnosing."
Another senior house officer (SHO) offered this interpretation of the 
processes involved in diagnosing a jaundiced patient:
"Somebody who is jaundiced, I mean, you walk into the room and it is 
bloody obvious what is wrong with them, and immediately you have 
narrowed down all the possibilities of what it could be and you figure 
it out."
The third SHO stated that
"Jaundice is quite straightforward. History, examination and a few 
blood tests can usually give you a pretty clear cut diagnosis. If doctors 
aren’t very good at diagnosing it, it must be the way they are taught 
because it is quite a reasonably straightforward mechanical thing. We 
could almost sit down and write out the algorithm, ’how you arrive at 
the diagnosis in jaundice’. But you couldn’t give the probabilities. I 
think that is much the reason why it [SOLUBILE] was brought out for
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the jaundiced patient - because it is actually a relatively a mechanical 
thing."
SOLUBILE is being set a task that is nearer point B than point A in the 
venturi model. The doctor has narrowed down the wider world - where 
jaundiced patients exist - to a narrower area characterised by specific 
responses and numbers. SOLUBILE is required to manipulate these discrete 
pieces of information and produce a diagnosis informed by the 345 cases in 
its data bank. According to the venturi logic, the machine should perform 
well at this (point B) level.
This may be the ideal type task for a computer - people can do the job using 
behaviour-specific action, and it lies near position B in the venturi.
The fieldwork was designed to assess the situation in practice: How 
acceptable is SOLUBILE to the medical staff? How well does it fit into the 
medical environment?
3. THE FIELDWORK
The research was conducted in a large general hospital in the 
Hampstead/Highgate area of London. My involvement with GLADYS had 
familiarised me with general concepts in gastroenterology, which overlaps 
with the area of liver disease, and I was at ease in my dealings with staff in 
the department. However, because of the travelling involved in this case 
study and because the computer was rarely used, full participant 
comprehension was not a viable option. Instead the fieldwork involved 
extended interviews and conversations with the designer and the relevant 
staff, and observation of the machine in use whenever possible.
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3.1 Day to Day Use
Most ’intake’ patients in this hospital are seen by a house officer (HO) or a 
senior house officer (SHO), and they were expected to use the computer. 
These doctors are notoriously busy and work long hours. A diagnostic device 
that saves them having to diagnose jaundiced patients could save valuable 
time and energy - a welcome addition to the available technology. The 
published statistics on the accuracy of the system are impressive (Alton et al, 
1990, p. 52). In a 495 patient study SOLUBILE gave the correct diagnosis in 
first place for 78% of cases and for 92% of cases the correct diagnosis 
appeared in the top three computer choices. The study also compared the 
system with clinicians and the authors state that "SOLUBILE performed 
better, both in correct first place diagnosis and first three placing. No 
clinician reached the values achieved by the computer" (p. 52/53). The 
consultant encouraged his junior staff to take the patient history, do the 
examination, make a diagnosis and then use the computer diagnosis as a 
comparison, do the recommended further tests and use the computer again. 
In view of the accuracy figures I expected the staff to be pleased to use 
SOLUBILE, even though this was not compulsory. The Consultant designer 
explained that the situation in practice was much different:
"No, no, no! They [the junior staff] have all sorts of other things to 
consider. This is another piece of work for them. Even if it only takes 
three minutes it is something else [for them to do]."
Apart from being too busy to use the computer he recognised that
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"Some humans are terrified of computers. [That is] just how it is. 
Especially when you come to making a diagnosis. I think it is partly 
because the doctor likes the fun of making the diagnosis themselves or 
something."
Clearly he felt that the barriers to the implementation of the computer were 
human barriers. The medical staff were too busy or didn’t want to use it.
The junior doctors admitted to using SOLUBILE infrequently and explained 
why: SOLUBILE is situated on the GI ward on the second floor of the 
hospital. Most patients arrive in casualty which is in a different area of the 
hospital:
"By the time they are got up to a ward or you have got time to go away 
and start using the machine you have got a fair idea of what is wrong 
with them anyway."
"It is stuck out of the way and you have to make a special point of 
coming up here."
"And it is in the endoscopy room. Half the time that is being used. 
They do endoscopies in there every morning."
So, few of the jaundiced admissions were entered into the machine because 
of this practical problem. All the junior staff had used it occasionally, and 
each described their experience and impression:
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"In one case that I used it, the differential was between gallstones and 
carcinoma of the pancreas and it was 50.2 and 49, and the chances 
were that is was carcinoma of the pancreas, so it was no big surprise."
Here SOLUBILE produced a list of differential diagnosis on which two 
conditions were assigned almost identical probabilities. The doctor decided 
which was the appropriate diagnosis by utilising information about the 
patient’s history, and dismissing the other diagnosis with the marginally 
higher probability.
Another doctor said that
"I thought it gave out completely zany results. I am sure that there 
must be some mistake in the algorithm. A young guy came in with 
jaundice and it said something which you never find in someone that 
young. I just put my own diagnosis in the patient’s notes."
In this, case SOLUBILE produced an unusual diagnosis which the doctor 
dealt with by ignoring it. Making a decision to ignore something is equally as 
important as making a decision to investigate something, and as much 
confidence and knowledge is required.
An incident that the third doctor recounted explained why she had not 
needed the machine to assist her in making a particular diagnosis. She said:
"I have had only one chap [with jaundice] but he had an enormously 
long history of severe alcohol abuse. And he was 35 so I mean it is 
pretty obvious what had caused the jaundice."
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The doctor saw this as a straightforward case with an easy diagnosis of 
alcohol related liver disease.
These instances where the doctors had used SOLUBILE were the exception 
rather than the rule. SOLUBILE is not used often. What is the explanation 
for this?
3.2 Whv SOLUBILE is Rarely Used
Judging by these examples and other comments made, it seems that there 
are three possible reasons why SOLUBILE is used so little by the staff it has 
been designed to help:
First is that the doctors do not need help in their diagnoses of jaundice. They 
see jaundice as easy to diagnose. So, they do not consider a computer to be 
useful or necessary. One of them felt that:
"It [SOLUBILE] is looking at a very limited field. As the limitations 
[of the area of application] increase, the less useful it [the computer] 
is."
The doctors felt that the system was wasted in the jaundice field:
"It would be better in a bigger area."
One of the junior staff was apologetic, saying:
"I am really sorry about this, sorry that we can’t say ’Hey it’s great, we 
love it’. But it might be that if you could extend the program to
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include other things, but a one-off program for jaundice, it doesn’t 
actually, it is very limited. It would be better if you could use it for 
other things like rectal bleeding, or abdominal pain.”
The staff continually stressed how much better it would be if the system had 
been designed for this kind of bigger area, or for the diagnosis of chest pain. 
In that area doctors admit to needing assistance, and the probability factor 
would be useful too:
Tf you walk in and someone is 35 and they have got a bit of chest 
pain, and you are walking in and thinking right, is this something to do 
with their lungs or something to do with their heart, is it something to 
do with their indigestion. Are they hysterical, have they fallen over 
and cracked a rib? You are working on so many, a bigger field. Now 
something like that it would be more useful in.”
The next doctor added to this, saying
"As a casualty officer, having done a casualty job, the number of 
people that you see going into casualty with chest pain and they vary 
from 17 to 117, with all sorts of varying history and stuff and at the 
end of the day, with the ones in the middle, the 35-40 year olds who 
do smoke but haven’t got typical cardiac chest pain, it would be quite 
nice for you to sit down and put it all in and for it to come up with 
some probabilities and say, ’yes the probabilities of this patient having 
an MI [myocardial infarction] is 5%’ or something."
A third SHO agreed, saying
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"If I went to see a young person with chest pain then I would be 
interested to know what the percentage probability is that she actually 
has ischemic heart disease."
Chest pain is a complex area of medicine. One of these doctors said of the 
field,
"There is nothing you can really go on, you can do a blood test but it 
doesn’t actually tell you anything."
That is why computer assistance would be appreciated. But they recognised 
the problems of assigning a computer to such a broad field:
"I don’t think it would work. You would have such an enormous 
amount of information that you would have to put into it."
A second possible reason why SOLUBILE is rarely used is that the 
probabilities which the machine produces are seen as intellectually 
interesting, but of little practical value when diagnosing jaundice. As one of 
the SHOs explained:
"You have to be pragmatic about it. We are not interested in 
probabilities that are as weird and wonderful as 2 percent in the 
middle of the night. As long as you manage to see that if they need to 
go to theatre they go to theatre, and those that need antibiotics and 
resuscitation and those that don’t, don’t."
One of the doctors explained how medical staff make differential diagnoses 
in practice:
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"In a differential diagnosis you put the most likely first and it goes 
down to the least likely and if we really think it is out of the way we 
put in brackets, ’very unlikely’. But we don’t actually quantify it 
because it is pretty meaningless."
It was generally felt that
"It [SOLUBILE] does throw out some interesting possibilities that you 
haven’t thought about and the probability of those things is so low 
anyway, like 0.9% or something, that you think, ’mmm that is 
interesting but not terribly relevant.’ I haven’t found it helpful. It just 
confirms my suspicions as to what the diagnosis is."
A third way of explaining why SOLUBILE is often by-passed, is that its 
diagnoses may be considered to be wrong by the doctors - as in the second 
case described above - and so it is regarded with suspicion. The research was 
not broad enough to determine whether this is regularly the case, and the 
trial results cited earlier in fact suggest that SOLUBILE gets it right more 
often than doctors. But as Lipscombe has shown (1990), clinical trials of 
expert systems often produce impressive results, whilst in practice the picture 
is different:
The figures in Alton et al’s paper (1990) need to be examined closely. The 
first part of the trial was a simple ’reclassification’ of 445 patients. This 
involves extracting a case that is already in the machine’s database and 
requesting a diagnosis on it. For this part of the study the accuracy was given 
as 82% correctly diagnosed in first place and 96% diagnosed within the first 
three choices. This type of study is often regarded as meaningless - as the
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designer admitted, "If he [SOLUBILE] has already got the patient in the data 
base that is not really any good." It may also be argued that since the patient 
details are already in the database, SOLUBILE should get 100% of the 
reclassification diagnoses correct in first place. This type of test is really just a 
check on internal consistency.
In the next part of the trial, ’the prospective diagnosis trial’, SOLUBILE 
showed slightly less favourable results. For this trial 50 cases were chosen "in 
an approximately similar disease distribution to that found in the data base." 
(Alton et al, 1990, p. 51). SOLUBILE’S first place diagnoses were correct in 
about 74% of cases and about 92% of cases were correctly diagnosed within 
the first three choices. But compared to the doctors’ average accuracy, of 
49.5% diagnosed correctly in first place, and 68.5% in the first three choices, 
the machine performed well. However, close questioning of one of the 
paper’s authors revealed interesting unreported details:
"They [the doctors] didn’t have the patients in front of them, they had
the same information as the computer, the sheets."
The doctors involved in the comparison were given the specific discrete 
pieces of information normally delivered to SOLUBILE. They were asked to 
make a diagnosis on the basis of information that another doctor had 
gathered, assimilated and interpreted. They were assigned the same part of 
the procedure that SOLUBILE is normally assigned, but were denied the 
opportunity to interact with the patient, interview them and examine them 
(2). SOLUBILE was in fact compared with clinicians who were asked to do 
something they would not normally do - make a diagnosis on the basis of 
another doctor’s patient assessment. The designer dismissed the relevance of 
this point:
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"My guess is that their diagnoses wouldn’t have been any the better for 
seeing the patient."
It is difficult to ascertain how well SOLUBILE compares with doctors 
making diagnoses according to normal procedures, as this is not what the 
study detailed in Alton et al examined. The interactive part of diagnosis - 
talking to the patient and examining them does not only serve as a means of 
gathering clinical information. It is also a means of ’sizing up’ the patient 
visually and mentally - assessing personality, state of mind and honesty. Such 
subjective analyses contribute to the doctor’s overall diagnosis and 
management strategy. This part of the strategy is a finely tuned skill. 
Knowledge, confidence and practical ability are required if this initial part of 
the process is to yield the necessary information. The doctors who stressed 
how easy diagnosing jaundice is seem to have overlooked their contribution 
to this part of the process.
The ’hidden talents’ involved in all stages of the doctor/patient interaction 
are essential aspects of the diagnostic process. These human parts of the 
process need careful examination if the value of SOLUBILE’S contribution 
is to be assessed.
3.3 The Human Contribution
When presented with a patient, the first task facing the doctor is deciding 
whether a patient is jaundiced. This is normally quite easy. As one junior 
doctor put it,
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"It is pretty ’either or’. And if it is borderline there is the blood test. 
But they [the patients] are usually duck’s-foot yellow. Glowing in the 
corner."
But it is not always this simple. One doctor explained that some patients 
take weeks to present at a GP surgery because they have not noticed they are 
jaundiced:
"Do you know, different patients, depending on their self awareness 
and their intellect, some patients are bright yellow and they haven’t 
even noticed, and their wife has said, ’oh, you’re getting yellow 
darling’. And some of them will come up at the first tinge. How do you 
get out of that. It is difficult is the answer."
Next, the doctor interviews the patient. The correct questions must be asked 
so that the necessary information is elicited. The doctor’s personality, 
interactive skills, medical knowledge and experience all influence the quality 
and quantity of information gathered. The doctor examines the patient, and 
clarifies such things as the position and size of the liver, is the liver palpable? 
The doctor makes decisions about which blood tests and urine tests to 
request. Then the information is assessed in the light of the patient’s history, 
social circumstances and personality.
The doctor is now in a position either to make a diagnosis or to answer the 
specific questions that the computer program poses, with specific digitized 
answers and numerical responses. All the information assimilated from the 
interview, examination and tests are collapsed into a form that the computer 
is designed to ’understand’. The system does not accept unusual values or 
responses that it is not programmed to deal with. Newman et al (1988)
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explain that "It is appreciated that some choices that SOLUBILE offers to its 
users may not be immediately understood by someone who is not used to 
SOLUBILE. For this reason SOLUBILE monitors all input made to it, and if 
a response is not reasonable it displays a help screen which should enable the 
correct response to be made." (p. 178). So SOLUBILE does not have to 
contend with unusual parameters that fall outside its range of 
comprehension. The system requires exact, digitized information and is 
entirely reliant on the doctor’s skill and knowledge to provide that 
information. The idea is that digital information is free of subjective 
influences. But there are some problems with this - the designer pin-pointed 
questions that the program poses which are open to subjective 
interpretations. He said,
"It starts off by asking some things that are quite certain, and then 
immediately you get into difficulty: ’marked abdominal pain’, now, 
instantly we are into a difficulty about the interrelationship between 
the English language, human beings and computers. We have got a 
word in here - marked. Do you see that this is still open to uncertainty 
and subjectivity? So right at the start this is the crux of some of the 
difficulties of using computers."
The doctors’ interpretation of what the patient says is essential. The doctor 
makes sense of the interview using prior knowledge of the patient, their 
social circumstances, their medical history. A great deal also depends on the 
doctors ability to relate to the patients personally, and understand their 
position in the same (human) form of life. So the input to the computer is 
subjective in so far as it relies on the interpretative skills of the doctor.
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When presented with SOLUBILE’S analysis, the doctor may choose to 
perform the tests that SOLUBILE regards as most beneficial, or to ignore 
SOLUBILE’S recommendations. Similarly the doctor may take 
SOLUBILE’S diagnosis on board, or again choose to ignore it. Much 
depends on how sure the doctor is in her own mind about the diagnosis. The 
most important decision is whether to accept the possibility of a serious 
condition if it is given a low probability. Where does the doctor draw the line 
between an acceptable and an unacceptable risk? The doctor also has to 
decide whether to perform the suggested tests, taking into account the 
amount by which it increases the accuracy of the diagnosis:
"Behind each of these [recommended tests] it gives a number of how 
much more it would increase the score. So it tells you that doing the 
platelet count is very worthwhile as it would increase it from 57% to 
70%. So it sort of gives them an idea, and possibly for the cost of an 
MCV increasing it by only 9% isn’t worth it. Or maybe it is?"(3)
Clearly, when SOLUBILE is used, the human involvement in diagnosing 
jaundice is still vast. In essence, the computer is being used only for a specific 
purpose - a subtask within the overall task of diagnosis of jaundice. It is used 
to manipulate specific pieces of data according to a mathematical procedure. 
This is seen as the best method of reaching the diagnostic decision.
"What it [SOLUBILE] does is to take all the information and do what 
the human brain is less capable of doing and that is correlating all that 
information, to say, is a billirubin of 30 in combination with an 
albumen of 26, what is that? And we are very bad at doing that."
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The designer believed that humans would make better diagnoses if, at this 
point, they too utilised a more stringent mathematical approach. This would 
be behaviour-specific mental action. Can doctors relate to this method of 
making decisions?
3.4 Behaviour-specific Action or Regular Action?
The designer thought that doctors found approaching tasks more 
methodically and mathematically, difficult. He suggested that was the reason 
why a machine would do the job more efficiently:
"I don’t think doctors think like that, which is a problem for doctors. 
What a doctor should do is to do some of what Bayes theory does, but 
the reality is that doctors don’t do it. Which is perhaps why doctors 
aren’t so good. For a start doctors are unable to store all the 
information in his brain and secondly because of that a doctor is 
unable to estimate the probability of any given diagnosis."
An SHO tried to explain how he thought the diagnosis process worked in 
practice:
"I think we do all go around with Bayes theorem in our mind, but in 
an intuitive sense, you know, what is the most likely thing? And if you 
think that something is extremely unlikely then asking questions 
relative to that is not going to change that, and you are not going to 
believe the answers or you are going to interpret them in a different 
way."
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Other doctors suggested that intuition played a much bigger part than 
mathematics:
"a lot of it is intuitive. I was in casualty the other day and a lot of the 
time you walk into a cubicle and fix your eyes onto the patient and 
within about - 1 don’t know - half a second, you have decided a lot of 
the time whether they need to come in or not, if they are that unwell. 
You fix your eyes on them and think ’oh, they’re ill’, or not, and so 
many things you make subconscious decisions I think, intuitively. Just 
by looking at them and seeing how they respond to you and that sort 
of thing."
Similarly, a senior registrar in Gastroenterology suggested that he could 
intuitively tell, as he walked up to a patient, or as they sat opposite him in a 
clinic, whether they really were ill, or "half way nuts". He claimed that if a 
patient wore tinted spectacles he would be inclined to initially class them as 
mad. On a more serious note, he said that just by looking at a patient, and 
"having a sniff1, he could make "half a diagnosis."
The consultant agreed that a lot of diagnosis is based on hunch. Hunch and 
intuition are not behaviour-specific responses. Neither are the decisions 
doctors often make when armed with an understanding of patients’ lives, 
problems, social circumstances and specific histories. In the cases where 
consideration of these unique factors influences the diagnosis made, regular 
mental action is used. Being able to make unorthodox decisions in the right 
cases is the mark of a good physician.
One doctor attempted to explain this:
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"a lot of our thinking is parallel rather than serial - it is not just one 
question at a time, it is all the input that has to be filtered all at once 
rather than that. Senior clinicians who go in, ask a few questions and 
say, well it is either this or this, and you think, how did they arrive at 
that, but it is just because they have seen so many things. And you find 
that when people get on but are still doing things systematically they 
obviously haven’t got a clue what is going on.”
Although the ’correct’ diagnosis can be determined using an algorithmic 
approach, the best clinicians do not always do it this way. A knowledge of 
when to deviate from the behaviour-specific format is essential. SOLUBILE 
does not equip uninformed users or medical students with this knowledge, 
with ’gut reactions’ or with intuitive acumen.
SOLUBILE uses a formula based mathematical method to do what people 
do using a combination of specific and ad-hoc methods. Humans do not only 
apply a formula, but rely on experience, hunch, intuition and patient specific 
cues; they respond to each patient in a unique fashion and use regular mental 
action. The designers of SOLUBILE are trying to replace this regular human 
action with a computer doing behaviour-specific action.
Because the task that SOLUBILE does is at the middle of the venturi, this 
should be an acceptable strategy. The narrowing down that the doctor has 
already done reduces the task to a microworld task, where behaviour-specific 
action should, theoretically, be an acceptable way of producing diagnoses on 
jaundiced patients. However, the fieldwork suggests that the results given by 
SOLUBILE were not always compatible with those of the doctors. Although 
the number of example patients involved in this study was small, 
discrepencies between the machine’s output and the doctors’, are clearly
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evident. Doctors sometimes disagree with the diagnosis given top priority, 
and sometimes choose diagnoses that SOLUBILE put in second place or 
lower. Explaining these discrepancies is not straightforward. But the crux of 
the issue is that SOLUBILE and the doctor are not really trying to do the 
same thing: In essence, SOLUBILE is designed to say which diagnosis is 
most probable given the available patient data. In contrast to this, the doctor 
is trying to make a diagnosis of what is wrong with this particular patient. The 
doctor may be interested in probabilities based on previous cases, but for 
each individual patient encountered, an individual diagnostic decision has to 
be made. One diagnosis may be mathematically more probable than another, 
but for each individual case the validity of that probable diagnosis is assessed, 
and a multitude of influences taken into account. Doctors’ ultimate decisions 
are based on more than they can quantify in SOLUBILE’S categories. For 
example, one senior registrar suggested that
'Doing the history and examination is the whole basis of clinical 
medicine, and with jaundice you have got some of the most difficult 
clinical signs. Like ascites. I would want to see for myself... because by 
looking and seeing the patient yourself you decide yourself what’s 
wrong or whether they are just half mad."
In a similar vein, a registrar said,
"you focus all your questions and your examination to try to answer 
why they have gone yellow. So all the time you are asking the 
questions - there is no point in examining if you don’t arrive at a 
diagnosis. You have to have a certain amount of clinical skill anyway 
and you have to develop some sort of relationship with the patient."
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When deciding exactly which condition is apparent the doctor may engage in 
negotiations with colleagues or seek advice from more senior staff. Writing a 
list of probable diagnoses in the notes, with the actual diagnosis somewhere 
on that list is not acceptable in the real world of medicine. But proponents of 
machines like SOLUBILE would claim that producing the correct diagnosis 
in the top three possibilities is a major achievement for a computer. In 
practice, this is of little use to a clinician who has to decide where to draw the 
line, which is the most accurate diagnosis on SOLUBILE’S list? The doctor 
has to make a choice one way or the other and decide on the appropriate 
management strategy.
What the computer is designed to do - give the most likely diagnosis bearing 
in mind the patient information - is behaviour-specific action. What the 
doctor does - make a real diagnosis for a particular patient with particular 
idiosyncrasies - is not behaviour-specific action.
4. DISCUSSION
The designer and the intended users view the issues differently. The designer 
believes that doctors diagnoses would improve if they utilized an algorithmic 
approach. Doctors do not deny the validity of this approach, but they do not 
use this method once they have laid the foundations for a diagnosis - which is 
necessary whether they use SOLUBILE or not. Doctors isolate the problem, 
take a history, make an examination and take blood tests. Then they will 
formulate the diagnosis.
Staff were not suspicious of the machine, they simply saw little use for it, 
except as an interesting device that put numerical values on differential 
diagnoses. These numerical probabilities were of little practical use because
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doctors work on the basis that it is either this or that - a decision has to be 
made one way or the other. As one of the SHOs explained,
"If somebody sees a patient and the differential diagnosis has fifty 
things, then people say, ’well obviously they don’t know what they are 
talking about.’"
The doctor has to narrow down the diagnosis to specifics as soon as possible. 
It is the doctor’s responsibility to interrogate, interpret and present the 
results to the machine. And then interpret the machine’s results in terms of 
the particular patient under scrutiny. Just like with GLADYS, the machine is 
sandwiched between human layers which provide it with information in a 
ready-digitized format, and convert its digitized output into a form that is 
useful in the real world. The doctor deals with the output in various ways. As 
the examples above show, they choose between diagnoses that are given very 
close probability values, they decide to disregard spurious diagnoses, they 
chose the ’obvious’ diagnosis in ’straightforward’ cases. These decisions are 
only possible because of their experience and medical socialisation. They 
tend to play down their own role in digitizing the machine’s input and 
analysing and repairing the output of the machine. Yet without the doctor on 
hand to assist SOLUBILE at the input and the output stages, the system 
would be of little practical use in a clinical environment. In order for 
SOLUBILE to blend into the clinical setting the contribution of a skilled 
human is essential.
5. SUMMARY
This case study has shown that the barriers to the implementation of 
SOLUBILE are human barriers. There are two ways of looking at why these
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human barriers exist. First, a great deal of regular action is required from 
doctors before they hand over to the computer. Making the diagnosis is the 
’icing on the cake’ rather than a tedious operation, and doctors are not keen 
to hand over this part of their craft to a machine (4). As the designer pointed 
out - sometimes doctors like the fun of making the diagnosis themselves. 
Investing time and effort in the earlier stages makes doctors keen to follow 
the task through to the end.
Secondly, the sub-task the machine does is not the area that doctors believe 
they need assistance in. Doctors may require assistance in making accurate 
overall diagnosis, but as explained above, that is not what SOLUBILE does. 
SOLUBILE does a behaviour-specific analysis of specific information, which 
in lots of individual cases is an insufficient basis for diagnosis. The real work 
of diagnosis, which is what doctors are interested in, is a sphere of action 
where patient-specific anomalies and unpredictable factors are important. 
Attempting to program a computer to perform at this wider level involves 
tackling insurmountable technical difficulties, because it is a job sitting at the 
wide end of the venturi. SOLUBILE is not designed to do this kind of task. 
SOLUBILE is only able to approach microworld tasks situated at the narrow 
end of the funnel. So part of the human barrier to use of SOLUBILE is 
based on an underlying technical shortfall.
However, the task that SOLUBILE is set is not positioned near enough to 
point B in the funnel. At point B, external factors have no bearing on the 
decisions made - they are encapsulated microworld decisions. But at the 
position SOLUBILE is operating, external factors still influence the decisions 
of human clinicians.
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Designers of machines like SOLUBILE seem to be proceeding according to 
a fault-tree model of medical practice. Such a view ignores the patient- 
specific anomalies and unpredictable factors that doctors on the ground have 
to contend with, in a manner that utilizes artistic and intuitive elements, as 
well as scientific principles. The consultant involved here apparently adhered 
to this ’rational’ view of medicine, and this view positions him at one end of a 
spectrum - the ’science’ end. Practising doctors on the ward, who undertake 
the everyday work of clinical medicine often fall at the other end of the 
spectrum - the ’art’ end. Gordon (1988) discusses these ’scientific’ and 
’art/clinical judgement’ components of medical practice. She points out that 
"while science has long been the official knowledge of medicine, art and 
clinical expertise were long considered legitimate." (p. 282). She outlines 
moves intended to make medicine more scientific, and warns against such 
changes, suggesting that they constitute a threat to art and clinical judgement 
and as such threaten a valuable human resource (p. 284). Although 
SOLUBILE’S designer has attempted to use mathematics in place of clinical 
judgement, SOLUBILE does not threaten clinical judgement or art in this 
field, because it relies so heavily on the human contributions. SOLUBILE 
operates in a small area and human talents are required to reduce the real 
world into a form that SOLUBILE can deal with, and to translate the 
limited-world type output of SOLUBILE, into useful real-world information.
The stumbling block is that SOLUBILE attempts to use a behaviour-specific 
response to do what humans would do using a combination of behaviour- 
specific and regular mental action. As a result, its suggestions sometimes 
clash with those of human staff, and this makes them less inclined to use the 
device. If SOLUBILE is to produce acceptable results, it must be applied to 
tasks at the middle of the venturi - encapsulated microworld tasks where 
behaviour-specific action is sufficient.
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This study was chosen because it seemed to fulfil my criteria of isolating a 
task that humans approach using behaviour-specific action. But closer 
analysis has shown that more than this is involved. The next case study was 
chosen with this consideration in mind: Blood Pressure measurement does 
appear to fit the behaviour-specific action model. Instructions for how to do 
the job are available - and as it can be reduced to rules an automated device 
should be able to take over the task. The next period of fieldwork involved 
investigations into the use of an automatic blood pressure measuring device 
in a hospital in Bath.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 6
1. ’Firm’, or alternately ’team’, is used to refer to all the doctors working 
under one consultant m one speciality. So, a full gastroenterology firm 
consists of the consultant, senior registrar, registrar, senior house officer(s), 
house officer(s) and any attached medical students.
2. The doctors were being asked to perform a job which, under these 
conditions, could only be achieved by applying rules and formulas. There was 
no scope for applying their tacit knowledge of the particular patient, because 
they had not interviewed or met the patient. They were forced into using a 
behaviour-specific approach. As Collins points out, people don’t find this 
kind of action easy, and this test seems inherently biased against the doctors. 
Clinically testing medical systems is problematic. In this case the only 
suitable clinical test would be to compare doctors working without 
SOLUBILE with doctors working with SOLUBILE, and then to undertake a 
post-mortem examination and compare this result with the earlier tests.
3. An MCV test measures the mean corpuscular volume.
4. This is different to the case of factory robots that perform the sub-tasks of 
car assembly, or spell checkers that do a sub-task of article checking. These 
machines are used because those behaviour-specific sub-tasks are tedious. 
People are not sorry to see a machine doing these jobs. The part of diagnosis 
that SOLUBILE does is different. It is an interesting and exciting integral 
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( 1) Pancreatic carcinoma Probability 17.77.
(19) Acute alcoholic hepatitis Probabi1i ty 3.77
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Alcoholic cirrhosis is 4.1 times more likely in this patient than 
Pancreatic carcinoma.
The following are the main pointers to Alcoholic cirrhosis, followed by the 
number of times more likely the parameter is with Alcoholic cirrhosis than with 
Pancreatic carcinoma.
Patient is 27 years old
Patient has an albumen level of 26 g/1 
Alcoholic cirrhosis is more common 










Based on what I know already, I think .that the ..following, questions are the one* 
which are likely to be the most useful for improving diagnostic certainty.
1 > Platelet count (10A6/dl)? (Score: .702e>
2) What was the patient's alcohol usage
in the last year (g per day/Guidance)? (Score: .6842)
3) Has the patient had pale stools
during this illness (Yes/No)? (Score: .6715)
4) MCV (fl>? (Score: .6635)
The 'scores' given with the above questions are measures of how certain the 
diagnosis is expected to be when the question is answered. A value of 1.000 i 
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CHAPTER 7 - THE AUTOMATIC BLOOD PRESSURE 
MEASURING MACHINE
1. BACKGROUND. PROCEDURES AND MEDICAL TERMS
Blood pressure (BP) measurement is a common yet essential part of the 
daily medical routine. It is recorded on admission and regularly 
throughout a stay in hospital. This is the case for routine medical and 
surgical patients and for those in more critical conditions. On coronary 
care, intensive care and renal units the BP is recorded more regularly 
than on other units. Similarly, during surgery monitoring is intense, as 
fluctuations in BP can be an indicator of an imminent change in a 
patient’s overall condition. The BP is expressed as one figure over 
another. The top figure (the systolic pressure) represents the pressure 
exerted when the ventricles of the heart are contracted. The bottom 
figure (the diastolic pressure) represents the pressure exerted when the 
ventricles are relaxed.
The BP can be measured either invasively or non-invasively. Invasive 
measuring is a complicated procedure: A fluid filled line is inserted into 
an available artery while the other end is connected to a pressure 
transducer and a VDU showing the pressure values. This procedure is 
used most often in surgery and intensive care units as it allows continuous 
monitoring, and because of the close proximity of the arterial line to the 
heart, gives results that are considered to represent closely the pressure 
inside the left ventricle. Non-invasive methods are used much more often. 
This familiar procedure is most often performed using an inflatable cuff 
wrapped around the upper arm, attached to a sphygmomanometer which 
measures pressure in millimeters of mercury (mm Hg). The cuff is
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pumped with air until the pressure it exerts interrupts blood supply to the 
arm. By slowly deflating the cuff and noting the pressure value on the 
sphygmomanometer when blood flow resumes - either by palpating 
(feeling) the radial artery or auscultating (listening to) the brachial artery 
through a stethoscope - the systolic pressure is ascertained. Further 
deflation to the point where the sound of the blood flow at the brachial 
pulse disappears determines the diastolic pressure (1). The BP is then 
expressed as systolic over diastolic. This "technique of listening to sounds 
is referred to as the auscultatory method." (Critikon publication II, p. 4) 
The method was developed around 1905 by Nicholai Korotkoff.
Normal values vary enormously depending on age, history, fitness and 
lifestyle. However, a very general guide-line often used is that an ’average’ 
resting adult can expect a BP somewhere in the range of 120/80 mm Hg.
A nurse, a junior doctor, a more senior member of the medical ’firm’, or 
an anaesthetist may normally be responsible for measuring the BP. Other 
paramedical staff - especially cardiac technicians and anaesthetic 
monitoring technicians - are responsible for monitoring the BP during 
various theatre procedures.
A working party of the British Hypertension Society has produced written 
guidelines for taking the blood pressure in the correct fashion (see Petrie 
et al, 1986). The instructions for taking blood pressure can be set out - the 
following passage from Miller and Keane (1978) is, in effect, a set of rules 
for taking blood pressure:
"Measurement of the Blood Pressure: The blood pressure is 
usually measured in the artery of the upper arm, with a
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sphygmomanometer. This consists of a rubber cuff connected to a 
glass tube containing a column of mercury. Alongside the glass 
tube are numbers that indicate the height of the column of 
mercury in millimeters (25 mm. equals 1 inch). In some 
sphygmomanometers the mercury column is replaced by a gauge. 
The rubber cuff is wrapped about the patient’s arm, and then air is 
pumped into the cuff by means of a rubber bulb. As the pressure 
inside the rubber cuff increases, the flow of blood through the 
artery is momentarily checked. The pressure within the cuff causes 
the mercury to rise or the gauge’s needle to move.
A stethoscope is then placed over the artery at the elbow and the 
air pressure within the cuff is slowly released. The pressure begins 
to fall slowly. As soon as blood begins to flow through the artery 
again, tapping sounds can be heard through the stethoscope. This 
is the pulse. When the first tapping sound is heard, the systolic 
pressure is noted.
As the air pressure continues to escape from the cuff, the tapping 
sounds grow louder. A point is reached at which the sounds change 
suddenly to very soft and then disappear entirely. The point on the 
mercury column at which the sound disappears entirely is the 
diastolic pressure.'1 (p. 130-132)
From this it seems that the ’same’ sounds will be audible in every patient 
and the task is best approached using the same strategy every time. 
Humans carrying out this procedure could use behaviour-specific action.
It follows - according to the theory of behaviour-specific action - that a
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machine should be able to do the job by following the same rules that a 
human follows when recording the blood pressure. A human recording 
the blood pressure and a machine recording the blood pressure would 
both be doing the same thing - trying to find out what the numerical value 
of the blood pressure is. This is not an attempt to make a ’diagnosis’, but 
is a presentation of information that will assist the doctors making the 
diagnosis. Measuring the BP is a very small part of many complicated 
medical procedures, and does not appear to require reference to external 
factors, or the extensive use of regular action that those more complex 
procedures demand. It is positioned in the region of point B in the 
venturi.
2. THE AUTOMATIC MACHINE
Manufacturers have recognised and stressed the advantages of 
mechanising this job - a wide variety of automatic BP machines are on the 
market. The machine pin-pointed in this study, manufactured by 
’Critikon’, is the ’Dinamap 1846SX’.
This machine uses a procedure that looks similar to the hands-on, non- 
invasive technique used by humans - it inflates the BP cuff to a level that 
enables it quickly to determine the systolic pressure. Then it deflates the 
cuff in steps to detect the systolic pressure. The machine uses the same 
procedure in every case.
On the front of the machine is a colour-coded control panel. This allows 
the user to instruct the machine to take a single reading, serial readings at 
specific intervals from 1-90 minutes, or a rapid succession of readings over 
a five minute period. The range of acceptable readings is also
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programmed into the machine, and an audible alarm sounds when a 
reading falls outside this pre-determined range.
The job of the machine is to record the BP value and alert a professional 
if this value falls outside the programmed range. The Dinamap machine is 
presented as an accurate, fast and easy to use device (See Freisen and 
Lichtor, 1981). Critikon cite independent published papers that draw 
attention to the reliability and accuracy of the monitors. These papers 
generally conclude that "The instrument was found to give good results in 
a wide variety of clinical subjects and physiologic states" (Ramsey, 1979). 
The conclusion of Inoue’s study (1988) is that the Dinamap monitor is an 
accurate means of measuring non-invasive BP in the operating room, and 
Epstein et al (1989) found the Dinamap monitor more reliable than the 
machine they compared it with, producing measurements that were closer 
to the auscultatory measurements on the chosen patients. It was also 
rated best automatic BP machine in a separate study comparing seven 
different devices (Health Devices Study, 1987). Grundy et al (1981) go so 
far as to suggest that "the Dinamap readings may in some instances be 
more accurate than intra arterial pressure measurements" (Grundy et al, 
1981) (2).
According to the manufacturers, the Dinamap 1846SX has "set new 
standards in the measurement of Systolic, Diastolic and Mean Arterial 
Pressures and Heart Rate." (Critikon publication I). Critikon have also 
conducted their own studies comparing the Dinamap readings with 
invasive pressure recordings. The results show mean differences between 
the two methods of plus or minus 5 mm Hg. As Seaman (1985) points out, 
using a non-invasive machine is far simpler and safer than invasive
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methods and spares the patient the trauma of undergoing an invasive 
procedure.
The impression conveyed in the literature is that the machine performs 
well, providing quick, accurate measurements and effectively taking over 
the task from the human operative. The literature reports suggest that the 
machine is achieving high levels of acceptance and effectively doing the 
human task. The empirical fieldwork was designed to analyse the 
situation in practical settings.
3. THE FIELDWORK (31
3.1 Practical Use
My first impression was that the machine performed well - on a unit 
where it was used regularly the nurse in charge reported that,
"You put it on to automatic when you do it over a set 
period, and then you just leave it and it does it all."
It fitted in well enough to be left to do the job unsupervised. Another 
nurse, who had previously worked on an intensive care unit, explained 
how it had been used there:
"There was no compunction in just setting it up and leaving 
it and trusting it to tell us ... I have found it very reliable."
This matches the sentiment expressed by Seaman in her 1985 paper. The 
title of this paper is 'should you trust automatic blood pressure monitors?’
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Her answer was "Yes, they give consistently accurate readings, [and] save 
you valuable time."
The staff seemed satisfied with the machine and confident about the 
ability of the machine to do the job unassisted. Once set up, I watched the 
activities on the ward and saw that the staff routinely left the machine, 
only returning periodically to read the results off the paper print out, or to 
respond to an alarm. A member of staff on the geriatric ward summed 
this up, saying "This does the job."
The staff involved with the machine seemed to assume that taking the BP 
was straightforward, something that a machine can be allowed to do. To 
them, it was not a complicated task - any skills involved had become 
invisible to them.
But a closer analysis of the literature suggests that taking the BP is far 
more complex than this: Although BP measurement is a procedure 
utilized at every stage of patient care, and it is taken for granted that staff 
are familiar with the non-invasive method and the significance of the 
readings, there seem to be difficulties involved: Jamieson et al (1990) sum 
this up, saying "Measurement of blood pressure is one of the most 
commonly performed clinical procedures but it is beset with difficulties in 
terms of instrumentation, patient factors and observer differences." (p. 
6435) O’Brien and O’Malley (1990) also suggest problems with the BP 
measurement technique, describing it as a "frail foundation" for managing 
and researching into hypertension. The problems associated with 
measuring BP, the factors that lead to false readings and guide-lines for 
measuring the BP are set out clearly in a document prepared by a working 
party of the British Hypertension Society (Petrie et al, 1986). In the
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Critikon publication (II), twelve common sources of error associated with 
taking the BP are discussed (p. 7). These include faulty and badly 
maintained equipment, and variations in observers’ techniques. It seems 
that a variety of methods are used by different staff, depending on where 
and when they were taught and by whom. This idea is echoed in Hatt’s 
research (1992). Amongst her conclusions is the assertion that methods of 
measuring blood pressure vary widely. Techniques depend on the grade, 
gender and geographical location of the measurer, and are highly context 
specific. Differences between measurements made by the same member 
of staff on one patient, are also discussed. (See also Dawe 1993, Jamieson 
et al 1990, Short 1976).
A senior registrar I spoke to also referred to these differences. He called 
the variation ’observer bias’, and explained what he meant:
"If you ask a nurse to take a patient’s blood pressure and ask 
another one two minutes later and another one two minutes later, 
they’d all make it different. It’s notoriously unreliable."
He recognised that the methods adopted by different members of staff 
were variable, and he pointed out why this was important:
"You take the blood pressure by feeling the radial artery and 
pumping the cuff up. That’s the right way to do it. [But] Nurses 
listen [to the pulse inside the elbow, at the brachial artery] and 
when the sound disappears they call it the systolic. But the sound 
can disappear, and when you go on pumping it up it can come back 
in later on. It is called an oscillatory gap, which you miss. You 
don’t miss that if you palpate the radial artery. And I have seen
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nurses underestimate the blood pressure by something like 100 
mm Hg. It is possible ... and when do you say it is diastolic? When 
the sound muffles or when it disappears? There could be 5,10,15 
mm of difference between that. If there is a significant difference 
you are supposed to record both. Some doctors don’t. Nurses don’t. 
Half of them don’t even know whether they are doing it at the 
fourth phase or fifth phase."
It seems that the methods used to record blood pressure are context 
specific, patient specific and measurer specific. The activity is performed 
in a different way at different times, and fits into the category of regular 
action. According to the theory of behaviour-specific action, the task is 
thus beyond the capabilities of an automated device.
So what exactly is involved in measuring the blood pressure? Is it a 
situated action, as the literature suggests - is this why "One-Third of 
Juniors [are] in dark on BP tests"? (Dawe, 1993). Or is it a task that can 
be performed according to a set of rules as the working party of the 
British Hypertension Society, and the instructions in Miller and Keane, 
suggest?
People who are overly-familiar with a task often lose awareness of the 
skills and understandings required to perform that task. In order to fully 
appreciate these skills and understandings, it is necessary to engineer a 
strangeness and recapture the perspective of the novice. The next part of 
the fieldwork was designed to engineer this kind of strangeness, so as to 
clarify the nature of the task of recording the blood pressure and the skills 
involved. In order to take the necessary ’step back’ I used the ’proxy 
stranger’ method (see Collins, 1992b). The method involves giving a
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stranger basic instructions, and observing them performing the task 
according to these instructions. An expert native observer will be able to 
see the mistakes the stranger makes, and the taken for granted 
assumptions that they themselves hold then become clear. The advantage 
of this directed enquiry is that it allows those familiar with the process to 
recognise what they know, by observing what a stranger doesn’t know. In 
this case it allows us to see exactly what is involved in taking the BP, and 
whether it can be accomplished by merely following instructions. The 
strangers chosen were from the sociology department at the University of 
Bath (4). They had no medical background or anatomy training, but all 
spoke English and were university educated.
3.2 The Proxy Stranger
The first volunteer was issued with a list of instructions. I created these 
with the intention of making them clear enough to follow and get the job 
done (figure 7.1). Before starting the experiment the stranger read them 
through and it was immediately apparent that the terminology used and 
her lack of anatomical knowledge were stumbling blocks. My first task 
was to explain the meaning of auscultation and palpation, and show her 
where the radial pulse and the brachial pulse were located. She did not 
know what ’occlude’ meant in this context (5). Before she started I also 
suggested the best place for her to sit in relation to the ’patient’.
Her next enquiry was about which arm to use -
"Should I use the arm nearest the heart?"
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I had not mentioned this in the instructions, not considering it to be 
relevant. Another point the volunteer raised was that she thought this test 
should be done after the patient had ’run around a b it\ I assured her this 
was not necessary for taking a resting BP. I next showed her the right way
Figure 7.1
INSTRUCTIONS FOR VOLUNTEERS IN BLOOD PRESSURE 
MEASURING EXPERIMENTS #1
1. Position the patient comfortably. Sitting is acceptable, with the arm 
resting on the arm of a chair, and the upper arm roughly level with the 
heart.
2. Locate the radial pulse and the brachial pulse by palpation.
3. Attach the cuff to the upper arm, above the elbow, over the brachial 
artery. Position it so that the two rubber tubes lie over the artery at the 
midline (inside the elbow).
4. Palpate the radial artery. Close the air valve above the air pump bell 
and pump the cuff up until the pressure that the cuff exerts is sufficient 
to occlude both the blood flow in the artery and the radial pulse.
5. Continue pumping to 20 or 30 mm Hg beyond this point, keeping the 
palpating fingers in position.
6. To find the systolic value, keep palpating at the position of the radial 
pulse, and slowly deflate the cuff by opening the air valve. Note the 
value when the radial pulse reappears. This is the systolic value.
7. At this point the Korotkoff sounds will be audible over the brachial 
pulse. Continue to deflate the cuff slowly whilst auscultating the 
brachial pulse using the stethoscope. Note the point at which the 
sounds disappear. This is the diastolic value.
8. Express the blood pressure as systolic over diastolic.
9. Feel free to comment on the values obtained.
to position the lever on the stethoscope so that sounds would be audible 
through the diaphragm. She tested it by tapping too hard with her 
fingernail on the diaphragm, with the stethoscope in her ears. Her 
reaction to this was "Ow, ow, oh shit".
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The first practical task was to attach the cuff over the brachial artery. The 
brachial artery is in the upper arm, above the elbow, but her assumption 
was that it was in the same place as the brachial pulse - in the bend of the 
elbow. I explained that the artery is actually above the pulse point. She 
then attached the cuff in the right place. "[Shall I] Close the air valve?" 
was the next question. I showed her how to close the air valve on the 
pump, so that no air escapes from the cuff as it is pumped up. She tried to 
pump up the cuff until she could no longer feel the radial pulse. The point 
at which she could not feel the pulse caused some confusion. Could she or 
couldn’t she? She wasn’t sure, and deliberated about it with the cuff fully 
inflated. (At this point the patient complained that the veins in his arms 
were sticking out). She carried on and decided that the systolic value was 
130 mm Hg. She next had to listen to the sounds in the brachial artery and 
decide when they disappeared. Confusion set in here, she tried to feel 
when the sounds disappeared, rather than listen. I explained that it is 
impossible to feel when a sound disappears, and redirected her. She was 
unable to hear anything through the stethoscope. When she eventually 
claimed to have found the right spot at which to listen, she deflated the 
cuff to zero, without noticing the point at which sounds disappeared and 
what the diastolic value was. The patient apparently had a BP of 130/0 
mm Hg. By this time his fingers were tingling and white because the 
process had taken so long.
Volunteer number two used the same instructions, and again the location 
of the radial and brachial pulses and the meaning of the terms 
auscultation and palpation had to be explained. She proceeded, attaching 
the cuff back to front. Once I rectified this, she was confused about how 
high to pump the cuff,
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"’what exactly does till you occlude the blood flow mean?"
I explained that this is when you can no longer feel the pulse in the radial 
artery. The stranger had trouble with this -
"It is really difficult, you have the pulse, but when you start 
to try and concentrate on something else it is not so easy. It 
is difficult to know when you have lost something."
She couldn’t manage the pumping up and continuing to feel the pulse in 
the radial artery. When she felt she had pumped sufficiently to occlude 
the artery, she had problems deflating and simultaneously feeling when 
the pulse came back in. Listening to the brachial artery sounds she found 
impossible - she couldn’t hear the sounds through the stethoscope and 
gave up the procedure, fearful that she was causing pain to the volunteer 
patient. She couldn’t do two things at once, and failed to produce either 
reading.
The third volunteer was issued with revised instructions which reflected 
the problems the first and second volunteers had encountered (figure 7.2). 
These new instructions explained the terms auscultation and palpation, 
specified where the radial and brachial pulse are found, and clarified the 
level to which the cuff needed to be pumped up. The instructions stressed 
that the brachial pulse had to be listened to through the stethoscope to 
find the diastolic value.
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Figure 7.2
INSTRUCTIONS FOR VOLUNTEERS IN BLOOD PRESSURE 
MEASURING EXPERIMENTS #2
1. Position the patient comfortably. Sitting is acceptable, with the arm 
resting on the arm of a chair, and the upper arm roughly level with the 
heart.
2. For reference,locate the radial pulse inside the wrist and the 
brachial pulse inside the elbow by palpation (feeling).
3. Attach the cuff to the upper arm, above the elbow, over the brachial 
arteiy. Position it so that the two rubber tubes lie over the artery at the 
midline (inside the elbow).
4. Palpate the radial arteiy. Close the air valve above the air pump bell 
and pump the cuff up until the pressure that the cuff exerts is sufficient 
to occlude both the olood flow m the artery and the radial pulse, ie 
pump until you can no longer feel the pulse at the wrist.
5. Continue pumping to 20 or 30 mm Hg beyond this point, keeping the 
palpating fingers in position - where the radial pulse was evident.
6. To find the systolic value, keep palpating at the position of the radial 
pulse, and slowly deflate the cuff by opening the air valve. Note the 
value when the radial pulse reappears. This is the systolic value.
7. At this point the Korotkoff sounds will be audible - through the 
stethescope - over the brachial pulse. Continue to deflate the cuff 
slowly whilst auscultating (listening to) the brachial pulse using the 
stethoscope. Note the point at which the sounds disappear. This is the 
diastolic value.
8. Express the blood pressure as systolic over diastolic.
9. Feel free to comment on the values obtained.
This volunteer proceeded well up to the point where he had to listen to 
the Korotkoff sounds through the stethoscope. He was using the wrong 
part of the stethoscope, so I intervened to flick the switch in the right 
direction. Still he had no success:
"I can’t hear sod all",
He gave up at this point and no diastolic value was obtained.
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For the fourth volunteer the instructions were revised further so as to 
reflect the problems experienced by the first three volunteers (figure 7.3). 
I included advice on how to use the stethoscope - the flick switch should 
be toward the user, and the silver diaphragm should be used to listen for 
sounds.
Still the fourth stranger had problems - he could not find the brachial 
pulse until I showed him exactly where to feel, he attached the cuff inside 
out so that the fastenings were invisible, and he did not realise that he was 
the 'user’ of the stethoscope and the switch should be toward him. His 
efforts led to him suggesting that his ’patient’ had a systolic value of 95 
mm Hg. He could not hear the sounds for the diastolic -
"What is it meant to sound like? I can’t hear anything."
His final comment was that the systolic value of 95 was ’pretty average’, 
but getting the diastolic value was far more difficult because,
"When you let the pressure out of here, it shoots down, doesn’t it, 
with a vengeance."
His idea that 95 was a pretty average reading for the systolic was the only 
comment that any of the four volunteers made about the values. None of 




INSTRUCTIONS FOR VOLUNTEERS IN BLOOD PRESSURE 
MEASURING EXPERIMENTS #3
1. Position the patient comfortably. Sitting is acceptable, with the arm 
resting on the arm of a chair, and the upper arm roughly level with the 
heart.
2. For reference,locate the radial pulse inside the wrist and the 
brachial pulse inside the elbow by palpation (feeling).
3. It is necessary to become accustomed to the stethoscope. The ’flick 
switch’ near the diaphragm must point toward the user in order for 
sounds to be heard through the diaphragm. With this stethoscope, the 
silver diaphragm is used to listen to sounds, not the black ’bell’
4. Hang the stethoscope around the neck, so that using it and inserting 
the ear pieces into the ears is easily achieved when needed.
5. Attach the cuff to the upper arm, above the elbow, over the brachial 
arteiy. Position it so that the two rubber tubes lie over the artery at the 
midline (inside the elbow).
6. Palpate the radial arteiy. Close the air valve above the air pump bell 
and pump the cuff up until the pressure that the cuff exerts is sufficient 
to occlude both the blood flow m the artery and the radial pulse, ie 
pump until you can no longer feel the pulse at the wrist.
7. Continue pumping to 20 or 30 mm Hg beyond this point, keeping the 
palpating fingers in position - where the radial pulse was evident.
8. To find the systolic value, keep palpating at the position of the radial 
pulse, and slowly deflate the cuff by opening the air valve. Note the 
value when the radial pulse reappears. This is the systolic value.
9. At this point the Korotkoff sounds will be audible - through the 
stethescope - over the brachial pulse. Continue to deflate the cuff 
slowly whilst auscultating (listening to) the brachial pulse using the 
stethoscope. Note the point at which the sounds disappear. This is the 
diastolic value.
10. Express the blood pressure as systolic over diastolic.
11. Feel free to comment on the values obtained.
It was clear to me that the instructions needed to be enlarged for each 
volunteer, and still queries and misunderstandings arose. The problems 
and confusion experienced by the volunteers showed me the things that 
experts knew about the procedure and took for granted, which the novices 
did not know and which I tried to make specific in a list of instructions.
184
They as novices did not have the necessary skills and expertise to do the 
job, and my instructions did not convey these adequately. Such things as 
knowing what auscultation and palpation mean, knowing where the 
brachial pulse and radial pulse are and how to find them, how hard to 
press, how to attach the cuff and where to attach it, how high to pump the 
cuff and how to do that whilst still feeling the pulse. I was able to decide 
when the pulse was and was not present, and I knew how to use a 
stethoscope, what to listen for, and when to decide that sounds were no 
longer present. All of these things were part of my expert ’taken for 
granted’ knowledge of the procedure of taking the blood pressure in the 
traditional way. The efforts of the strangers showed how internalised or 
invisible these things had become to me (6). This is the expertise that has 
become ’hidden’. These experiments show that there is, literally, more to 
taking the blood pressure than meets the eye - and that there is more 
involved than following specific instructions and executing behaviour- 
specific action.
The question that arises from this is, if the task is so complex, involving 
many learned, internalised skills, how does the computerised machine 
cope so well? The machine is not part of the medical form of life - it is an 
asocial artefact. Answering this question involves looking at the exact task 
that the machine performs. What aspects of the human role have been 
subsumed by the machine?
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3.3 The Humans* Role and The Machine’s Role
3.3i The Traditional Human Role and The Skills Required
The proxy stranger experiments show the range of human skills required 
to take the blood pressure. Locating the pulses, attaching the cuff, 
inflating it, feeling, listening through the stethoscope, deciding the systolic 
and diastolic levels, deciding on the significance of the reading in terms of 
this particular patient. The human needs to master each of these 
procedures in order to produce a BP reading and to act appropriately in 
the light of that reading.
3.3ii The New Human Role and The Skills Required
When using an automatic device to monitor a patient’s BP the human 
operator has to approach the patient, explain the procedure, attach the 
cuff and set the alarms on the machine. Only then does the machine do its 
job. And after that the human has to transfer the BP reading from the 
digital display or paper print out to the patient’s charts and notes, and 
decide whether to act on the results. The parts that the human does have 
changed very little.
3.3iii The Machine’s Role
We can see that the machine does a small part of the overall procedure - 
it inflates the cuff and senses the pressures as the cuff deflates. At the 
beginning and at the end of the process the human role remains the same 
as it was before the introduction of the new technology. Under the new 
system the machine fits nicely into the middle of the human contributions.
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A doctor who has been extensively involved with automatic blood 
pressure measuring summed this up well:
"All it does is save you pumping up and listening or palpating. It 
stops you having to go along every hour, maybe forgetting, stops 
the same person having to go along every hour. It does the boring 
bits. It is useful for things like that, but you’ve got to know its 
limitations."
The human contribution at the start of the process ’digitises’ the input, 
narrows down the wider world of, for example, different kinds of patients, 
different sized patients and different sized arms, and presents it in a form 
that the computer can deal with. At the end, the human ’repairs’ the 
output insofar as they decide how relevant the reading or alarm is in the 
particular case under scrutiny. They convert the readings into courses of 
action acceptable in the medical world. The doctor pointed out that the 
machine does the ’boring bits’ in between the digitization and repair. How 
does it do this?? After all, people have difficulty with this part of the task. 
Novices often fail - as the proxy stranger experiments show - and so called 
’experts’ often produce readings that do not correspond with those made 
by other experts. What is it about this specific part of the process that 
makes it suitable for delegation to the machine?
3.4 The Specific Task for the Machine
The ideal BP taking scenario would arise if all operators responded in 
the same way to the same sounds. If this behaviour-specific response was 
evident, BP readings would be comparable over time and between 
measurers. But, although humans may ideally want to use a behaviour-
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specific technique and instantiate parts of the action of recording the 
blood pressure with the same behaviour every time, they rarely achieve 
this in practice. Medical staff use various techniques, depending on who 
taught them and their personal preferences. Another factor is the acuity 
of the hearing of the operator - what one person describes as muffled, 
another may hear clearly. It may be inaudible to a third. When the 
operator listens to the pulse at the brachial artery through the stethoscope 
these factors come into play. Similarly, when palpating the pulse at the 
radial artery - who can say when a pulse is no longer present? How hard 
do you press? One person’s BP recording is quite likely to be different to 
the next person’s recording on the same patient. Beyond this, it is 
probable that readings taken by the same human vary over time, 
especially if they are in a hurry, or if they are tired or bored. The 
behaviour in each case varies - it is not as simple as the behaviour-specific 
model suggests. And yet it does fall into the category of behaviour-specific 
action because people (ideally) intend to use behaviour-specific action. 
(See Collins, 1990, p. 34)
The clarification of the terms behaviour-specific action and regular 
action, that Collins and Kusch are perfecting (see chapter 4), helps to 
explain how the machine can perform well and produce results that are 
seen as comparable over time: Collins and Kusch acknowledge that 
variability in instantiations occur in both regular action and behaviour- 
specific action. In the case of behaviour-specific acts, actors do not intend 
to vary their instantiations, but some degree of variation is tolerated, 
provided that the outcome of the action is ’satisfactory’. People have a 
margin of tolerance for variation in technique but this variation is not part 
of the actors’ intention. In the case of BP measuring, the actors’ intention 
- in ideal circumstances - is to reproduce earlier instantiations so that
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readings are comparable and observer bias is eliminated. Measuring BP is 
an example of behaviour-specific action where the margin of tolerance to 
variation in technique is relatively wide. Collins and Kusch suggest that if 
a machine reproduces any of the acceptable instantiations that the people 
use, it will be acceptable to those people. However, this case is slightly 
different because the machine is not reproducing any of the instantiations 
that a person would use, but instead uses a different method:
Forster and Turner (1986) point out that "The technique most widely 
used by physicians to measure blood pressure is the auscultatory method. 
Measurements made by this method require interpretation of the onset 
and disappearance of flow (Korotkoff) sounds. This procedure requires 
skill and is difficult to automate. In recent years there has been a renewal 
of interest in other methods that can be more easily automated ... the 
oscillometric method appears to offer the best opportunity for 
automation." (p. 359)
The Dinamap machine uses the oscillometric method. This was first 
described by Marey in 1879. The technique is an alternative to the 
auscultatory technique, and measures pressure changes rather than 
sounds (see Davis, 1982). The principle of the method is that during 
deflation of the cuff, the blood and the vessel wall start to oscillate when 
the systolic pressure is reached, and continue to oscillate until there is no 
constriction over the artery. The oscillations are transmitted through the 
air filled rubber bladder in the cuff, and measured electronically by a 
transducer. This procedure looks similar to the hands-on, non-invasive 
technique used by humans - the cuff is inflated to a level that allows 
measurement of the systolic pressure. Then the cuff is deflated, a further 
deflation step taken when two identical sequential pressure pulses are
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detected. This eliminates the effect of noise and ensures that accurate 
readings are given by the machine (Critikon publication II, p. 10). This is 
a sensory mechanism requiring no microphones or external transducers. 
The machine measures systolic, diastolic and mean arterial pressure as 
shown in the diagram in figure 7.4. The Critikon publication (II) suggests 
that "The oscillometric method of measuring blood pressure is prone to 
fewer errors than the conventional mercury sphygmomanometer and 
stethoscope technique, and observer bias is removed" (p. 11).
DETERMINATION SEQUENCE
Systolic Pressure is the cuff pressure at which oscillations in pressure begin to increase in amplitude. 
The Mean Arterial Pressure is the lowest cuff pressure at which the maximum oscillations in pressure occur. 
Diastolic pressure is the cuff pressure at which the oscillations stop decreasing in amplitude.
Figure 7.4
The machine is using a different technique to that used by human 
operators. This is where the example leaves Collins and Kusch behind. 
The machine is not mimicking an instantiation used by humans. But it is 
producing acceptable results using a different rule-based method. I 
suggest that if the desired outcome is produced by a machine, the method 
used by the machine will then fit into the humans’ margin of tolerance for 
variations in technique. Going further than Collins and Kusch, it seems 
that in cases where we are indifferent to the way a task is performed, a
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machine does not need to mimic what any one human would do. It needs 
to produce an acceptable outcome. It follows that the method used will be 
an acceptable one. The BP machine is doing a job that people often find 
difficult, using a different method to people. The machine substitutes the 
humans' badly executed attempts at behaviour-specific action with well 
executed mechanical behaviour-specific action.
3.5 Advantages of A Mechanised Approach
Critikon, the manufacturers of Dinamap, have suggested that the current 
confusion over the ’correct’ human technique has meant that "both 
hypotension and hypertension may be over or under diagnosed. Patients 
may be misclassified and treatments either withheld or prescribed 
inappropriately." (p. 5) They go on to claim that it is "against this 
background that the use of automated devices is growing rapidly." (p. 5)
In practice, the machine does seem to remove the ’observer bias’, as one 
of the nurses explained. She said that the major advantage of using the 
computerised technique was that it produces ’standardised’ readings:
"This machine will always give the same BP on a patient, as long as 
their condition is the same. Not like with people. They can vary. 
And different people can give different readings."
Staff had their own strategy for minimising this human variation, which a 
nursing sister explained:
"When you are doing observation on, say a patient with a blood 
transfusion, hopefully you won’t chop and change [the person
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recording the BP] except at the end of a shift when those changes 
can be noted.”
When the machine was used, there was no longer to worry about 
variation over time or between measurers. The machine’s behaviour- 
specific action was more useful than the unreliable attempts of the staff to 
do behaviour-specific action.
4. DISCUSSION
Several points have been highlighted by the fieldwork: First, taking the 
blood pressure is best achieved using regular action for some parts, and 
behaviour-specific action for other parts. Although a behaviour-specific 
response would be the ideal way to do the ’detecting and measuring’ parts 
of the job, in practice humans rarely manage this. Two types of variation 
occur: (1) Inter-human variation and (2) Intra-human variation.
This machine is being used to do the detecting and measuring parts of 
taking the BP. The machine uses a different technique to people and by­
passes the subjective decisions that humans make about when the sounds 
become muffled, or disappear, or when pulses are no longer palpable. 
Consequently, the machine, which uses a standardised procedures and 
produces completely standardised readings gives what are considered 
’better’ results over a period of time than would be produced if several 
humans undertook the task between them. Machines are better at 
behaviour-specific action than we are - examples of humans choosing to 
instantiate action with the same behaviour every time are difficult to 
locate. This is despite F W Taylor’s dream of routinized factories full of 
workers doing tasks in a pre-specified manner.
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Some of the other parts of this task could also be reduced to a behaviour- 
specific format, and delegated to machines. Attaching the cuff to the arm 
is another part of the job that can in theory be mechanised in this way, 
without loss, because it is feasible to anticipate most variations in arm 
size. The desired outcome of ’attaching the cuff correctly’ could be 
achieved using any method that ’works’, which would then fall within the 
zone of tolerance of the humans (7). However, other parts of the process 
do not lend themselves to a behaviour-specific approach. They are 
situated near the top, wide end of the venturi. These parts of the 
procedure are influenced by broad, wider-world type factors and 
individual patient’s characteristics. Explaining the procedure to the 
patient, setting the alarms and deciding on the relevance of a given 
numerical reading fall into this category. These factors cannot be reduced 
to a behaviour-specific format without losing a great deal of what is 
important in the actors’ world. When people undertake this kind of task, 
they respond to variations in a spontaneous way. Part of the actors’ 
intention when performing these regular acts is to give variable responses 
in each individual case. The outcome of a behaviour-specific approach 
would not be ’acceptable’ for these wide-end-of-the-venturi tasks. As such, 
computerisation of these tasks seems highly unlikely.
The experiments highlight exactly how complex a task it is to take the BP 
in the traditional fashion and how many skills are involved in producing a 
BP reading. The machine accomplishes its part of the job - a part best 
done using behaviour-specific action - because we surround it with skill 
and expertise. This expert reaction to the prevailing circumstances 
amounts to digitization and repair, and it enables the machine’s concerted 
behaviour to fit into the medical world of concerted action. The humans
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use their accumulated hidden expertise and commonsense abilities to fill 
in the gaps between the machine’s level of competence and the real world 
of medicine. This ’hidden expertise’ allows the machine to function 
effectively without crossing boundaries into other facets of medicine. The 
staff deal with these external influences when they narrow down the wider 
world to specifics that the machine can deal with and when they adapt the 
machine’s output for use in the wider world. A senior registrar talked 
about this. He was adamant that human skill and expertise were still 
necessary when using an automatic machine, but this skill went largely 
unnoticed. He identified two specific cases. First, he explained the 
importance of setting the alarms at the appropriate level:
"I’ve seen people use that machine to monitor blood pressure after 
liver biopsy, but then you have got to set it within certain limits - 
what level would you have it alarming at? They [the patients] could 
have esanguinated [bled to death] by the time it alarms if you set it 
low enough."
The ’correct’ level at which the alarm should be set is different for every 
patient, because ’normal’ varies for every patient. A decision based on 
their medical condition, their age, any investigatory procedures they may 
have undergone, etc, is made in each case. He then went on to talk about 
transferring the reading to the notes, and deciding whether to act on it.
He was adamant that expertise and skill were essential at this point:
"If the machine gives a reading of 50/20, what does a non qualified 
person do? Write it down, oh 50/20. Ooh, 50/20 that’s alright, 
lovely."
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Such a reading is dangerously low, but it requires expertise to recognise 
and act on this (8). It is necessary to be well-versed in the significance of 
BP readings in many different kinds of patients. This human expertise, 
which takes account of individual patient characteristics, is essential if the 
machine is to fit into the social setting.
5. SUMMARY
The theory that machines can reproduce that part of human action which 
people choose to carry out in a behaviour-specific manner is not 
challenged by this study. An interesting additional point illustrated here is 
that machines using one set of behaviour-specific responses can be used 
in place of humans who have failed in their attempts at a different set of 
behaviour-specific responses. The BP machine’s results are as acceptable 
as the human results, (or, in this case, more acceptable) even though the 
method used to do the task is different.
This machine does its job in a way that is completely acceptable to the 
users - it is well received and blends into the social setting of wards. The 
users contribute skills that enable this blending-in to occur, but the 
tedious, methodical part has been handed over to an automated device. 
There seem to be no barriers to the use of this machine, either human 
barriers or technological barriers. This is because this is a very limited 
field of medicine, not affected by external influences, where behaviour- 
specific responses are the best way to get the job done. This is a task that 
sits in the narrowest part of the venturi. Employed at this level, the 
machine works well. Do any other facets of medicine fall into this 
category? Does the success of the automatic BP measuring machine occur
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in other instances? The next case study involved investigations into the 
use of automatic machines designed for interpreting electrocardiograph 
traces. Does this case contribute anything new to the theory of behaviour- 
specific action, or tell us anything new about the usefulness of the venturi 
model?
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 7
1. Sometimes the point at which the sound of the blood flow muffles is 
used to determine diastolic pressure. There is much debate about which 
point should be used. Some textbooks suggest that diastolic pressure 
should be recorded at the 4th phase (when the sounds muffle) eg. see 
Macloed (ed) 1979, p. 112. Other texts suggest phase 5 (when the sounds 
disappear) eg. see Perloff 1982, p. 50; Miller and Keane 1978, p. 132.
2. This is an important claim because it is generally accepted within 
cardiology that an intra-arterial pressure value is the next best thing to a 
direct pressure from inside the heart. To be more accurate than an intra- 
arterial pressure, the value would have to be recorded within the chamber 
of the left ventricle using a cardiac catheter.
3. Gaining native competence and understanding during this case study 
was easy. I drew on my own experience as a cardiology technician familiar 
with both methods of BP measuring and with the significance of the 
readings, and I drew on the experience of the experts involved with the 
new technology. When full participation was not possible, I used 
conversations with users and periods of observation of the machine in use 
to see how the machine performed and how well it fitted into the routine 
of the department.
4. A problem with this method is deciding how strange the stranger should 
be. An extreme choice of stranger would be one so strange that she did 
not speak the same language as the natives. This would illustrate all the 
expertise to do with understanding English that is involved in the task at 
hand. The stranger need be as strange as the experimenter chooses. In 
this case my choice was based on the need for someone unfamiliar with 
the medical task under scrutiny, but familiar with other aspects such as 
English language knowledge, which are needed for the job.
5. In retrospect it may seem that I was naive to have expected novices to 
the medical world to understand these anatomical terms, and that 
including them in the instructions was disingenious. At the time of 
formulating the instructions these terms seemed perfectly appropriate. 
This may signify how invisible the extent of my medical socialisation had 
become to me. As such it reinforces my claim that a step back needs to be 
taken by those overly-familiar with any task.
6. They were so familiar to me that I needed someone else to show them 
to me. A poet once sumed this up:
"You need someone to open up a door,
To show you something you seen before, 
but overlooked a hundred times or more.
You need someone to open your eyes."
(Bob Dylan, 1963)
7. A senior registrar had suggested that attaching the cuff to the arm was 
one of the more skilled parts of the task. He asked me, "Well would you 
know how to fix it to the arm? Would anybody else know? Would my 
mother know how to fix it to the arm over the brachial artery?" He was 
stressing the expertise needed for this part of the procedure, and would 
presumably argue that this part could not be delegated to a machine. My
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suggestion is that anticipating the likely variations associated with this 
part of the procedure is more feasible than anticipating the likely 
variations associated with other parts of the task, so an acceptable 
mechanically produced outcome is more easily envisaged. The necessity 
for an experienced human to stand by and intervene when a patient with 
an arm type (or without a left arm) that has not been anticipated is still 
necessary.
8. This is a very broad claim. Is this kind of knowledge really limited to 
experts? An ad-hoc poll amongst my non-medical peers suggests that 
knowledge about blood pressure readings is indeed esoteric. When asked 
what a reading of 50/20 meant to them, the responses varied. Many had 
no idea, being unaware of what a normal reading was. One person said, 
"That sounds OK to me, because isn’t the bottom figure supposed to 
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CHAPTER 8 ■ INTERPRETIVE ELECTROCARDIOGRAPH 
MACHINES
1. BACKGROUND. PROCEDURES AND MEDICAL TERMS
Heart attacks (infarcts), high blood pressure (hypertension), and episodes of 
chest pain on exertion (angina) are common-place in the developed western 
world. Cardiology is the branch of medicine that deals with these problems 
and one of the most simple Cardiac tests is an Electrocardiograph (ECG). 
An ECG is a graphical record of the electrical potentials produced in 
association with the contraction and relaxation of the Cardiac muscle. 
Electrodes attached to the surface of the body detect this electrical activity 
which is presented either on a VDU or as a permanent record on paper. 
Irregularities in the timing (rhythm) of the heart’s complexes as well as in the 
shape (morphology) of the complexes are evident on an ECG trace. These 
cues enable an experienced practitioner to ascertain the condition of the 
Cardiac muscle and the electrical conduction mechanism which triggers the 
heart’s contractions, and to tell whether a previous infarction has occurred.
Each time the heart beats, one ’cycle’ is produced on the graph. A schematic 
cycle is shown in figure 8.1. The p wave corresponds to atrial contraction, the 
qrs complex to ventricular contraction and the T wave to ventricular 
relaxation. In normal Sinus Rhythm each p wave is followed by one qrs 
complex and one T wave. Deviations from this pattern signify an unusual 
rhythm.
Ten electrodes are positioned on the body during the recording of an adult 
ECG - one on each arm and leg, and six more on the chest. Various 
combinations of these ten electrodes produce a ’twelve lead’ ECG. This is a
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chart showing twelve sections of Cardiac rhythm, which offers an all-round 
view of the heart. Most recordings have a long ’rhythm strip’ printed beneath 




Figure 1.1 Normal sinus rhythm
p wave = Atrial depolarisation 
qrs = Ventricular depolarisation 
T wave = Ventricular Repolarisation
Routine ECGs are recorded on all types of patients, even those without 
obvious Cardiac problems. Most patients requiring a general anaesthetic can 
expect to have an ECG taken in advance to check for Cardiology problems, 
and to determine whether they are fit to withstand anaesthetic and surgery. 
These ’pre-op’ ECGs become more likely with increased age, when the 
patient is a heavy smoker, or falls into some other high risk category. If a 
long stay in hospital is anticipated, a series of ECGs may be recorded, so that 
changes in Cardiac condition can be monitored. ECGs are quick and easy to 
perform, painless and inexpensive, and it has been estimated that over two 
hundred million ECGs are recorded annually world-wide (Banta et al 1985, 
p . 2 3 ).
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Writers such as Doue and Vallance believe that "ECG interpretation (is) a 
complex and hard learned profession" (1985, p. 29). However, some 
conditions are more easy to identify than others, and certain ECGs can be 
interpreted by utilising knowledge about the expected normal physiology of 
the heart and the conduction mechanism. The ’rhythm strip’ is used 
extensively at this level of analysis. The heart rate, rhythm disturbances and 
first, second and third degree heart blocks are easily seen on long rhythm 
strips (1).
Other abnormal ECGs are less easy to interpret and an analysis of all 12 
leads of the trace is required. The patterns associated with new, old and 
established infarctions, ischemia or muscle hypertrophy, supra-ventricular 
tachycardias and axis deviation may occur alongside the rhythm disturbances 
described above. A basic knowledge of the physiology and conduction 
mechanism of the heart is necessary but not sufficient for analysing these 
traces - complex criteria have to be utilised and delicate patterns and trends 
distinguished.
This can tax medical staff for a number of reasons. When presented with 
these complex traces many medical staff are unable to offer an 
interpretation; even if they once understood the traces, nurses, medical 
students and doctors working in specialities other than Cardiology can easily 
become ’rusty’. Some staff may never have even mastered ECG 
interpretation because of a lack of available expert tuition, and in any case 
the standards of ECG analysis vary widely between institutions. To add to the 
confusion, it has been admitted that the parameters used to interpret ECG 
information are not standardised throughout the medical world. As Ginzton
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and Laks acknowledge, "Cardiologists do not apply criteria consistently when 
reading ECGs." (1984, p. 40).
2. THE COMPUTERISED MACHINE
Manufacturers of Cardiac monitoring equipment have recognised the 
esoteric nature of ECG interpretation skill and they see a machine which can 
accomplish ECG interpretation and disseminate the information to a wider 
audience as commercially desirable. The initial ECG analysis programs, 
developed in the 1960s, were greeted with excitement. Each new generation 
of improved machines has been hailed as a step in the right direction. 
Ginzton and Laks (1984) suggested that computerised ECG analysis was 
advantageous because of its speed, consistency and the reduction in turn­
around time (the time between taking the ECG, getting a report and 
initiating the appropriate action) that it engenders. Other authors believe 
that "these analysis programs are attaining widespread acceptance as a means 
to help contain the cost of health care," and that they make the physicians job 
easier, eliminate much of the drudgery involved in ECG analysis, and allow 
the physician more time to concentrate on patient care. (Banta et al 1985, p. 
23/24).
The justification for introducing interpretive ECG machines is that they can 
reduce the workload of the physician by performing some of the more 
tedious aspects of routine ECG analysis. It has been suggested that when 
people interpret ECGs, "The human expert’s task can be divided into two 
parts; Screening - given an ECG readout, determine whether the patient is 
suffering any heart malfunction at all. Diagnosis - given an abnormal ECG, 
give a hypothesis diagnosis of the heart disorder it represents." (Priest 1989, 
p. 39/40). One of the major claims is that automatic machines can take over
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the ’screening’ of ECGs. A recent study on the efficacy of interpretive ECG 
machines concluded that "the machines tested appear to have a place in 
sorting electrocardiograms into normal and abnormal [screening]." (Lack et 
al 1989, p. 24). This is a point that is emphasised by manufacturers of the 
automatic machines - if the ECGs are screened automatically, the physicians 
have the luxury of only over-reading those traces deemed ’abnormal’ by the 
machine. This gives them more time to do other, more interesting things. A 
sales representative explained it as follows:
"We are trying to limit the amount of work the Cardiologist is having 
to do ... They are not interested in reading ECGs any more if the 
machine can do it and they can just look at a few."
Beyond this, the machines are designed to measure various sections of the 
ECG and to offer an interpretation of all ECGs, including those deemed 
’abnormal’.
3. THE FIELDWORK
The fieldwork was carried out at three hospitals in Wales. Between 1981 and 
19861 had worked permanently in the cardiology department at one of these 
hospitals and participant comprehension was thus easily achieved. My prior 
experience and the insider understandings I held meant that I was completely 
at home in the world of cardiology. I knew what was and what was not 
admissible as an account within the field and I experienced no language 
barriers - in terms of accent or technical jargon. Dealing with staff of all 
grades posed no problems in terms of misplaced deference. I was fully aware 
of the accepted and expected conduct within the hospital, I was interested in 
new developments in the field and was able to engage in authentic two-way
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exchanges with the professionals and patients involved. Most important for 
this study, I learned my ECG interpretation trade at a centre of excellence, 
and am able to analyse most ECGs. I visited one department every day for 
several weeks, assisting, talking and collecting examples. At the smaller 
department I spoke with all the staff in the department, from technicians to 
once-a-week consultant, and observed as the machine was used. At the third 
hospital, I was given a uniform and allowed to do the job of a technician for a 
month. The objectives were to assess the nature of the task of ECG 
interpretation, is it regular action or behaviour-specific action, and where in 
the ventrui does the task fit? How well do interpretive ECG machines 
perform, and how well do they fit into the social/medical environment? Do 
the answers to these questions alter in view of the particular medical 
environment in which the machine is deployed?
3.1 Day To Dav Use
My first impression was that the staff foresaw no problems in allowing the 
machine to screen the ECGs. Theoretically they saw it as a straightforward 
job that a machine should be able to do. For example, one registrar 
specialising in Cardiology suggested that,
"An ECG is just a line on a piece of paper, so all you are doing is 
describing what you see, based on a background of what you believe 
to be normal, and only then deciding whether it’s abnormal or not ... 
given the technology, a machine should be able to say whether a black 
line on a white piece of paper is normal or not."
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As long as the machine limited itself to describing the ECG in relation to 
what it is programmed to define as normal he foresaw few problems. A 
second expert stated that
"I think that you can clearly get a machine that will tell you if an ECG 
is normal - 1 don’t think that’s any problem at all."
Many of the staff were willing to rely on machines to carry out the screening 
function, and a concensus emerged along the lines of:
"In cases where the machine says it is normal, then fine, I think we can 
rely on that."
But when I looked at the machine in practice it became clear that in 
everyday use practitioners have become accustomed to machine failures and 
mis-interpretations. One member of staff recounted an instance that had 
occurred a few days previously, which involved a patient with third degree 
heart block. Such patients are usually assessed quickly with a view to 
pacemaker implantation. The automatic machine had analysed the ECG and 
made an interpretation of ’normal sinus rhythm’. This mistake was serious, 
and the technician summed up her reaction to the mistake:
"Its hard to believe that it could get something so basic, wrong. I think 
it’s because in this instance, the rate was fast for third degree block - it 
was about 60 - so instead of looking for the p waves it just assumed 
that it was normal sinus rhythm because it was so fast. I think it has 
real trouble sensing the p waves, and was only sensing the qrs."
"So what did you do about it?"
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"I did another ECG with the interpretation switched off. You can’t 
have them hanging around with false diagnoses on them."
This example of a ’false normal’ was the most severe that the technician 
could remember. Soon though, an instance where the machine produced a 
’false abnormal’ occurred: In the ECG reproduced below (figure 8.2), the 
machine has produced an interpretation that includes atrial 
flutter/fibrillation. It has ’detected’ multiple p waves at a rate of 343 bpm, a 
ventricular rate of 62 bpm, and declared the ECG to be abnormal.
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This interpretation is presumably based on the pattern evident in lead VI. 
But it is not possible for an ECG to show atrial flutter or fibrillation in just
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one of the 12 leads of the ECG. In this situation a competent human analyst 
would view the ECG as a whole. This would provide a resource for finding 
the ECG to be of good quality except for lead VI, and they would 
subsequently be able to make an analysis based on the information in the 
other eleven leads. The result would be an interpretation along the lines of:
- Loose electrode or interference in VI,
- Normal sinus rhythm at 62 bpm,
In both these cases the machine has failed to separate the normal ECG 
examples from the abnormal (screen the ECGs) in an acceptable fashion.
What about interpreting abnormal ECGs? Is the machine better suited to 
this part of the job? Staff generally felt that this task was beyond the scope of 
computerised ECG machines, as machines do not have access to the 
strategies that humans use. When experts were asked about these strategies 
they often found it difficult to express them. The cardiology registrar said:
"I look at the rhythm, I look at the rate, I look at the axis, I do this, I 
do that, but sometimes I just pick it up and say ’my God, complete 
heart block’ and put it down again, or say ’left bundle branch block’, 
and you don’t say much more about it."
And a Cardiac Consultant stated that
"ECG analysis is such an incredibly complex thing. It’s not just what 
you learn in the books, it’s the twenty years of experience ... knowing 
which T waves which are inverted are the ones that are likely to be 
troublesome and the ones that are not. So that experience side of 
things is very difficult to verbalise and very difficult to program."
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Thus, it seems that human experts rely on past experience to interpret 
ECGs. However, whilst they know how to do it, they cannot always explain 
how they do it. That is, experts find it difficult to specify the characteristics of 
this essential tacit knowledge. Clinical judgement allows experts to decide 
how to deal with subtle variations in each new case, but programming this 
information into a machine is by no means straightforward. One senior 
registrar felt very strongly that a machine should not attempt to interpret 
abnormal ECGs, because
"a machine can’t talk to the patient and get a history, and the machine
can’t examine the patient."
Is this pessimistic view justified in terms of the machine’s practical results? 
What happens when the machine interprets the ECG traces? During the 
fieldwork I collected numerous examples where the machine produced 
unacceptable interpretations. Example 3 overleaf shows an ECG with a 
ventricular ectopic. This was the first ECG I saw the machine interpret 
(figure 8.3).
The interpretation is that the aberrant beat is an atrial ectopic rather than a 
ventricular ectopic. This is not a life-threatening mistake - neither variety of 
ectopic is dangerous if it occurs singularly and infrequently. However, this 
mistake is interesting because it is so basic. The characteristics of an atrial 
ectopic are quite different to those of a ventricular ectopic. The machine has 
failed to interpret the ECG correctly and has failed to recognise the distinct 
characteristics of the most common abnormal beat - the ventricular ectopic.
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Another classic example of the machine’s incompetence soon occurred. An 
ECG was recorded on a sixty nine year old man. The machine produced an 
interpretation of sinus rhythm with first degree AV block - which it 
categorised as abnormal - at 15.01 on May 25 (example 4, figure 8.4). This 
interpretation is inaccurate, as is the suggestion that the patient presented 
right-axis deviation. After some discussion with the technician in charge a 
second ECG was recorded, with no adjustments to the recording leads. 
Example 5 - the trace in figure 8.5 - was produced at 15.06, and this time the 
machine suggested that the ECG was borderline, showing a non-specific 
conduction delay. No mention now of right-axis deviation. This interpretation 
is also inaccurate. Finally, example 6, shown in figure 8.6, was produced at 
15.13. This time the machine gave a more accurate interpretation - atrial 
flutter with a 4:1 block. For the first time, the possibility of right bundle 
branch block was suggested in the analysis.
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In this instance the machine has offered three different interpretations of 
ECGs taken from the same patient over a period of just twelve minutes. 
(These three cases are discussed in more detail in section 3.3, below).
Occasionally technicians make mistakes when applying the electrodes to the 
patient. If the arm leads are reversed, or a leg and an arm lead are swapped, 
the ECG will display unusual characteristics. These are normally noticed by 
the technician when the ECG is printed and the electrodes rearranged so 
that another ECG can be recorded. However, the interpretive machine does 
not always detect human error in limb lead application, as is shown in the 
following experimental case.
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CASE 1: Two ECGs were recorded - the first with normal limb lead 
application, (figure 8.7) and the second with the arm leads reversed (figure 
8 .8).
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The trace in figure 8.7, which was recorded correctly, has been interpreted 
as abnormal by the machine. Figure 8.8 also has a list of abnormalities 
printed on it, and an interpretation of abnormal. The machine has not 
noticed that the trace in figure 8.8 has been recorded with the arm leads 
reversed (2). More of these experiments were performed on several patients. 
The machine did occasionally suggest that the limb lead application was 
incorrect, but far more often it attempted an interpretation on a trace that 
was recorded from wrongly positioned electrodes.
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The details of these examples are not of prime importance here. The major 
point that I am making is that the machine is unreliable in its ability to 
distinguish acceptable input from unacceptable. It produces an interpretation 
on unacceptable data - and relies on the human operator to provide it with 
acceptable data.
In the ECG reproduced in figure 8.9 the machine has made an abnormal 
interpretation. A pacemaker rhythm has also been identified, but no 
pacemaker activity is actually present. To an experienced eye, the mistake 
can be explained because the qrs complexes are regular and of high voltage - 
similar to pacemaker spikes. The operator in this case ignored both the 
misinterpretation and the extraneous suggestion that a pacemaker rhythm 
was evident.
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The ECG shown in example 10 (figure 8.10) has been interpreted as 
abnormal, but the essential abnormality - that of a malfunctioning pacemaker 
- has not been listed. This omission is serious, the patient is liable to collapse 
at any moment. The lack of ventricular activity on the rhythm strip shows that 
spontaneous ventricular contraction cannot be relied on. The pacemaker 
spikes on this trace are not followed by ventricular contractions, and the 
machine has mistakenly identified these redundant electrical pacemaker 
impulses as high voltage qrs complexes - suggestive of left ventricular 
hypertrophy. All in all, this interpretation misses the vital characteristics that 
humans would notice and use to categorise this ECG as dangerously 
abnormal. The operator reacted by recognising the mistake, mentally 
inserting the missing portion of the interpretation, and ensuring that it was 
brought to the attention of a physician.
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The examples of the machines’ mistakes described here took many working 
hours to collect. These examples were carefully selected from many cases 
where the machine did give what was counted as accurate screening and 
interpretation decisions. In practice the machine coped well with many 
straightforward traces. Beyond this, the amplitude and voltage measurements 
produced were believed to be extremely useful in clinical settings, during 
drug trials, and most importantly for measurements on heart transplant 
patients’ traces. The machine is very useful in these areas. However, the 
cases described above show that fully acceptable automatic ECG 
interpretation has not been achieved. Programs often fail to produce 
interpretations that equate with human interpretations. Despite this, the 
machines are appearing in more and more departments and apparently being 
used regularly. How can we explain this paradox?
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3.2 Digitization and repair
First of all, staff are aware that the machines require ’clean’ input data, 
devoid of mistakes or fuzzy data. The staff provide this ’digitized’ input. 
When the machine is left to cope with input signals that have not been 
adequately digitized, such as in example 2, the output they provide is not 
acceptable. Examples 7 and 8 show what happens when the machine is fed 
faulty input - it produces interpretations on ECGs which humans would 
recognise as having been recorded incorrectly. If the staff do not provide an 
acceptable and clear input signal, the output is often unacceptable. One of 
the consultants was well aware of this, and told me:
"You know the American expression ’Garbage in - garbage out’? Well, 
that’s what happens with this machine. If you screw it up by putting 
the wrong stuff in, you get the wrong stuff out. It is not that 
intelligent."
Staff also respond when the machine produces unacceptable output 
interpretations: When presented with the ECG described above, which the 
machine described as showing sinus rhythm when third degree block was 
evident, the technician ignored the machine’s ’normal’ decision, over-read 
the ECG herself and decided that the machine had made a serious error. She 
then produced another recording without an interpretation. Again in ECG 
example 2, the technician immediately ’repaired’ the machine’s faulty output. 
She realised that the interpretation was wrong, adjusted the VI electrode so 
as to receive an improved signal and recorded another trace - this time with 
the interpretation mode switched off. Similarly in examples 9 and 10.
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Without human repair of erroneous output, the consequences in either of 
these cases may have been serious.
The concepts of digitization and repair do help explain how the machine is 
able to fit into the environment despite its obvious shortcomings. But how 
can the human reaction to the series of mistakes associated with the traces in 
figures 8.4,8.5 and 8.6 be explained?
3.3 The ’Same’ Traces
From a cardiological point of view the ECGs in figures 8.4,8.5 and 8.6 are 
the same, in terms of rhythm, rate and morphology. When technicians and 
physicians were asked to comment on these ECGs the responses were as 
follows -
"Ha! Identical. The rhythm is the same, the qrs morphology is the 
same. It is identical. These three are identical ECGs."
"They are the same ECG basically."
"Yes, same, yes."
"I would say that they are probably all the same. I haven’t measured 
the things, but they look all the same to me."
"Yes, I can’t really see any difference."
All the experts that were approached considered the ECGs to be the same. 
Yet finding them ’the same’ is an achievement on the part of the
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practitioners, since the traces are in fact slightly different: the ventricular rate 
varies, the voltage of the complexes varies, and there is artifact on figure 8.6 
in lead V3. Yet to experienced practitioners these ECGs are sufficiently ’the 
same’ in terms of the important criteria to be classified as the same - they 
ignore the differences (3). Thus, concepts of similarity and difference do not 
come ’ready packaged’ so to speak, but are organised in the context of their 
situated application. What people see as ’the same’ or ’different’ is a product 
of their expertise and experience. Cardiologists are able to respond to these 
three ECGs in the same way, in the knowledge that other Cardiologists will 
also respond to them in that same way, because of their Cardiological 
socialisation and training. The machine, though, is programmed to recognise 
specific differences. So, differences that the experienced human ignores 
cause the machine to come to, what is in practice, a wrong conclusion. The 
human technician displayed great tolerance and charitability toward the 
machine. She re-pressed the start button every few minutes until a 
reasonable interpretation of the ECG was produced by the machine. Had I 
not been there, expressing an interest in the mistakes, she said that she would 
have switched the interpretation facility off after the first mis-interpretation, 
in order to avoid dealing with the mistake. She would have spared the 
machine the close inspection I insisted on.
4. DISCUSSION
The commonly expressed belief was that the machines should be able to 
screen ECGs, but would have difficulty interpreting abnormal ECGs. The 
fieldwork has shown that in practice the machine faces difficulties with both 
tasks.
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The belief that the machine can distinguish between normal and abnormal 
ECGs is based on the notion of a definite dividing line between these 
categories. But this ignores the possibility that in practice ’normal’ is an 
achieved rather than a given characteristic of an ECG. Categorising an ECG 
as ’normal’ involves negotiations performed the light of prevailing 
circumstances. This can be seen in three ways:
First, when doctors or technicians classify an ECG as normal a number of 
different contextual factors are taken into account, such as the age, race, 
medical history and body size of the patient. Thus, what is ’normal’ for one 
population would not be ’normal’ for another. What is ’normal’ for an 
eighteen year old would not be ’normal’ for an eighty year old. Attributions 
of ’normality’ are thus based upon the medical practitioners experience of 
the relevant categories that can be assigned to a patient and the contextual 
relevance of their information. As one doctor pointed out,
"There are some people who’s body shape is so extreme that what is 
normal in them would be thought of as abnormal if you didn’t know 
what the shape of their bodies were."
Second, rather than being a statistical term, related to the exact morphology 
of the complexes, ’normal’ may refer to a state in which the patient is fit and 
healthy. An asymptomatic patient may present an ECG that is statistically 
abnormal, but which experienced practitioners count as ’normal’ in that 
particular case. One of the consultants explained that
"Different races and different ethnic groups have different normals."
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Third, disagreement about the criteria for an abnormal ECG is widespread. 
Similarly, what constitutes a normal ECG is a source of debate amongst 
medical practitioners. As one Cardiologist put it:
"There are as many definitions of what’s normal as there are 
Cardiologists."
A senior registrar reinforced this point when he suggested that the idea of 
’normal’ changes as more information becomes available to the analyst, and 
they become more confident. As this confidence grows, they become able to 
say,
"This, although it is a bit odd is normal in the absence of any other 
problem, whereas a machine does not have the confidence because its 
not built in to have confidence to say - ’Well, on balance this is 
probably just nothing, and is just a q wave in V2, maybe the heart is 
just a bit rotated - forget it.’"
A cardiology consultant also expressed concern that problems may arise if 
the machine was asked to interpret subtle variations on normal, and 
determine what these meant clinically in each individual case. He was wary 
of the machine’s tendency to produce
"worrying reports ... on what are actually normal variants."
Another doctor reinforced this when he said,
"I think sometimes, an ECG that I would consider to be normal, the 
machine would come up with a list of possible abnormalities."
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These points suggest that a definition of normal can only be ’for all practical 
purposes’, and that any blanket formalisation of normal has to be moulded to 
fit the circumstances in which it is used. A consequence of this is that the 
meaning of normal and the position of the normal boundaries can be 
negotiated, and when human analysts disagree, considered discussion leads 
to a consensus interpretation. ’Correct’ interpretations of ECGs, and the 
normal or abnormal decision are achieved by the participants - the physicians 
and technicians involved - using regular (mental) action. Pre-defining normal 
is difficult, especially in borderline cases. Consequently, programming 
machines to identify normal cases is a dubious concept (4).
Similarly, when interpreting abnormal ECGs the machine can make quite 
drastic mistakes. This is because just as the classification of an ECG as 
’normal’ or ’the same as’ or different from another trace is a situated 
achievement, so too is the classification of a trace as ’abnormal’. During 
ECG interpretation the machine applies criteria in a pre-specified manner 
which does not match the way that human experts interpret ECGs. Machine 
interpretations which differ from humans’ interpretations arise because the 
machines do not approach the task in the same way as humans do, or use the 
same cues.
Another problem with the machine is that it often ’over-diagnoses’, and 
interprets what people would consider to be normal ECGs as ’abnormal’.
One consultant suggested that this occurs because:
"The philosophy of the machine is to diagnose normality with 
certainty. The corollary of that is that it must also diagnose some 
normality as abnormality in order to be certain."
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This possibility of over-diagnosis produces a split amongst practitioners. 
Some see the machines’ propensity to diagnose normal traces as abnormal as 
acceptable, others do not: A chief technician remarked that
"It may give out abnormals when they are not. That is a step in the 
right direction. It is better for it to say ’query abnormal’ when it is 
normal, than it saying its normal when its distinctly not norm al... so 
that someone has the chance to over-read it."
He saw the production of false abnormals as a small price to pay for a 
machine that can (theoretically) carry out the screening process. However, 
other practitioners offered an equally credible argument: When normal 
ECGs are diagnosed as abnormal, "inexperienced staff become alarmed", 
(registrar) "time and money is wasted on unnecessary referrals to hospitals, 
and patients become anxious" (consultant).
The question that arises from this discussion is, does it matter that the 
machines sometimes produce interpretations that are considered to be 
inaccurate and of little use? The human contribution is so evidently 
necessary and accepted, it is likely that the machine’s mistakes do not matter 
because they will always be detected.
In practice the machine’s normal decisions are not relied on by experienced 
operators in the largest hospital in the study. The ECG traces are routinely 
and automatically checked, and the experienced human experts do not accept 
the normal/abnormal distinction made by the machine, nor the full 
interpretations. Instead they rely on their own interpretations. The technician 
in charge of the pacemaker clinic in this department pointed out that patients
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attending the pacemaker clinic are routinely given an ECG, but in this 
situation,
"When I get the ECG, I may read what it says on the top [the 
machine’s analysis], but I don’t take it in. I always interpret the ECG 
myself, because that’s what we’ve always been taught here."
The users here seem to expect and accept the mistakes made by the 
machine. Rather than complain to manufacturers, they take on board the 
role of ’detector of mistakes’. Evidently the machine’s performance is 
dependent on the charity of the humans who operate it. At this point it 
became clear that at this hospital, the largest in the study, many of the 
technicians never used the interpretation mode. They felt that checking the 
interpretation and recording another trace when the interpretation was 
unacceptable, was a waste of time. Furthermore, using the interpretation 
facility was in itself time consuming, because it involved asking the patient 
personal questions, typing this data into the machine and waiting for the 
machine to produce an analysis at the end of the recording. Very often the 
technicians either extracted the ECG from the machine before it was given a 
chance to print an interpretation, or else they requested a measurement-only 
report, and ignored the interpretation facility completely. Their justifications 
for this policy were wide ranging:
"It takes so long to decide on it’s diagnosis after it’s printed the ECG."
"It takes too long, and then it’s sometimes wrong"
"If you are busy you just can‘t wait - it takes ages. You could have 
done a whole ECG while you were waiting for it."
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"Doctors here shouldn’t need it - this is Cardiology"
"It is much too time consuming to punch in all the data that it asks for. 
Sometimes patients don’t know how tall they are, let alone the drugs 
they are taking."
"I’m not confident to give it to them [doctors], in case I don’t check it, 
and it turns out to be wrong, and they may take it at face value. Who 
would be at fault then?"
The technicians felt that their own interpretations were quicker and more 
accurate than those produced by the machine. So, in a large hospital such as 
this, no, it does not seem to matter that the machine is often unreliable. 
Human cardiological expertise is available literally ’on tap’, and the 
machine’s ECG analyses are over-read and often over-ruled.
But this is not the case everywhere. In the smaller hospital involved in the 
study, there were no resident medical cardiac staff and the technicians were 
more or less self-taught. There the machine was often relied on to give a 
definitive ECG interpretation. The sales representative admitted that,
"You will find that [some] Cardiology departments will use it as a 
definitive machine, to give them an interpretation... I would say that 
of the market, one out of twenty buy it for that reason."
A doctor at this small hospital reported that
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"Most of the SHOs here are specialising in Opthalmology, and I’m 
sure they’d be the first to admit they are not crack ECG interpreters"
It seems that when these doctors require an interpretation of an ECG the 
machine’s analysis is referred to. The technician in charge remembered that
"We have had one or two people who have actually looked at the 
diagnosis and taken it as fact."
Bearing in mind the machine’s mistakes described above, such reliance is 
alarming. The consequences of using an interpretive ECG machine are 
obviously different in this environment where human ECG interpretation 
skills are in short supply, than in the large teaching hospital. A visiting 
Consultant to the smaller hospital set out a vivid example of the problems 
associated with the use of the interpretive machine there:
"When an abnormal ECG [according to the machine] comes up, the 
switch is flicked, and the patient is discharged. And if you put yourself 
in that patient’s position, they’ve come to hospital, apprehensive, 
psychologically prepared to undergo an unpleasant experience. They 
get to the last stage and somebody flicks a switch, [on the basis of the 
automatic ECG interpretation], the trap door opens and out they go 
again."
In effect the machine was used as an exclusion device to decide who was and 
who was not fit to undergo anaesthetic and surgery.
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5. SUMMARY
I have shown some of the problems involved with using interpretive ECG 
machines. In some departments, the machines are not used because 
experienced operators acts as a barrier - they may ignore the interpretation 
facility, believing they can do better themselves, or they repair the machine’s 
shortcomings. This human barrier to their use is based on a recognition of 
the technological inadequacies of the machine. However, despite the 
practical problems highlighted here, interpretive ECG machines are 
becoming increasingly common in practice and continue to stimulate great 
interest. In establishments where human cardiac expertise is in short supply, 
staff look favourably on potential solutions 10 the skill shortage. Large and 
advanced medical units recognise other attractions of the machines - high 
quality presentation, glossy traces with no evidence of messy human 
intervention, and a series of useful amplitude and axis measurements. In 
both environments, manufacturers’ ’special deals’, which frequently offer 
interpretive machines at the price of non-interpretive models, are the final 
persuasion. One Chief Technician summed up the situation when he said,
"Who wants to be the only Cardiology department without an
interpretive machine?"
I have shown that both stages of the ECG interpretation procedure involve 
regular action rather than behaviour-specific action - the calcification of the 
normal/abnormal decision, and the classification of abnormal traces are 
situated achievements. The task of ECG analysis is complex, and lies towards 
the wide end of the venturi model, where the medical world meets the wider 
world. The wider world influences become evident when we consider the 
range of factors that influence all parts of the human achievement of ECG
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interpretation. It is understandable that the rule based functioning of the 
machine does not produce interpretations that always equate with human 
interpretations. Still the machines are popular in many departments, clinics 
and surgeries. Under these circumstances it is vital that the disadvantages 
and the advantages of the systems are made clear to all users, because the 
tendency is that in environments where human expertise is lacking,
"People will believe anything that bloody machine writes, because it 
looks so formal, it looks so impressive. Their attitude is, this can’t be 
wrong." (cardiology consultant).
Despite the inaccuracies in some of the interpretations, these machines 
blend into the social setting in the medical environments. I have shown that 
the human digitization, repair and general charitability toward the machine 
underlies this ’fitting in’. The human role in the machine’s performance is 
essential. But in environments where human ECG expertise is in short 
supply, repair of the machine’s inaccuracies does not always occur, and still 
the machines ’fit in’. It seems that staff who are unaware of the nature of 
competent human performance welcome the machine, as it appears - to them 
- to be an acceptable social prothesis. But it is not an acceptable social 
prothesis in the eyes of experienced practitioners. The reason for this is that 
it does not cross the boundary between ECG analysis (the discrete area in 
which it works) and the wider world - the arena in which experienced humans 
work.
It must be recognised that the machine demands the presence of an expert 
human interpreter. The danger of using the interpretive machines is that 
some physicians and technicians, who are not themselves expert ECG 
interpreters, are impressed by the nature of the trace and the mechanical
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interpretation. They are liable to accept the interpretation without 
considering the value of its content, or repairing it in the light of the 
particular patient under scrutiny. Only an experienced human can clear up 
ambiguities, explain anomalies to novices, check the validity of unusual 
measurement decisions, and decisively over-rule an interpretation. The role 
of the charitable, knowledgeable human is essential. In essence, these 
machines can be employed as tools, under experienced supervision. They are 
never suitable as replacements for experts, unless an informed decision has 
been made that the machine, with all the faults that have been highlighted 
here, is more acceptable than the available alternative. This decision is only 
likely in situations where the available alternative is no interpretation at all.
This case has involved looking at a machine which is attempting to do a task 
that involves a range of situated, regular human actions when people do it. 
The failures of the machine and the reasons why - despite these failures - it is 
still popular in Cardiology departments, have been discussed. The next case 
study is concerned with another machine - 'HELP’ - that is tackling a wide 
range of human actions. Do the same explanations of charity, digitization, 
repair and human inability to recognise a competent or an incompetent 
performance, explain why the ’HELP’ system is such a prominant aspect of 
health care at one particular American hospital?
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 8
1. See Hartland (1993) for explanations and examples of various rhythm 
strips and abnormalities.
2. The machine has requested a repeat ECG because of the artefact present 
in some of the leads, not because of the incorrect limb lead application.
3. Transparencies of these traces are reproduced in appendix 1. When these 
are superimposed it is clear that although the traces are very similar, there 
are subtle differences. The doctors involved are able to ignore these 
differences.
4. See Hartland (1990b) for a more thorough discussion of the problems 
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1. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
The ’HELP’ hospital information system differs from the other case 
studies presented: it is designed to tackle a wide range of tasks within the 
hospital, rather than a specific single measurement or diagnostic task. 
HELP has been under development at the Latter day Saints (LDS) 
hospital in Salt Lake City for more than 20 years. The LDS is a 520 bed 
private tertiary care hospital that acts as a major teaching centre for the 
University of Utah school of medicine. HELP facilities have gradually 
become part of the routine in most departments in the hospital. In their 
book, Kuperman et al (1991) describe HELP as a ’Dynamic Hospital 
Information System’ - because it is continually being updated and 
improved, with new facilities and sub-systems being added.
HELP is the acronym for ’Health Evaluation through Logical 
Processing’. Throughout its development, the system has often been used 
as an example in the study of the use of computers in medical care. As a 
result, the evolution of the HELP system has been charted in great detail 
in the medical and research literature - Kuperman et al (1991) list 180 
publications and 42 dissertations and doctoral theses that are based on 
HELP and its applications.
H R Warner is considered to be the main pioneer of the HELP system at 
the LDS. His work in the late 1950s involved the use of computers to 
make diagnoses on the basis of clinical information from congenital heart 
disease patients. These diagnoses were produced using Bayesian 
statistical analyses. This progressed in the early 1960s to work on
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computer processing of physiological signals. This marked the beginning 
of the field of patient monitoring. Successes here eventually led to the 
computerisation of many patient signals in the intensive care units 
(ICUs). As computer hardware and software improved, it became 
possible to directly interface laboratory blood gas analyses to a central 
computer at the LDS, so that laboratory data was automatically collected 
and transmitted to ICU, where it was used in the care of patients.
The next development at LDS was the application of ECG interpretation 
algorithms in 1968 - "The two first LDS hospital computer decision 
making applications to become clinically operational were interpretations 
of the ECG and blood gas results." (Kuperman et al, 1991, p. 9). ECG 
interpretation algorithms are accepted as being the forerunners of all 
other decision making and decision support systems offered in the current 
version of HELP. (See Warner, 1978) (1).
As more monitoring capabilities were introduced at the hospital, it 
became clear that integrating the outputs of these individual systems 
would be of greater value than the outputs of the individual systems 
themselves. In 1970 all clinical systems programs were combined to use a 
common data base, and this data base was the initial step in the 
formulation of the current HELP system.
There were four major objectives for HELP at this stage: 1. The system 
must allow for an ever-expanding medical data base. 2. It must possess 
medical decision logic, including criteria for diagnostic, therapeutic and 
alarm protocols. 3. It must serve the medical and administrative needs of 
the hospital. And finally, 4. the system must allow for effective research 
sub-systems that facilitate clinical research using the large data base in
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the system, (see Pryor et al, 1983). Since then, research into additional 
clinical applications of the system has continued and the number of 
decision support facilities has increased. A coding system for medical 
terms is now in place which has allowed expansion of the knowledge base 
holding the medical ’logic’. Throughout the 1970’s the services offered by 
HELP were made available to more and more staff as terminals were 
installed on all the ICUs and some general nursing floors. The entire 
system was transferred to more modern computer hardware in 1979. This 
changeover incorporated facilities that allowed HELP to assist with the 
financial and administrative work in the hospital.
During the 1980s the decision making capabilities of HELP were 
expanded and more functions were added. In 1989 Gardner et al outlined 
the types of decision support that HELP was programmed to provide at 
that time. These were:
1. Alerting of staff to time critical or action oriented events such as 
abnormal laboratory values, vital signs or medical contra-indications.
2. Interpreting, by assimilating data results such as ECG morphology and 
rhythm, and interpretation of blood gas data.
3. Assisting through use of decision support to simplify actions, such as 
assisting with clinical orders.
4. Critiquing, which involves analysis and validation of decisions such as 
drug prescriptions.
5. Diagnosing by applying a medical ’model’ for understanding the state of 
a physiological system - eg, diagnosing using Bayesian strategy.
6. Managing patients, using techniques such as the generation of protocols 
for ventilator control in critically ill ICU patients. (See Gardner et al,
1989, p. 96).
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Add to this list the newer functions described by Kuperman et al (1991) - 
such things as surgery scheduling, Xray scheduling, all billing and 
administrative functions, ordering of supplies, nurse charting - and it 
becomes clear that "What started in 1967 as a computerised system to 
help monitor patients following open heart surgery has now dramatically 
matured." (Gardner et al 1992, p. 235). Now the daily operation and 
smooth running of the hospital depends on the HELP system.
2. THE COMPUTERISED MACHINE
Patient information is stored in HELP’S clinical data base in two forms - 
a long term abstract of information to be used if a patient is readmitted to 
the hospital, and a short term comprehensive collection of all data 
gathered during the current admission. (Pryor et al, 1983; Burke et al, 
1991). The patient reports and directives that the system produces are 
dependent on information from a wide variety of departments being 
entered into the integrated data base. Data entry is the responsibility of 
nurses, therapists, pharmacists and laboratory staff.
The system works on both a time drive and a data drive principle. In time 
drive mode the system activates at a specified time each day, or each 
week. In data drive mode the ’logic’ is automatically activated whenever 
new patient data is entered. There is no need for manual activation of the 
system in either mode: HELP tirelessly monitors patient data, sifting 
through enormous quantities of clinical information.
The LDS hospital system is unique in the extent of the computerised 
services that it offers patients and staff. Kuperman et al point out that
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"The research and development that have taken place at LDS hospital in 
physiological monitoring, systems integration, database development, 
man-machine interface and medical decision making makes the LDS 
hospital experience in the field of computerised hospital information 
systems unparalleled." (1991, p. 13).
In essence HELP is used for 1. data management, 2. information 
processing and 3. automated decision support. (Kuperman et al, 1991. p. 
53). These writers explain that Data is the raw, uninterpreted elements 
used by decision makers - laboratory results, physiological signals, patient 
charges. The computer stores, organises and allows retrieval of this data. 
Information, by contrast, is a collection of data arranged in a manner that 
conveys meaning. An example is a display of various physiological 
readings that is presented in an organised way to a physician, which allows 
plans of action to be initiated. The distinction between data management 
and information processing can be blurred and somewhat arbitrary. 
Automated decision support is a different kind of computer task. For this 
the computer utilizes medical knowledge stored in the knowledge base 
and uses it to make patient-specific inferences.
Many instances of HELP using encoded medical knowledge for 
automated decision support are documented. The most comprehensive 
description of these can be found in Kuperman et al (1991). The 
infectious disease and drug alerting programs are two examples that fit 
into this category of automated decision support. The chief pharmacist 
explained that
"the programs dealing with infectious diseases and drugs are used
most often."
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These two programs incorporate the following three capabilities:
1. Algorithms for determining which patients have hospital acquired 
infections, and for predicting which patients are likely to acquire these.
2. Guidelines for improving the timing of pre-operative antibiotic 
prescribing and for reducing the unnecessary use of post-operative 
antibiotic use.
3. Algorithms that alert the physician to the likelihood of an adverse drug 
reaction.
These three capabilities show the HELP computer undertaking ’human’ 
tasks. The next section will concentrate on these three capabilities of the 
infectious disease and drug alerting programs, rather than on the data 
management and information processing capabilities.
3. THE FIELDWORK PART 1:
THE INFECTIOUS DISEASE AND DRUG ALERTING PROGRAMS
The information in the following sections was collected in November 
1991 during a visit to the LDS hospital. In order to attain understandings 
and native competence, I comprehensively trawled the literature about 
the HELP system, I had detailed conversations with designers and users 
of the system, attended demonstrations of new capabilities and observed 
parts of the system in routine use.
3.1 Detection of Hospital Acquired Infections
Between 5% and 8% of patients admitted to a US hospital develop a 
hospital acquired, or nosocomial, infection. The hospitals are required by
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the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Health Care (JCAHC) to 
report all instances of nosocomial infections, explaining where and how 
the infection was acquired. The chief pharmacist explained how this is 
achieved at the LDS hospital:
"In the infectious disease area, the computer diagnoses the 
nosocomial infections."
This facility has been available since 1984. The computer uses data from 
the microbiology laboratory and other branches of the HELP system, and 
’knowledge’ from the specific microbiology module of the medical 
knowledge base. The microbiology module has two components - the 
clinical microbiology laboratory system which produces routine 
microbiology results for patients, and the computerised infectious disease 
monitor (CIDM). The CIDM produces reports for the department of 
infectious diseases and for pharmacy. It is the CIDM that assesses every 
patient’s data, accesses the knowledge base and produces a list of patients 
with nosocomial infections.
A CIDM report is automatically generated each morning for every 
patient. An alert is produced if the patient has a nosocomial infection (2). 
In addition to this, the CIDM has six other functions, and will alert the 
physician when any of the following are detected:
- An infection at a normally sterile body site.
- An infection due to a bacteria with unusual antibiotic sensitivity 
patterns.
- An infection in a patient who is receiving no antibiotics, or antibiotics 
which are inappropriate.
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- A patient who is receiving an antibiotic that is not the least expensive.
- An infection that should be reported to the National Health Authority. 
(As explained by the programmer).
Since the computer has been assigned the task of identifying nosocomial 
infections, the process has been speeded up, and the computerised 
method is generally considered more efficient than the manual method. 
The senior programmer explained that
"The computerised surveillance identified 90% of the hospital 
acquired infections and the manual surveillance identified 76% 
[and] manual required about two thirds or three quarters of the 
infection control practitioner’s time."
The accumulated information in the CIDM has also been analysed in 
retrospect. A statistical analysis of 24 variables from patients presenting 
nosocomial infections was carried out. The factors analysed ranged from 
sex, age, physician and disease, to type of surgery, use of urinary catheters 
and length of stay, etc. A predictive model was produced which allows the 
computer to pin-point the patients currently at risk of acquiring a 
nosocomial infection. The chief programmer explained how this works:
"We run the patient through this model and the patient will get a 
score between 0 and 10. If your score is less than 1 you have got a 
10.9% probability of getting an infection while you are in the 
hospital. But if your score is greater than 9 you have got a 97.6% 
chance. So the computer will tell us everyday which patients are at 
high risk."
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About 35 nosocomial infection alerts are generated every day in the LDS 
hospital. (Evans et al, 1985). Evans suggests that identifying patients with 
nosocomial infections and isolating patients at risk of acquiring a 
nosocomial infection constitutes a "logical benefit". This he defines as "an 
improvement in the process of care, such as a reduction in time or 
medical personnel, that allows a process that is not efficient when 
performed manually to become efficient through the use of a computer." 
(Evans, 1991, p. 284).
3.2 Improving the Timing of Antibiotic Administration
In 1986 attempts were made to improve the timing of prophylactic 
antibiotic administration (3). These antibiotics should be administered 0-2 
hours before surgery. A survey at the LDS in 1986 showed that only 40% 
of patients who should have received prophylactic antibiotics in this 
period actually did. (Evans, 1991). A computer program within HELP was 
designed to search all patients every day and identify those surgical 
patients requiring a pre-operative antibiotic (see Larson et al, 1989). The 
result is that,
"Now there is a computer program out there that the nurses can 
actually run and it will tell them which patients should get a pre­
operative antibiotic."
The administration rate during the 0-2 hour period has now increased to 
95% of patients. Alongside this, significant decreases in the post operative 
wound infection rate have also been noted. The chief pharmacist 
explained the mechanism of this system:
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"Only 40% of people were getting their antibiotic within that time 
[0-2 hours pre-op]. And what we decided to do was use a reminder 
that was generated by the computer that would go and find all 
these people that needed an antibiotic and generate a sticker that 
would go in the chart so the surgeon would think about whether to 
give an antibiotic or not."
To make these predictions HELP uses information in the knowledge 
base which identifies procedures which require a pre-op antibiotic. Such 
procedures are apparently well recognised -
"We can absolutely guarantee that there are certain surgeries that 
require antibiotics. There is literature world-wide to back you up 
on this one."
A further application of this program operates on a time-driven principle 
at 11am every morning. It identifies patients that have already undergone 
surgery and checks the time since the operation. If this is more than 48 
hours and they are still receiving antibiotics, the program asks why. The 
policy decided on at LDS is that post-op antibiotics should stop after 48 
hours, but this is sometimes overlooked. Assigning this task to the 
computer was designed to improve cost efficiency by stopping antibiotics 
on time. The pharmacist explained that after the computer has identified 
patients still on antibiotics after 48 hours:
"It looks at the underlying diseases. In the case of thoracic surgery 
patients it checks to see has this patient had his arterial lines or 
swan ganz lines [out] because all thoracic surgeons want their 
patients to have antibiotics as long as they have their lines in. If
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there is no evidence out there on the computerised medical record 
why the patient should still be on antibiotics the computer will 
generate an alert."
A report in 1990 concluded that computer surveillance in this field is an 
efficient and promising means of identifying errors in microbial 
prescribing. (See Pestotnik et al, 1990).
The continuous antibiotic monitoring of all patients that HELP performs 
is facilitated by the modular knowledge base and integrated patient data 
base. Burke et al’s paper (1991) offers a detailed description of these 
processes.
3.3 Detection of Adverse Drug Events and Reactions
As many as 30% of patients may experience an adverse drug event 
(ADE) when in an American hospital. 0.31% of patients suffer an ADE 
that is fatal - this amounts to between 60,000 and 140,000 patients every 
year (Classen et al, 1991).
ADEs of two types arise. Type A is a predictable event - a drug/drug, 
drug/food or drug/laboratory interaction. Type B reactions occur either 
when patients have an allergy to a drug - which is not predictable unless 
the patient is aware of the allergy - or when the normally prescribed dose 
of a drug is too high for the particular patient under observation.
Hospitals are required to report all ADEs to the JCAHC and this was 
traditionally done manually by the nurses. The nurses "had to describe the 
reaction and what was done about it, decide what drug caused the
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reaction, and have the nursing supervisor and prescribing physician sign 
the report." (Evans, 1991, p. 286)
Relying on this voluntary reporting is potentially cumbersome and 
ineffective (Classen et al, 1991), and in the year May 1988-April 1989, 
only nine ADEs were reported by this manual method at the LDS.
The knowledge engineers and computer programmers set about 
designing a program that would do the job of checking for ADEs 
automatically. The resulting module is driven by patient data. All patient 
drug data, laboratory data, food data, and known allergy data is checked 
every day by the program. This system is easy to use, and far less time- 
consuming than the manual method. The programmer explained that,
"They [nurses] just enter the data. Every time that gets entered the 
information will activate the data driver. And the data driver 
activates the knowledge base."
The system has been in operation since 1989. In the first year, 401 ADEs 
were identified and reported. The following year, with an extension of the 
knowledge base, this increased to 597. By 1991, Classen et al (1991) 
reported that the figure was 700. This is an increase of almost 80 fold on 
the manual figure of 9 cases per year reported.
The computer has access to every aspect of the patient data, and is able 
to constantly monitor all the variables, so that all ADEs for every patient 
are pin-pointed. Of the ADEs detected by HELP, 95% were classified as 
moderate or severe, and resulted in a change in therapy or duration of 
hospital stay. Recognising ADEs quickly allows for early cessation of the
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causative agent and potential prevention of more serious manifestations, 
which could have resulted in a longer period in the hospital. Clearly the 
ADE monitor is another example of what Evans (1991) terms a ’logical 
benefit’.
The program has been improved in an attempt to reduce the number of 
false positives it produces (4). New ’logic’ has been added that allows 
HELP to check for other patient specific reasons for an unusual result, 
before suggesting an ADE. The knowledge engineer explained this 
concept:
"For example, if the patient has a creatinine clearance of less than 
50ml/min, that will activate the knowledge base as a possible 
adverse drug event. But then the knowledge base goes to check, 
say, does this patient have any other reason why he is having other 
renal problems? It checks the underlying diseases - is he scheduled 
to have kidney transplant or whatever, so it checks the underlying 
diseases and surgery information. If it cannot determine why the 
patient would have a creatinine clearance that low other than an 
ADE, it generates an alert."
In a similar way to which the HAI program has been extended to predict 
the patients at most risk of acquiring a nosocomial infection, this program 
is being developed to predict which patients will be likely to suffer from 
an adverse drug event. A retrospective analysis of patient variables is 
being conducted so that new patients at risk can be isolated.
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4. DISCUSSION
Neither the infectious disease program nor the drug alerting program are 
foolproof - they may suggest nosocomial infections or ADEs in patients 
where they are not evident; they may suggest that post-operative 
antibiotics should be stopped, when the patient under scrutiny actually 
requires an extension to the usual 48 hour post-op administration. The 
programmers have two methods of reducing these false positive alerts: 
First by continuously updating and improving the knowledge base, adding 
new logic so that the computer will consider as many alternatives as 
possible before issuing an alert. Secondly, by attempting to educate the 
doctors to inform the system when a patient is somehow unusual in their 
presentation and requires drugs or treatment for longer than usual 
guidelines.
Doctors at the LDS are reluctant to become involved with inputting data 
to HELP, so patients who are somehow unusual, and exceptions to the 
rules and logic in the knowledge base continue to crop up, and alerts 
continue to be generated inappropriately. In these cases it is then up to 
the doctor to over-ride the computer’s suggestions. The chief pharmacist 
pointed out that
"You are still going to have to rely on your personal experience to
say ’do I believe this and does it apply in this particular patient?’.
Because the computer cannot know everything about every
patient."
Although they can make mistakes, the three programs that I have 
selected and described all offer ’logical benefits’ (Evans 1991, Table 2).
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They all allow processes that were not efficient when performed by 
humans to become efficient through the use of the computer: Identifying 
hospital acquired infections using the computer is now more efficient and 
takes less time than it took manually; the administration rate of 
prophylactic antibiotics during the optimal period has improved from 
40% to 95% of patients; identifying and reporting ADEs has increased 
from 9 cases a year by manual methods to 700 cases by computer. The 
computer is doing these jobs far more efficiently than the humans did. 
How does the computer achieve such dramatic increases in efficiency?
The chief pharmacist suggested that an important factor is the nature of 
the area of drugs and infectious disease. He explained that,
"Infectious diseases and pharmacy is a field that many physicians, 
nurses and even pharmacists cannot keep abreast of everything. 
There are so many factors, so we started to look at the areas in 
infectious diseases and pharmacy where we could make the 
greatest impact with the computer."
The areas that these programs cover are broad and the data that is 
amassed each day for over 500 patients is vast. Systematic computer 
searching is a more effective means of dredging the data, than are manual 
searches. In order for HELP to produce lists of patients with nosocomial 
infections, patients with ADEs or patients requiring pre-op antibiotics, it 
must have access to all the information. The integrated data base in 
HELP makes this feasible. As the programmer explained,
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"The knowledge base doesn’t just activate the data from the 
pharmacy, it has access to everything else, surgery data, previous 
data, X ray data - everything."
The computer is able to scan this data constantly. This is beyond the 
capabilities of the human staff, firstly because people become tired and 
bored when asked to search routinely through large amounts of data, 
much of which is acceptable data. The programmer emphasised this point, 
saying
"If the human is checking a thousand patients and is only going to 
find a situation in two of those, there is the chance that the human 
mind wouldn’t even pick that up because it is so tedious. But with 
the computer it doesn’t matter. It can do a thousand patients every 
day."
Beyond this, time constraints mean that
"A human cannot look and monitor everything, every test result. 
[But] The computer is able to constantly monitor everything."
The implication is that the systematic, rule-based searches performed by 
the computer are an effective way to do jobs that humans cannot, or 
choose not to, perform. The result is that the computer equips the 
medical staff with more information and data than they would otherwise 
have access to. When the computer-produced information becomes 
available, decisions about what to do next are made by the medical staff. 
At this point the human staff take over from the computer. A knowledge 
engineer in the radiology unit explained the necessity for the human 
involvement after the computer provides data and makes suggestions:
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"The judgement phase, the common sense phase happens after the 
computer makes its suggestion. The computer makes a suggestion 
that is filtered through the human who works with all the 
imponderables that a computer can’t ponder."
At this level of operation the computer is a provider of information 
rather than a decision maker. This view is reflected in the published 
literature on HELP: For example, Evans (1991) states that "The computer 
can provide timely and important information but it is the human user 
who must apply the information." (p. 287). The knowledge engineer 
stressed this point:
"Somebody can then take that information [provided by HELP] 
and they then make the final decision or choice. But the computer 
is never going to replace the physician. The computer can help you 
and recommend and the computer can alert and can suggest. It is 
the doctor who really has the more broader view of everything, and 
he makes the ultimate choice. This [computer] just provides as 
much information as possible by doing these things. He [the 
doctor] can’t do all this stuff."
This is the crux of the issue. The computer does things that the doctor 
does not do. (See also Gardner et al, 1989, p. 97). The object of these 
HELP modules, which use medical knowledge, is to enhance processes 
that the humans themselves are unable to do, or do badly. The knowledge 
engineer agreed with this interpretation, and explained his view as 
follows:
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"We are constantly thinking, and this is what I do, I design and 
think about things ... this isn’t working manually, things that the 
computer can do that you cannot do manually or something we can 
do manually but the computer can do better and faster."
ADE monitoring and prophylactic antibiotic screening are examples of 
tasks that the medical staff can do, but usually do badly. So too is 
identifying nosocomial infections - in theory it can be done manually but 
would be far too time consuming. Similarly with identifying patients 
taking post-op antibiotics for too long. The pharmacist felt that,
"You could do that manually if you hired five people just to go 
through everybody’s record every day."
These computer functions are not ’replacing’ humans in medical tasks. 
Warner (1980) stressed this point. He stated that the aim of the system is 
"to look for ways of handling things that are presently difficult for a 
human to handle." (p. 77). The computer’s success in these areas rests on 
the nature of the computer’s abilities in relation to human abilities. 
Computers are able to sort through large volumes of patient data, day in, 
day out, without becoming bored or careless. They follow pre­
programmed rules, applying them to all cases, to isolate individual cases. 
The system does not respond to patient specific variations, but follows 
rules in the same way every time, carrying out a behaviour-specific 
response. Its tasks exist inside microworlds at the narrow point of the 
venturi - no external factors affect the searches and the mathematical 
calculations. Responding to individual patient’s idiosyncrasies is left to the 
medical staff who oversee and evaluate the computer’s output in the light 
of real world circumstances. In this way, any instances where the decisions
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made by HELP do not fit the particular patient under scrutiny are 
identified. The patient specific knowledge and context based decision 
making performed by the staff allows the HELP decisions to be used 
practically. So, the computer performs a range of tasks in the way that a 
human would if they were using behaviour-specific action, and the 
humans check these responses using regular action. The staff are thus 
provided with useful information that allows them to proceed with the 
next stages of patient management more effectively. As Evans (1991) 
points out, "The appropriate use of the information provided by the 
computer makes the application successful." (p. 287).
Studying the chapters in Kuperman et al’s book (1991) where the 
capabilities of the HELP system are described in detail, almost all fall 
under this umbrella - they are modules programmed to perform tasks that 
the medical staff are ill equiped to do. As a result the computer provides 
the staff with useful data. This applies to the laboratory results that are 
displayed at various sites all over the hospital, the billing facility that adds 
up patient costs automatically as the patient progresses through their stay, 
surgery scheduling, ordering facilities, etc.
Each of these programs is a useful addition to the running of the hospital, 
prompting staff and providing information. The staff role is one of an 
expert overseer of the computer output. Together the computer and the 
staff perform well, but the computer is not replacing a human making 
medical decisions. However, the programmers and developers at the LDS 
have recently branched out in this field, developing ’protocols’ to direct 
the management of intensive care respiratory patients. The computer has 
been programmed with the protocol instructions which it follows and 
from which it produces directions for the management of patients. One of
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the knowledge engineers explained the significance of this progression, in 
relation to the other tasks that HELP was programmed to do:
"You come up with any of those alerts [such as those described 
above] and ask a doctor if he know it, and he will say 'sure I knew 
it, I just happened to miss it at that particular point in time’. But 
the things we are doing now on ICU with the respiratory system, 
they are a step beyond that."
The next section looks more closely at this 'step beyond'.
5. THE FIELDWORK PART 2
COMPUTERISED CLINICAL PROTOCOLS - A STEP BEYOND?
5.1 Introduction
Engineers at the LDS have installed protocol programs into the HELP 
computer. These are designed to enable HELP to direct the ventilator 
therapy of patients with Adult Respiratory Distress Syndrome (ARDS). 
Using protocols demands that doctors forfeit their own individual 
methods of treatment in favour of computerised 'consensus' based 
(protocol) decisions. In this capacity, HELP seems to be taking over a 
human task involving complicated decision making processes.
ARDS is an acute respiratory failure condition requiring artificial 
ventilation. "There is no uniform and universally accepted definition of 
the syndrome" (Morris et al 1989, p. 138), although common elements are 
arterial hypoxaemia (5), radiographic infiltrates (6), and clinical 
expression of respiratory distress (7). There are an estimated 150,000
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cases of ARDS annually in the United States, and patients who survive do 
generally resume productive lives. In 1979 a subset of ARDS patients 
meeting pre-specified ECMO criteria (8) were singled out and found to 
have a survival rate of about 10%. By contrast, in 1984 Gattinoni et al 
published results of a new therapeutic program for ARDS patients 
satisfying the ECMO criteria, which appeared to achieve a 77% survival 
rate.
The new treatment used involved a 3-step therapy program: First, 
pressure controlled inverse ratio ventilation (PCIRV), and then either 
continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) if the patient improved on 
PCIRV, or low frequency positive pressure ventilation with 
extracorporeal C02 removal (LFPPV-ECC02R) if the patient failed to 
improve on PCIRV. The LFPPV-ECC02R is designed to underinflate 
the lung and limit the ventilatory rate, so as not to further damage an 
injured ARDS lung (Morris et al 1990).
This vast increase in survival rate prompted international interest, 
despite there being no control or randomization during the trial. 
Researchers at the LDS were anxious to repeat the trial under more 
regimented conditions. The proposed study at the LDS involved assigning 
ARDS patients satisfying ECMO criteria to two groups. Traditional 
treatment - continuous positive pressure ventilation (CPPV) - was to be 
administered to the control group and the new therapy was to be 
administered to the other group. A problem with this simplistic design 
was feared, which the researcher at the centre of the project explained:
"We may create an environment where the patients who were
having the new therapy would have all kinds of attention to detail
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and senior people looking in on them. Whereas the ones that were 
randomised to the control would get the medical student and the 
student nurse."
It is recognised in the literature that "variations in patient care can be 
seen not only among hospitals but even among ICUs within a single 
hospital, and among physicians within an ICU." (Morris et al, 1990, p. 
229), so it is possible that the different groups in this trial could have 
received different levels of care. With this in mind the researchers 
attempted to ensure that both groups received the same quality of care so 
as to improve the credibility of the trial result (Morris 1992). There were 
four major aims: (1) that uniform care be given to both groups, with (2) 
equal intensity of monitoring and (3) equal frequency of monitoring, and 
finally, (4) consistent decision making logic be used in both groups. 
(Morris et al 1989, Morris et al 1990, East et al 1990, Morris 1992). 
Specific treatment protocols were conceived in an attempt to ensure that 
these criteria were met, and to direct the respiratory management of all 
the patients with ARDS in the trial, whether they fell into the 
experimental or the control group. One researcher suggested that 
equalising quality and quantity of care for both branches would also make 
the study "far more scientific".
5.2 Protocol Development
East et al (1990) state that "Physicians’ decisions are influenced by many 
different things including: the journal article that they read yesterday; the 
research meeting they attended; the colleague they spoke to last week; 
the last drug representative that visited and the current patient that they 
just spent the whole night trying to save." (p. 566). Clearly, physicians
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make decisions in different ways, depending on these factors. If protocols 
are to be created to direct the execution of any task, all involved parties 
have to forfeit their own preferred method in favour of the decision given 
by the computer. A six stage method was used at the LDS to design the 
ARDS protocols. It involved discussion sessions with various personnel, 
production and testing of paper based protocols, computerisation of the 
protocol logic, validation and eventual release for routine use. A  diagram 
representing this process is shown below - figure 9.1. (See also East et al 
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A researcher extensively involved with organising the production and 
perfection of the protocol logic and its introduction into practical 
environments, explained that initiating discussion and forming consensus 
amongst the physicians had not been easy. The argument she had used to 
help persuade them to collaborate went as follows:
"Look, everybody has a different way [of managing the ARDS 
patients] and still we get a terrible outcome (9), so what is the 
problem with saying ’look, I don’t know if my way is better, but we 
need to pick a [specific] way, all do it, and then see if it has any 
effect on the outcome’."
She admitted that the process had been long and tricky, involving a great 
many meetings and discussions, and that early on in the process she 
doubted whether the project was feasible:
"During the first five hundred hours I thought ’we are not going to 
be able to do it’. "
The doctor in charge of the ICU echoed this, explaining that developing 
this first set of protocols had been
"bloody and brutal, because getting physicians to give up their own 
stylistic ways of doing it is very very hard."
He pointed out that
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"If you look at the decisions that are made in medicine, what you 
are going to find out is that at least 50% of what we do, we don’t 
know if it is right or wrong. And what it came down to was saying 
’this [consensual method] may not be our way, but it is a way, it is a 
way that we can accept and it is not different from letting the 
residents make decisions.’ And we do that all the time."
After much debate, tests and trials, the protocols were completed, 
computerised and ready for application at the bedside.
The protocols respond to changes in arterial p02  levels, suggesting an 
increase or decrease in therapy, or giving instructions to wait and 
withhold any changes in therapy. The protocols were intended to be fully 
operational by the time the trial comparing the new therapy for ARDS 
with the traditional therapy was started. Figure 9.2 (overleaf) shows a 
portion of protocol instructions for a patient on ICU at the LDS on 31 
January -1  February 1989. (This chart reads from the bottom upwards).
The notion of using computer-generated decisions to direct therapy is 
important. Have the human professionals handed over control of this 
aspect of care to the computer? To what extent, if at all, is human 
involvement still required? If the computer’s decisions are acceptable to 
the physicians in all cases, it is a major achievement for both the 
knowledge engineers and the programmers. How well do the protocol 
instructions ’perform’ and how does their utilization fit into the regime of 
the ICU? Researchers at the LDS have published the results of the 
clinical trials of the new ARDS treatment. These results fostered 
increased interest in the protocols themselves, as explained below:
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5.3 The Clinical Trial
The exact dates and details of the clinical trial are not immediately clear 
from the literature. For example, in 1989 Morris et al forecast that 60 
patients would be included in the trial over a two year period and that 
"stratified randomization with blocking will be used and all personnel will 
be blinded" (p. 143). Stratified randomization was to be limited to age 
(<40 years /  >40 years), and cause of ARDS (trauma /  non trauma). 
Whereas in 1990, Morris et al describe a "randomized, prospective single 
centre clinical trial" (p 228). 40 randomized patients stratified by age and 
by the presence or absence of trauma were referred to in this paper, and 
it is stated that "Blinded randomization with blocking is being used." (p. 
229). Furthermore, the papers by Morris (1992) and Morris et al (1992) 
both refer to a "prospective randomized clinical trial", of 40 patients 
satisfying ECMO criteria for ARDS, which took place between August 
1987 and April 1991. The 40 patients included were divided -19 in the 
control group and 21 in the new treatment group. Overall survival was 
reported at 38% (42% in the control group and 33% in the new treatment 
group). This survival rate represents almost a four-fold increase in the 
traditional survival rate.
These descriptions of the trial(s) do not make clear whether the patients 
were blind to which group they were in or whether the staff were blind to 
this detail. Or were both staff and patients blinded? Who was aware of 
which patients were in which group? What exactly ’prospective’ means in 
this context is not explained. Are the 40 patients referred to by Morris 
and Morris et al a subset of the 60 patients reported on in the 1989 paper, 
or are they a different set of patients?
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Wallace (1993) has explained that these papers, with inconsistent details 
of the ARDS treatment study, all refer to the same trial, which took place 
between August 1987 and April 1991. The final results of this trial are 
reported in Morris et al (1992). The conclusion that the researchers drew 
from the results is that survival of the ARDS patients increased when the 
protocols were used to direct treatment, to a level around 35%. This was 
the case for the control group who received the traditional therapy and 
for the experimental group receiving the new treatment. On this basis 
they suggest that extracorporeal C 02 removal therapy is not 
recommended for treating ARDS - there is nothing to suggest that the 
therapy itself improves survival. The survival rate of both groups in the 
trial was a surprise and researchers felt that the increase was due to the 
use of strategic protocols to direct care. The focus of attention suddenly 
shifted from the usefulness of the new ARDS therapy to the perfection of 
the protocols. The clinical director of the ICUs at the LDS summed up 
the intended direction of the department:
"If we can find the funding, [we are] going to launch into a lot of 
different protocols, for doing standardised care, because we are 
totally convinced that standardised care is better care. You really 
have got better outcomes."
He felt that the standardising of care was the essence of improving care - 
it allows everyone in the team to be completely familiar with the 
processes and procedures, and to work in a routine manner. His opinion 
is that:
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"The standardisation process in itself is very good. And I think that 
it improves care a lot. And I think that the protocols showed us 
that."
This notion of standardised, algorithmic rules to control an essential 
aspect of a patient’s therapy portrays an extremely ’scientific’ image of 
medicine. It runs contrary to any notion of medical decision making being 
context related or intuitive. As such, the idea of protocol directed care 
offers a stiff challenge to those who see medical decision making as a 
situated, non behaviour-specific action. Closer attention to the way 
protocols are used on the ICU, and how they fit into the regime of the 
environment is necessary. What contribution do staff make to the 
apparent usefulness of the protocols?
5.4 The Protocols In Use
The practical use of protocols on the ICU involves the computer 
producing patient-specific instructions based on arterial oxygen levels.
The system is data driven, activated by patient input regarding the arterial
02. The instructions generated by the computer are not implemented by 
the computer - they are assessed by the staff, who choose whether or not 
to follow the directive.
When the protocols were under development and first introduced at the 
bedside, staff followed about 60% of the instructions. The other 
instructions were ignored or challenged. As the protocols were improved, 
decision rules adjusted and logic updated, the percentage of the time that 
they were followed increased to nearer 90%. (Henderson et al, 1990; 
Henderson et al 1992; East et al 1992). The system as it is now leaves "the
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physician free to decline to follow a protocol instruction, if he or she has a 
defensible reason." (Morris, in press, p. 8). These challenges to the system 
are recorded and discussed, so that their validity can be assessed. When 
the challenges are deemed ’valid’, appropriate changes are incorporated 
into the system in an effort to perfect the program.
The figures for staff compliance suggest that staff are - on the whole - 
following the protocol instructions. In effect they have delegated this job 
to the machine for about 90% of the time. But compliance is not 
maintained at a constant level: Drops in the level of compliance with the 
protocol instructions by the staff occur periodically. These drops are 
attributed to "the introduction of new logic, rotation of new clinical staff 
into the ICU and identification of previously unencountered clinical 
problems." (Henderson et al, 1992, p. 277).
A paper by Henderson et al (1992) is concerned with the proportion of 
the instructions generated by the computer that are considered ’correct’.
A ’correct’ instruction is defined as one that is the same as was specified 
in the original paper-based version of the protocols. The results showed 
that 90.2% of the instructions were considered - in retrospect - to be 
’correct’, with less than 10% ’incorrect’. In a different paper (1990) 
Henderson et al reported that 11.4% of the instructions generated by the 
computer were, in retrospect, ’incorrect’. Almost a third of these 
’incorrect’ instructions were implemented, which suggests that staff are 
sometimes inclined to follow instructions, regardless of the 
appropriateness of that instruction. The authors claim that in retrospect, a 
reason why an incorrect instruction was generated could be found in all 
but 1.5% of instances, and that this number of incorrect instructions will 
diminish continually as the program is improved. It is clear that
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(1) medical staff do not comply with the instructions all the time - about 
10% of the instruction are challenged or over-ruled.
(2) The computer does not always produce ’correct’ instructions, as were 
decided on and laid down in the original version of the paper protocols - 
about 10% of the instructions are, in retrospect, labelled ’incorrect’.
These are not exactly the same 10% as were challenged, because a third 
of these incorrect instructions are implemented.
(3) The protocols are only in operation for 86% of the day (Morris et al 
1992, p. 85). The rest of the time the patients are taken out of protocol, 
because the circumstances are unusual or the physiological feedback does 
not represent the patients ’real’ condition.
These three points should be borne in mind when attempting an analysis 
of the machine’s protocol capabilities and it’s apparent performance of a 
human activity. If the patient is under protocol control for 86% of the day, 
only 88% of the protocol instructions generated during this period are 
followed (Morris et al, 1992), and approximately 10% of the instructions 
are incorrect, then human directed treatment is clearly being 
administered some of the time. In the next section I examine the use of 
the protocols, with particular attention to the three factors outlined 
above. This analysis shows the essential nature of the human contribution 
to the care of the ARDS patients.
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5.5. Closer Examination Of The Protocols 
5.5/ Staff Non-Compliance
Staff non-compliance occurs in about 1 in every 10 instructions. Reasons 
for non-compliance can often be formulated in retrospect by the 
designers, but this does not mean that instances of non-compliance can be 
anticipated in advance. Alterations to the program can only be made after 
staff have rejected a particular directive.
Staff knowledge of what is and what is not an acceptable treatment 
decision is essential if challenges to the system are to be made, and 
inappropriate directives ignored. Henderson et al state that one of the 
causes of a drop in compliance with directives is the occurrence of 
previously unencountered clinical problems. When a patient’s condition 
varies from the expected pattern, and the patient shows individualised 
characteristics, the protocol produces directives that staff may not comply 
with. Protocols are not designed to respond to unusual, unexpected 
clinical problems in the way that a human would and the role of a human 
’overseer’ in these situations is essential.
5.5// 'Incorrect Instructions*?
In a retrospective analysis, a portion of the directives issued by HELP are 
labelled ’incorrect’. Some of these are followed by the staff, some are 
rejected. There are two problems with ’incorrect’ instructions: First, 
although no fatalities have yet occurred as a result of an incorrect 
instruction being implemented (Henderson et al 1990), this cannot be 
ruled out in the future. Second, and more fundamentally, why are
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incorrect instructions produced? It may be because the patient is in a 
chaotic or emergency situation which the protocol does not cover. Or it 
may be that the particular patient under scrutiny is for some reason an 
exception to the rules which the protocol proceeds by. In either case the 
experienced doctors’ skill is necessary to direct care in a way that is 
acceptable for the particular patient and the particular scenario.
5.5iii Time That Patients are Out o f Protocol
The protocols were designed only for management of the stable critically 
ill patients. The patients are removed from the protocol environment 
when they enter unstable critical phases, or when they exhibit unusual 
characteristics. For these acute or emergency situations protocols are 
abandoned and doctors’ traditional skills and ability to react intuitively to 
unexpected developments are called on so that the patient is managed 
successfully, through regular action. As the chief researcher pointed out,
"If the patient was in a crisis and had to have some acute problem 
taken care of, these scenarios - we didn’t write the protocols for 
those crisis situations, we wrote the protocols for a patient who was 
in a stable, albeit very sick state of affairs."
6. DISCUSSION
These three issues have a common thread linking them - the notion that 
the protocols are designed only for treating stable critical patients. When 
instability is introduced into the system, directives are ignored, incorrect 
directives may be produced, or ultimately the patient may be removed 
from the protocol environment.
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The protocols are designed to work when the patient’s responses fit into 
a pre-defined set, for which the optimum management has been 
anticipated and programmed. Within the boundaries that protocols 
operate, the application of specific management strategies for specific 
physiological changes seems to work well (10), possibly increasing the 
chances of survival to about 35%. In this respect it is more successful than 
the mix of responses to a poorly understood condition that a range of ICU 
doctors would produce. As shown above, the doctors use regular action. 
The protocols are an attempt to replace this regular action with a 
behaviour-specific response. As Morris and Gardner point out "the 
protocols provide a standard therapeutic response to the arterial 
hypoxaemia in mechanically ventilated patients with severe ARDS."
(1992, p. 510). This does not mimic the regular human action, but 
replaces it with something which, in this instance appears to be more 
effective in many cases.
It is important to remember that the protocols are designed to respond to 
p02  levels - this is a small part of the overall care of an unconscious ICU 
patient. It is a small task, located within the broader context overall 
patient care, but isolated from it. The computer is operating on a very 
narrow set of variables. The computer uses a behaviour-specific response 
and produces acceptable results within this narrow field. However, when 
the patient’s responses move out of this microworld situation, towards the 
wide end of the venturi, a doctor is needed to care for the patient using 
regular action to respond to unexpected events.
Areas where behaviour-specific responses are acceptable are difficult to 
locate in the medical world. This particular area exists because regulation
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of p02  is intrinsically isolated and because the responses of unconscious 
ICU patients are more predictable than those of fully conscious general 
medical patients. The staff involvement in the management of ARDS 
patients occurs when the patient’s signs or responses become too ’unusual’ 
for the computer. When broader factors begin to influence a patient’s 
condition - for example, when a patient begins to regain consciousness, or 
when the physiological information falls outside the boundary of the 
computer’s competence - the doctor steps in. The machine is by-passed 
and knowledge from ’beyond the microworld* is used to manage the 
patient.
7. SUMMARY
The protocols are an exciting development on the ICU. They respond in 
a pre-determined fashion to changes in arterial oxygenation levels. Their 
behaviour-specific response works in a manner that staff find acceptable 
for much of the time. The role of the experienced doctor or respiratory 
therapist remains essential for overseeing the system, because the 
protocols only deal with stable patients who are confined to a 
’microworld’ of medicine at the narrow part of the venturi. Human 
intervention is needed when these responses develop into the less 
predictable undigitized responses of an unstable patient nearer the wider 
medical world. Human expertise is essential for carrying out the aspects 
of the job where regular action and situated responses to unexpected 
circumstances are needed. Protocol directives serve only as advice and do 
not directly influence the treatment of the patient because protocols 
utilise behaviour-specific responses. The human intermediary is still an 
essential link in the treatment of ARDS patients. The protocols are a step 
beyond the other HELP programs, but are evidently less of a ’Step
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Beyond’ than seemed to be the case at first. They have not crossed the 
boundary between behaviour-specific action and regular action. Neither 
have they stepped into the area where medicine meets the real world. 
Protocols operate in a microworld where behaviour-specific action 
suffices.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 9
1. Warner (1978) says that "Electrocardiography has been the proving 
ground for many of the basic concepts of medical decision-making by 
computer. This paper describes a system [HELP] in which these concepts 
have been generalized for application to the whole field of medical 
practice." (p. 115)
2. This is an example of the system operating in time driven mode.
3. Prophylactic is a term used in medicine which means to treat in 
advance, or prevent before symptoms occur.
4. A false positive occurs when the computer suggests an ADE although 
none is present.
5. This is deficient oxygenation of the arterial blood.
6. These show as shadows over the lung on an Xray, whereas chest Xrays 
normally show the lung without shadows.
7. The clinical signs of respiratory distress are dyspnea - laboured and 
inadequate breathing, ana tachypnea which is rapid but shallow 
breathing. Both lead to inadequate oxygen levels in the blood. Thanks to 
Dr. Ann Miller at the Respiratory Department, Royal United Hospital, 
Bath, for her explanation of these terms.
8. Extracorporeal membrane oxygenation - ECMO criteria. See Morris et 
al 1989, Table 2.
9. A terrible outcome in so far as the average survival of ARDS patients is 
traditionally about 9%.
10. This is a broad assumption based on the ARDS trials at the LDS 
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CHAPTER 10 - SUMMARY. CONCLUSIONS AND 
SUGGESTIONS
1. INTRODUCTION
There is a lack of practical assessments of medical computers in everyday 
environments. Contradictory images permeate the literature on artificial 
intelligence in medicine, but most of this work is based on theoretical 
analysis or controlled clinical trials of computers in research 
environments. By contrast, the investigation presented here was 
conducted using a participatory methodology to look at computers being 
used in working medical environments.
In view of the importance of the issues under discussion, a sociological 
investigation of this area is legitimate, and because medicine influences 
everyone’s life, this investigation also has a wider general relevance. 
Questions such as can we expect a ’post physician era’ with computers in 
place of white coated doctors, or will human staff still reassure and treat 
us in the clinics and wards of the future, arise. Pinch’s comment (1993) 
that "This debate, unlike many of the rather esoteric areas of science 
studied in second generation SSK, has consequences for us all" (p. 369), 
seems particularly applicable to this research. This investigation has 
looked at several medical computers, and analysed the situation in 
practice. Particular attention has been given to how and why computers fit 
into our lives as social protheses, why in some instances they fit better 
than others, and the extent to which they deskill the workforce. My 
criticisms of the AI approach stem from AI workers’ neglect of the 
processes of socialisation that people undergo in order to participate in
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social life - in contrast to this AI workers emphasise the formal methods 
of representing knowledge about the world.
2. OTHER CRITIQUES OF FORMAL APPROACHES TO PROBLEM 
SOLVING
Other writers have offered alternative criticisms of formal approaches - 
eg, Ashmore, Mulkay and Pinch (1989) discuss the Quality of Life (QOL) 
and Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) measurements devised by health 
economists, as an example of a formal technique for solving practical 
problems (see also Mulkay, Ashmore and Pinch, 1987).
They criticise this formal method by showing how the practical problem 
of NHS resource allocation is reformulated into an abstract economic 
problem by the introduction of economists, terms and definitions. The 
semantics of economics are a persuasive means of showing a problem to 
be soluble by formal methods. But, Ashmore, Mulkay and Pinch claim 
that the nature of the problem is altered because the inherent irrationality 
is removed from the problem by the reformulation (1). They explain how 
the subjective QOL preferences of individuals were converted into 
objective QALY measurements. This reformulation occurred within 
health economists’ frameworks of how people function and experience 
the world. In this framework everything is reduced to a component of a 
QALY. As a result of the reformulation, potent solutions were produced 
because it was assumed that QALYs applied to large groups of patients, 
as opposed to individuals. Ashmore, Mulkay and Pinch stress the role of 
the economists’ background assumptions in the process of ’QALY 
devising’. These assumptions are three fold - first, the assumption that the 
analysts’ categories and the everyday experiences of the respondents
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correspond (2). Second, the health economists assume that peoples’ 
preferences are stable (3). Thirdly, the health economists claim that the 
quantification of subjective assessments is a reasonable representation of 
individuals’ everyday feelings (4). QALYs are presented as the 
preferences of ordinary people, and as beneficial to ordinary patients, but 
they are only a reflection of those preferences after filtration through the 
health economists’ measurement techniques. These techniques reflect 
health economists’ preconceptions and assumptions, and constitute just 
one way of looking at the world.
Ashmore, Mulkay and Pinch maintain that the alternative ways of 
looking at the social world, the social character of the research process 
and the social character of the knowledge claims produced should be 
acknowledged by health economists when they apply their expertise in 
areas of social policy beyond their own field of economics. The health 
economists should recognise that the consequences of their intervention 
vary according to the social context in which it is employed. Rational 
economic solutions work best within the confines of rational economic 
contexts, but when economists’ formal responses are reintroduced into the 
irrational arena of the NHS, a complex series of exchanges ensues and the 
problem is moved from one context into another.
Ashmore, Mulkay and Pinch conclude that they have no interest in 
evaluating the epistemological status of the knowledge claims they 
analyse (p. 187), and that they do not intend to ’damn’ the health 
economists, or offer their own solution to health economists’ problems. 
Rather, their aim is to show that there are alternative ways of analysing 
any situation. Their analysis is essentially a moral critique of formal
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methods, and their reflexive stance recognises that sociologists are open 
to the same criticisms as health economists.
Some of the points raised by Ashmore, Mulkay and Pinch as criticisms of 
the health economists’ formal approach have parallels with the formal AI 
approach highlighted in this research: AI workers must also redefine 
problems in their own terms; they also present their products as beneficial 
to ordinary patients; they often run into difficulties when their ’rational’ 
solutions to problems (their expert systems and computerised devices) are 
reintroduced into the ’irrational’ diagnostic arena. Many of these 
problems arise because the AI workers seek to replace what they see as 
the inherent ’irrationality’ of the diagnostic process, with elegant formal 
solutions.
However, my stress on the socialisation argument is a different kind of 
criticism of the formal approach to that made by Ashmore et al. Whereas 
they are content to point out the multiple ways of viewing any situation 
rather than present any alternatives to the practical strategies of the 
economists, I press my case further: That there are multiple 
interpretations of any event from different perspectives is not at issue. 
However, if practical work is to commence, it is necessary to treat the 
world as understandable and manipulable in terms of a unitary discourse 
(Ashmore et al, 1989, p. 190) (5). My participatory research has allowed 
me to asses the situation from the insiders’ perspective, and to side-step 
the paradoxical, multivocal nature of the world, in order to make 
progress. Using this strategy I will make recommendations for an 
improved approach to using AI in medicine and deciding where systems 
are likely to be most useful. Essentially these recommendations involve 
recognising the human contribution to the effective performance and
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acceptance of computerised artefacts. These practical suggestions are set 
out in guidelines at the end of this chapter.
The theory of behaviour-specific action and the venturi model of medical 
practice (adapted from Blois’s work) have been used as the framework for 
my analysis. These theories emphasise the human role and the social 
factors influencing machine performance, and so fit in well to research 
influenced by the sociology of scientific knowledge.
In accordance with criticisms levelled at the theory of behaviour-specific 
action (eg. Slezak 1992), I have attempted to distinguish between the 
regular action and the behaviour-specific action for each of the case 
studies presented, so that ’predictions’ about what the computers should 
achieve can be made. This is often difficult because of the problems of 
estimating actors’ intentions. The next section discusses this in detail. 
Following this I present a summary of the main findings of the fieldwork 
in relation to the questions raised in chapter 4. Conclusions about the 
research are then drawn.
3. IS IT BEHAVIOUR-SPECIFIC ACTION OR REGULAR ACTION?
How do we decide whether a computer has stepped over the line 
between behaviour-specific action and regular action? Slezak (1992) says 
that to do this it is necessary to specify in advance what in the world of 
human activity is regular action and what is behaviour-specific action:
The information from the GLADYS study suggests that when doctors do 
dyspepsia diagnosis it can sometimes be accomplished using a series of 
rule based responses, ie, behaviour-specific action. At other times,
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unforeseeable reactions to various factors is required and regular action is 
involved. The same is so for the management of dyspepsia - the specific 
cases outlined in chapter 5 show that management is sometimes 
straightforward, but that regular action which responds to the 
unforeseeable specifics of each patient and their problems is also 
sometimes required. So, according to the theory of behaviour-specific 
action, GLADYS should be able to produce acceptable diagnoses some of 
the time and acceptable management decisions some of the time.
Similarly, the SOLUBILE case shows the variable nature of jaundice 
diagnosis. It seems that some cases can be diagnosed using a behaviour- 
specific action whereby doctors reproduce earlier actions, whilst others 
require a more unorthodox approach based on regular action. It follows 
that in theory SOLUBILE should also be able to produce results that 
doctors find acceptable in some cases, but not in all cases.
The study of the automatic blood pressure machine highlighted a task 
which can be completed by following rules. It seems to be a behaviour- 
specific action where some variability is tolerated, to which the actors are 
indifferent. However, people often fail to instantiate a behaviour-specific 
response - instead they use techniques that do not fall within the margin 
of tolerance of the actors. My analysis suggested that behaviour-specific 
action is the best way to accomplish this task and avoid variations 
between measurers. So, the automatic machine should produce 
consistently acceptable results by using a behaviour-specific method which 
falls within the margin of tolerance of the rule-following model.
The information from the study of the automatic ECG machine shows 
that ECG analysis is a  two stage process. The first of these stages seems,
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on the face of it, to be a rule based decision about whether a black line on 
a white piece of paper is normal or not. On closer analysis this decision is 
often context specific and patient specific - made on the basis of 
unforeseeable details. It sometimes demands regular mental action. The 
second stage, which involves determining the nature of any abnormalities, 
is another task that may involve either regular action or behaviour- 
specific action in different cases. The interpretive ECG machine should 
be useful for some instances of screening and for some instances of 
abnormality interpretation.
The final case study described the HELP system. The jobs that this 
computer is assigned to fall into two categories. The first set of tasks are 
large-scale sifting of information tasks, and the isolation of specific cases 
which do not fit into pre-determined ’normal’ categories. This task - if 
done by people - could be done using behaviour-specific action and 
HELP should produce good results using a behaviour-specific approach. 
The second kind of task this system does, involves responding to patient 
oxygen levels and in the light of this, suggesting therapy. Advising on 
patient therapy is traditionally seen as an area where experience and 
intuition are necessary qualifications for the job. It is regarded as regular 
action because of the wide variety of symptoms and signs that have to be 
considered in each different patient’s case. However, as shown in chapter 
9, the management of arterial oxygenation levels involves assessing only 
one variable. This is a very small part of the overall monitoring of the 
physiological body. A limited number of variations on the readings and a 
limited number of responses (which fall within a zone of tolerance) have 
been formulated in advance. Staff could deal with run-of-the-mill readings 
using this rule based, decision-tree type of analysis that covers all 
expected variations of the reading from a pre-defined normal. The
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’microworld’ nature of this area has prompted the designers of HELP to 
try to anticipate all the variations and the appropriate responses to them. 
However, when the patients responses fall outside those that have been 
anticipated and accounted for (fall outside the microworld) the doctor is 
called on to use the knowledge and experience gained from dealing with 
unexpected occurrences to rectify the problem. The machine is only 
designed to deal with stable sick patients, when their oxygen level 
variations fit a predictable model. Within this boundary, the system 
should work well.
On the whole these predictions about what the computers will and will 
not be able to reproduce have been upheld by the empirical field work: 
GLADYS and SOLUBILE both produce acceptable results some of the 
time; the BP machine consistently produces acceptable results; the ECG 
machine offers acceptable interpretations some of the time. The HELP 
system performs task type 1 acceptably, and performs type 2 tasks 
acceptably in some cases (6). Even though some of these machines are 
only performing the tasks ‘acceptably’ some of the time, all the systems 
are situated in working environments where they are used by the staff. 
Looking closely at how the machines and the staff interact reveals more 
about the capabilities of the mechanical devices:
4. HUMAN MACHINE INTERACTION
The research has highlighted the various contributions made by the 
people working with machines. These contributions permit the machines 
to blend into the social setting and make the machines look as if they do a 
great deal of the ’human’ work. The staff deal with the real world and act
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as a conduit between that real world and the machine, and between the 
machine and the real world.
Machines do not interface directly with the world because understanding 
the real world beyond their area of application requires participation in 
the world. Socialisation and enculturation lead to the accumulation of 
mutual understandings. These understandings permit the competent 
functioning of people in the world, in a way that other people understand 
and respond to. We are all apprenticed to society. Computers do not have 
the benefit of this socialisation and apprenticeship. So they are designed 
in such a way that they can utilise our understandings. How does this work 
in practice?
In the case of GLADYS, the staff select ’suitable’ patients for the 
computer, and the patients provide ’suitable’ digitized responses for the 
computer to work on. The link between the wide world (which people 
understand) and GLADYS’S world is thus made.
In the case of SOLUBILE the doctor interviews and examines the 
patient, interprets the program’s questions and provides specific statistical 
responses which the computer then works on. The doctor makes the real 
world of medicine into a SOLUBILE friendly set of statistics.
The automatic BP machine is provided with a fully prepared patient, with 
the cuff ready positioned, and the ’normal’ limits agreed on and 
programmed. The person who does these tasks has reduced the real world 
understandings into a suitable shape for the machine to work with.
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The automatic ECG machine is presented with a relaxed patient who has 
been attached to the machine in the correct manner, and whose ECG 
signal should be clear and sharp, thanks to the work of the ECG operator.
HELP is given a series of oxygen saturations from a stable patient. This 
information has been separated from the confounding mass of 
physiological information that the patient produces. This mass of 
information is dealt with separately by human practitioners.
All of these contributions that humans make to the different processes 
constitute ’digitization’ of the world. In each case the real world is 
narrowed down and presented to the machine in neat discrete categories 
that it can work with. This narrowing down is represented in the top half 
of the venturi diagram. The digitization narrows down tasks so that they 
lie nearer to point B. They are transformed into microworld tasks where 
rule based approaches are suitable. (See figure 10.1 below, and chapter 4, 
section 1.3ii).







Microworld area where 
behaviour specific action 
is appropriate
The wider world of medicine, where regular action is used
Figure 10.1 - The Venturi Architecture
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This is only half of the story - people come into play at the ’output’ end of 
the equation too. The output end occurs after the computer has 
performed its task in the pre-defined manner. At this stage, the human 
contribution makes the machines’ output fit into the real world of 
medicine, as opposed to the microworld in which it was produced. How 
do people do this?
GLADYS is being used in a level 3 trial (ie, in operational form with an 
awareness that it is not fully proven) and its output is being compared 
with that of physicians. This means that physicians go about their business 
as usual, merely comparing their diagnoses and management strategies 
with those given by GLADYS. However, if GLADYS was in full 
operational form, a qualified practitioner would be required to stand by 
and oversee GLADYS. The unacceptable diagnoses and inappropriate 
management strategies highlighted in the specific cases in chapter 5 
would have to be over-ruled and adjusted by the doctor. This is where 
GLADYS’S output would be ’repaired’, making it fit for use in the real 
world.
SOLUBILE is in use in a London hospital. The doctors manipulate the 
list of differential diagnoses given by SOLUBILE so that they fit the case 
in question. The doctor decides on the relevance of SOLUBILE’S 
probabilities for each condition, decides whether or not to perform the 
tests SOLUBILE suggests, and may have to decide whether any of the 
diseases given a low probability need investigating. As it stands when 
produced, the SOLUBILE printout is only useful when a practitioner has 
decided what to do with it to make it useful in the real world in relation to 
the particular patient under examination.
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Similarly with the automatic BP machine. The staff respond when the 
machine sounds it alarm, they also assess the numerical readings 
produced, in the light of the particular patient under scrutiny, and decide 
on the best course of action. Decisions about whether the reading is too 
high or too low are situated actions made by the qualified practitioner. 
These decisions are necessary if the machine is to fit into the world of 
human action.
The human repair that occurs after an interpretive ECG machine has 
performed its task is highlighted in chapter 8. When using the interpretive 
ECG machine, operators react to misinterpretations by ignoring them or 
switching off the interpretation facility. When the machine misses an 
important abnormality the technician brings it to the attention of a 
doctor. The role of an experienced practitioner is essential if the machine 
is to be used responsibly.
Finally, the ARDS protocol decisions produced by the HELP system are 
also subject to human repair: As shown in chapter 9 the staff decide 
whether or not to follow a directive. They may decline to do so if they feel 
the directive is inappropriate in the light of the particular patient’s 
condition. Especially during periods when the patient is in an unstable 
condition the staff may decide that a directive is inappropriate.
All of these human contributions effectively repair any inappropriate 
computer-produced diagnoses and decisions. The charitable human 
transfers the machines’ output from the form it took in the microworld in 
which it was produced, to a form that is acceptable in the real world of 
medicine. This part of the process is represented in the bottom half of the
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venturi model, between points B and C. All the machines in this study 
only do a small part of a bigger task - they are all dependent on the staff 
for assistance with the parts of the task that they cannot perform. The 
result of this is that the staff link the part that the machine does, to the 
broader world of medicine. The people working with the machines are 
assisting the machines, helping them fit into the environment. The 
digitization and repair mean that the computers become acceptable in the 
social environment in which they are placed, and they often appear to do 
much more than they really do - "most of us are sufficiently expert... to 
compensate for what these artefacts cannot do." (Collins 1990, p. 215). In 
the case of medical ’artefacts’ and machines, specialist knowledge of the 
medical world is required by the users of the machines in order for the 
inadequacies of the machines to be compensated for. The skill of medical 
personnel is necessary if the computers are to be employed usefully. The 
skill of the staff is not, then, completely subsumed into the machine.
However, the fieldwork showed that although digitization and repair can 
be used to fit the machine into the environment of the people, and will 
compensate for mechanical shortfalls, it is sometimes unnecessary. This is 
because the staff sometimes choose not to use the machines at all. Why 
does this by-passing of the machine occur?
5. WHY COMPUTERISED MACHINES ARE SOMETIMES BY­
PASSED
GLADYS, SOLUBILE and the interpretive ECG machine are often 
ignored by the staff who are the intended users.
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Although staff have agreed to participate in the GLADYS trial, they 
often expressed exasperation with it - this applies to the nurses who were 
required to help patients use it, and the doctors who were supposed to 
benefit from its output. The senior registrar stressed that if GLADYS was 
not under trial he would not be using it because it does not have access to 
the wider context that doctors work in when interviewing, diagnosing and 
managing patients. He felt that dyspepsia is too wide an area for 
reduction to computerisation and as a result, GLADYS gets decisions 
’wrong’ in the doctor’s eyes, and its probability based outcomes are of 
little use in the real world of medicine (7).
SOLUBILE, however, is employed in a working environment. It is 
generally agreed that jaundice diagnosis is a ’narrower’ field than 
dyspepsia, because a diagnosis can be made with less evidence, and the 
popular idea is that the computer will work well in this smaller area. But 
the staff complained on the one hand that SOLUBILE gave diagnoses 
that they did not consider to be accurate, and on the other hand about the 
fact that it was being used in a narrow field where they did not require 
any assistance. It seems that being employed in a ’narrow’ field is no 
guarantee of success in terms of producing results that skilled staff find 
acceptable. The human barrier to the use of SOLUBILE is based on both 
these factors - the ’mechanical’ problem of inaccurate suggestions, the 
philosophical problem of too small an area, and thirdly, the unacceptable 
(although interesting) method of probabilities used by SOLUBILE in 
differential diagnoses which mean little to practising clinicians.
The ECG machine’s interpretation facility is often ignored by 
experienced technicians so that they do not have to assume the role of 
’detector of mistakes’. They see the machine as time-consuming, often
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inaccurate, misleading and unnecessary. Staff at the large hospital who 
were well trained, do not use the machine because they recognise its 
technological inadequacies.
In each of these cases the acceptability of the machines to the social 
group is limited.
However, the automatic BP machine and the HELP system do not face a 
human barrier to their use. Staff are happy to use both computers. These 
machines produce acceptable results for a  large proportion of the time. 
But even in these two cases, the presence of a skilled human is essential 
for the instances when the machine does not produce an acceptable 
output, or is faced with a situation it has not been programmed to respond 
to. It seems that three of the machines pin-pointed in this study achieve 
only limited success and are often rejected by users, whilst the other two 
are accepted - to a much greater extent - as legitimate social protheses. 
Explaining this difference requires close attention to the intricacies of 
digitization and the necessity to reduce tasks to a machine-approachable 
microworld form.
6. MICROWORLDS. ACTOR’S INTENTIONS AND BEHAVIOUR- 
SPECIFIC ACTIONS
In the cases of arterial oxygen level maintenance and BP recording the 
machines are more readily accepted.
First, the case of arterial oxygen level maintenance by HELP: This is a 
sub-task within the broader task of patient management. Through a 
process of ’digitization’, part of the actor’s world has been simplified from
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a complex world (overall patient management) to a microworld (oxygen 
level monitoring). Acting within a microworld can be accomplished by 
following a set of exhaustable rules, because, as Haugeland (1985) 
explains, a microworld is a "domain in which the possible objects, 
properties and events are all narrowly and explicitly defined in advance." 
(p. 185). Maintaining oxygen levels involves measuring and responding. 
As long as the measurements fall into pre-defined categories, the 
appropriate response can be set out in pre-determined rules and the 
action performed within a microworld.
Any parts of an actor’s world could be reduced by digitization to a 
microworld format, provided that the reduction of the complex variety of 
the real world into invariant unambiguous categories does not represent 
too much of a ’loss’ in terms of the actor’s world and form of life. In the 
case of the sub-task of managing oxygen levels, what is lost by digitization 
is not important to the broader task of patient management. It is clear 
that in this field the actors’ intention is usually to respond to the oxygen 
level measurement according to the pre-set criteria. Consequently, a 
machine can be programmed to reproduce this behaviour-specific action 
within the confines of the microworld without loss.
However, microworlds cannot be combined to add up to the complexity 
of the real world. This is why - in this case - when the oxygen levels fall 
outside the pre-specified values and rules operating in the microworld, a 
doctor from the real world is called on to respond using regular action. 
The conditions and specifications of the microworld do not apply outside 
the boundaries. In this broader context the intention of the actor is not so 
easily pre-determined. Regular action that responds to unspecifiable 
variations in unspecifiable ways occurs. A machine cannot be
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programmed to mimic this kind of response in the world outside the 
microworld.
Secondly, the automatic BP machine. The range of techniques that 
people use to record the pressure can be reduced to one particular 
method that relies on behaviour-specific action. ’Measuring the pressure’ 
is reduced by digitization to a rule-following procedure - without loss to 
the wider complex world of ’taking the blood pressure’. The intention of 
the actor is to record the systolic and diastolic values in a behaviour- 
specific way. This task can be regarded as occurring in a microworld, 
where everything is determined in advance and where rules can be 
formulated for successful completion of the task. Behaviour-specific 
action will suffice in this case and the machines can be assigned to do the 
task.
Collins makes the point that "Those who want to substitute human labour 
with machines must first arrange the job so that it can be done in a 
machine like [behaviour-specific] way; that is where deskilling comes in." 
(1990, p. 221) He is suggesting that without the rearrangement of tasks 
into a behaviour-specific format, the role of machines is strictly limited. 
Both tasks described above can be arranged so that they can be done 
using behaviour-specific action. But the opportunities for arranging 
medical tasks so that they can be done in a completely behaviour-specific 
manner are rare. Medical treatment is, by nature, the performance of a 
range of tasks which span a hierarchy of levels (see Blois, 1988). As 
Szolovits and Pauker point out (1993) "Medical diagnosis is inately an 
uncertain business." (p. 171) ECG analysis, dyspepsia diagnosis, dyspepsia 
management and jaundice diagnosis are the tasks that the other machines 
in this study were designed to approach. These machines are less
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acceptable to users than HELP or the BP machine. So, what exactly 
happens when the interpretation and diagnosis parts of ECG analysis, 
dyspepsia diagnosis, dyspepsia management and jaundice diagnosis are 
reduced to microworld tasks? Close analysis shows that difficulties are 
encountered when these tasks are digitized in order to fit them into 
microworlds. To explain this it is necessary to return to the venturi model.
In Blois’s original funnel description, at the time of the first 
doctor/patient encounter, a broad range of possibilities are open to the 
doctor, and a range of clinical and ordinary judgemental skills must be 
employed in order to approach the problem.
The narrow end of the funnel is approached when a working hypothesis 
has been reached, or when the range of possibilities has been narrowed 
down, and where a calculation or the application of highly specific expert 
knowledge will finish the job and produce a decision. No knowledge of 
the wider world beyond the microworld is needed at this point.
Monitoring oxygen levels of stable patients and responding in a pre­
determined manner, and measuring the BP of patients whose cuff is 
already attached and who have been familiarised with the procedure, are 
tasks lying at the narrow end of the funnel. These tasks, which HELP and 
the BP machine are designed to do are near the narrow part of the funnel 
(or venturi). Digitizing the task to a microworld format can be achieved 
without loss to the actors form of life - all the variables can be predicted 
in advance within the boundaries of the microworld. These tasks may 
move up into the wider end of the funnel if unforeseen circumstances 
occur which require more than straightforward knowledge of the ’narrow 
end’ microworld variety.
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GLADYS and SOLUBILE have been designed to solve problems 
situated at the wide end of the venturi. A wide range of possibilities face 
the doctor that is presented with a jaundiced patient or a patient with 
dyspepsia. Determining the doctors’ intention in advance is difficult 
because of the range of possibilities and the ’open’ nature of the job.
Between the two extremes of the funnel architecture the automatic ECG 
machine is designed to do a job that probably lies somewhere in the top 
third of the funnel, nearer to the wide end than the narrow end. This is 
because the job of ECG interpretation does not occur at the point of the 
first doctor patient encounter - so it is not at the widest part of the funnel. 
But interpretation does require some of the broad skills and judgement 
that characterise ’wide end’ tasks. It does not fall under the umbrella of 
narrow end tasks, where no knowledge of the wider world is needed.
Blois’s point is that computers will not be acceptable when applied to 
wide end tasks because they do not have the wider world knowledge 
necessary to function at that point. Computers can be useful for narrow 
end tasks, which have been sufficiently sharpened by the action of 
humans, for a machine to finish off the job.
The designers of GLADYS and SOLUBILE face the prospect of 
computerising a task that lies at the wide end of the funnel. One means of 
overcoming this problem is to move the tasks in question from the wide 
end of the funnel to the narrow end. This is attempted by digitizing the 
information presented to the machine; ie, by reducing patient specific 
characteristics to a series of yes/no answers and numbers so that the 
individual patient is effectively ’digitised-out’ of the process. But this kind
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of digitization changes the nature of the task: The excessive digitization 
that is required to move the task into the narrow part of the venturi 
means that essential parts of the problem and the method of solving it, 
are removed. The result is that neither GLADYS nor SOLUBILE are 
doing the same thing as a doctor would do: In the cases of both dyspepsia 
diagnosis and jaundice diagnosis the human doctors’ task is to find out 
what is wrong with the particular patient presenting, in the light of 
symptoms, signs, history, social context, psychological factors and familial 
circumstances. GLADYS and SOLUBILE though, are doing something 
different. They are calculating the probability of various diseases being 
present in the light of various numerical values and yes/no answers to 
specific questions. They do this without taking into account the external 
factors that the doctors consider. The digitization is too extreme. It 
eliminates factors that are essential to the way the task should be 
approached. This inappropriate digitization I will term ’hyper- 
digitization’. The hyper-digitization of real world complexities into 
microworld categories removes all external influences. This constitutes a 
great loss in comparison to the real world activity of a doctor, and as a 
result, GLADYS and SOLUBILE often provide ’unacceptable’ outputs 
which are rejected by the staff. However, not all diagnosis cases demand 
reference to these external factors - some cases are much more 
straightforward. Then the removal of the external factors by hyper­
digitization is not crucial. In these cases GLADYS and SOLUBILE do 
produce acceptable results.
ECG analysis is slightly different. The machine is designed to interpret 
heart recordings. Both machine and human analyst are attempting the 
same thing - ECG interpretation. Yet the machine is often rejected 
because it cannot perform this task consistently. This is because the
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machine uses an algorithm which is a representation of the way humans 
interpret ECG traces. By digitizing the (assumed) human procedures, the 
designers have attempted to move the task down to the narrow end of the 
funnel. But the difference between individual patients, and the 
significance of each trace in the light of individual patients, cannot be 
anticipated and formulated into rules. The digitization of techniques into 
specific rules ignores such factors - they are ’digitized-out’ of the 
mechanised process. This again is an inappropriate type of digitization, 
because the loss of these factors constitutes an important difference 
between the mechanical method of ECG interpretation and the method 
employed within the human form of life. The result of the hyper­
digitization is that the machine often produces results that are 
unacceptable within the human form of life. Sometimes though, the 
machine produces acceptable interpretations in cases where the digitized 
rules are close enough to the procedures used by people, to make no 
difference. Again, in some cases, the losses incurred during digitization 
are not critical.
What arises from this discussion is the idea that reducing a human task at 
the wide end of the funnel to a form that a machine can perform involves 
moving the task to the narrow end of the funnel. Attempts to achieve this 
are made by hyper-digitization of the task and exclusion of many external 
factors. As a result, the machine often ends up doing a different job to the 
human and this is why computers and people sometimes produce 
divergent results when assigned to the same job. The hyper-digitization 
removes the context based factors and fits all variables into pre-defined 
categories. In the cases of GLADYS and SOLUBILE, hyper-digitization 
changes the nature of the task that is left for the computer compared to 
the task that the doctor would have done. In the case of ECG analysis, it
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results in the machine working with a set of interpretation algorithms 
which have digitized-out some of the variables that human staff assess 
when interpreting ECGs.
However, when we consider the jobs that HELP and the automatic BP 
machine do, the situation is different. These tasks are positioned at the 
narrowest part of the venturi - they can be performed with little reference 
to patient specific or contextual influences. The digitization required to 
make these tasks computer-suitable is minimal. Whether a person or 
HELP performs the task makes no difference - it remains the same task - 
measure and respond to oxygen levels. Similarly with the BP machine, the 
task is detect and record blood pressure pulses, which is what a human 
recorder also does. They are microworld tasks. Ignoring the external 
factors - as the machines do - does not constitute a great loss in 
comparison with the world of the human actor. The context and patient 
related factors are taken into consideration after the machine has 
performed its analyses. Then the staff decide on the validity and relevance 
of the machine’s output in relation to the particular patient under 
investigation.
To summarise these ideas: The computerised machines are useful when 
assigned to tasks which lie in the narrow section of the venturi, where 
patient specific characteristics are less important and can be ’digitized 
out’ of the process without significant loss to the task at hand. But some 
tasks belong at the wide end of the funnel and are greatly influenced by 
external factors at many stages during the procedure. Hyper-digitizing 
these kinds of tasks to fit into a microworld format, and artificially 
’moving’ them into the narrow end of the funnel means that these 
characteristics are ignored. This constitutes a great loss to the actors
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world and the characteristics of the task. As a result these machines are 
working with a different set of information, sometimes even performing a 
different task, and so sometimes produce different results to the staff.
This explanation goes some way towards showing why some computerised 
systems produce acceptable results and others do not. It is to do with 
where they lie in the venturi, and the effects of moving them into the 
narrowest section of the venturi in order to reduce them to microworld 
tasks where behaviour-specific action will reproduce the actor’s intention.
7. CONVERTING MICROWORLD OUTPUTS INTO WIDER WORLD 
TERMS
The human contribution to each of these processes that makes the 
mechanised output acceptable in the real world, is represented in the 
bottom section of the venturi. Here, staff repair the output created at 
point B and move it to point C. Blois (1980) recognises that a great deal 
of work is often done before the task is given to the computer, but he does 
not refer to this work that humans do after the computer has performed 
its analysis.
In the cases of GLADYS, SOLUBILE and the ECG machines, the extent 
of the repair required can be extensive - particularly in instances where 
the hyper-digitization was inappropriate. In some cases, the digitization 
and repair required are too time consuming and the rewards in terms of 
assistance to experienced staff, are too small. These staff may then reject 
the technology, recognising the technical shortfalls.
However, I have also shown that when inexperienced staff are presented 
with the same technology that experienced staff reject, it is possible that
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they will not recognise the inherent inadequacies of the technology. For 
example, less experienced staff are far more inclined to use the ECG 
machine interpretation facility, because they do not recognise the 
inadequacies of the device. This is because less experienced staff work in 
a slightly different form of life to highly skilled staff. For the 
inexperienced, the hyper-digitization of the task constitutes less of a ’loss’ 
because they are at a different starting point to the experienced 
personnel. They do not themselves use a full range of regular actions to 
respond to each new case, but seem to function at a less developed level. 
The technicians may be functioning at a rule-based behaviour-specific 
level. They lack the tacit knowledge and expertise required to make 
unorthodox decisions based on individual factors in each new case. Their 
methods lie near the narrow part of the venturi. So they do not see a 
computer which functions at the narrow section level, as problematic. A 
clear example of this is detailed in chapter 8, where the untrained ECG 
technicians and doctors unfamiliar with ECG evaluation were content to 
accept the interpretation offered by the computerised machine. They did 
not recognise the inadequacies of the machine nor the necessity to repair 
its output, because its method of operation was in fact similar - or perhaps 
even better than - their own method.
8. AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION
This explanation of where machines work best and how likely they are to 
prove acceptable, emphasizes the interaction between the machines and 
the people using them, and stresses the importance of human digitization 
and repair. My account shows that the efficacy of the machines - in the 
eyes of the users - depends on different levels of intervention by those 
users.
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An alternative view is that the efficacy of the machines and their level of 
acceptability is (or will be) determined by processes of negotiation 
between people. The social constructivist perspective (outlined in chapter 
1) presents this negotiation as the crucial factor in the determination of 
the adequacy and acceptability of technology.
In the case of the machines highlighted in my case studies, negotiations 
of this sort about the ’adequacy’ of medical machines involve users, 
designers and purchasers - ie, medical staff, AI workers and 
administrators - each party using negotiating ’tools’. Mackenzie (1989) 
suggests that the testing phase is a vital stage in deciding where and how 
well machines work, and what their characteristics are (see p. 12). It is 
during the testing and trials of medical machines in working environments 
that users make decisions about machines, whether they ’work’, and 
whether they are ’adequate’ and suitable for everyday use. These 
decisions to accept or reject are influenced by social processes of 
negotiation. The ’usefulness’, or perceived usefulness, of the machines 
emerges from these negotiations.
Anderson’s (1992) interpretation (see chapters 1 and 4) fits in well with 
the social constructivists’ analysis of the processes by which machines are 
determined to be adequate or not. Anderson explained the rejection of 
diagnostic technology in a Melbourne hospital in terms of a power 
struggle and debate between opposed groups of diagnosticians and 
scientists - the diagnosticians eventually ensuring the rejection of the 
technology. Anderson accepted the results of an ill-conceived clinical trial 
which he believed demonstrated the usefulness and accuracy of the 
devices. His analysis is weakened because he disregarded the perceived
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usefulness and adequecy of the machinery to the users, which arose from 
the debates.
The philosophical issues associated with AI are illuminated by the 
practical applications of the technology, and the practical experiences of 
users cannot be ignored. Analyses such as that provided by Anderson do 
not seem to recognise the close proximity of the philosophical issues and 
the practical issues.
It is clear that the decision whether to accept a machine - on a trial basis, 
or more permanently - is influenced by social factors, argument and 
consensus (8), and the usefulness of social constructivist perspectives is 
not at issue. However, my contribution - which highlights salient points 
concerning human-machine interaction at the point of use and the users’ 
perception of the usefulness of the devices - is an important component of 
constructivist interpretations of events (9). The guidelines provided at the 
end of this chapter show how closely related the perceived adequacy of 
the devices (in the eyes of users) and the acceptance or rejection of the 
devices are.
9. DISCUSSION
The picture presented here is that some machines are extremely useful 
for doing limited, microworld tasks where behaviour-specific action 
produces acceptable results.
Within strictly defined boundaries these machines can replace people. 
However, it has also emerged that when machines are applied to tasks 
that do not readily fit into the microworld format problems can arise.
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When jobs demanding regular action and reference to external factors are 
reduced to a microworld format, the external factors are ignored. 
’Creating’ microworlds in this fashion is not always successful because in 
so many cases the external factors are crucial to the performance of the 
task.
Inappropriate or hyper-digitization of tasks by designers (as in the ECG 
machine), or by users (as in the cases of GLADYS and SOLUBILE) does 
enable the machines to approach the task. But it may result in the 
machines approaching a different task to the staff, or taking note of 
different factors to experienced people. This can lead to unacceptable 
output and rejection by the users.
Microworld tasks from the middle of the venturi where behaviour- 
specific action is sufficient are rare in medicine. Transferring wider world 
tasks into a microworld format is fraught with difficulties. Medical expert 
systems and other computerised artefacts can be equipped with basic 
knowledge about sub-sections within medicine. All independent pieces of 
information that stand alone, and apply to all patients in all situations, can 
be programmed into a machine. This is the extent of the system’s 
’knowledge’. This is the kind of knowledge needed to solve problems lying 
in the middle of the venturi. At the wider end of the venturi influences 
from other spheres of medicine and from the real world play a part in the 
decisions made about individual patients in different situations. Then 
doctors draw on their tacit knowledge, gained from being in the wider 
world, in order to approach problems. Computers do not have access to 
this level of tacit knowledge because they are not participants in our form 
of life. There is then, a gap between the two levels of knowledge. This gap 
can be narrowed if the machine is equipped with more and more complex
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rules of behaviour. These can be formulated in retrospect after any event. 
But rules for coping with next week’s unique patient cannot be formulated 
in advance. Ramifying rules allows a computer to come a little closer to 
the mimicking of human regular action. But rules do not encompass the 
never ending variety of responses that humans display when they are 
doing regular action. Accessing the full range of human knowledge cannot 
be achieved without participation in the human form of life, and 
interaction in the human collectivity. Machines do not participate or 
interact. Socially gained collective knowledge of the type described by 
sociologists of scientific knowledge is necessary for performing in the real 
human world. Machines do not have access to this knowledge. So, 
machines do not perform at the same level as socialised humans.
This discussion is based on empirical results. Have the designers and 
manufacturers of the 1990s altered the goals of their research in view of 
their acknowledgement that "the dissemination and use of AIM systems 
has remained minuscule."? (Szolovits and Pauker, 1993, p. 178). Since the 
early pioneering days, Szolovits, often publishing with Schwartz, Patil, and 
Pauker, has been a prominent researcher in the field of AI in medicine. 
Schwartz has now abandoned the field, perhaps losing interest or 
recognising the substantial hurdles to AI in medicine (10), but Szolovits 
and Pauker are still active.
10. THE VIEW OF AN AI RESEARCHER
In late 1991, Professor Szolovits and I discussed developments in the field 
of AI in medicine, and the changes that have occurred since the early 
1970s. He explained that research had originally been prompted by three 
goals. The third of these was
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"to build the practical systems that we built here, and in some 
senses I think that’s the one at which it has been least successful."
This lack of success has dampened initial enthusiasm:
"by comparison with the enthusiasm that I and many of my 
colleagues felt fifteen years ago we certainly have not achieved as 
much as we thought we would at the time."
The reason for the lack of success early on was, in his opinion, the naive 
model of how computers would be used in medicine which the designers 
worked toward: They saw a ’doctor in a box’, consultant type of system as 
the best application of the burgeoning technology. This model worked on 
the underlying principle that if a patient exhibits symptoms and it looks as 
though they have a disease, then they do have that disease. But this kind 
of reasoning ignores overlapping symptoms, multiple diseases, opposing 
symptoms, evolving illnesses and the changes that occur as physicians 
intervene. Szolovits felt that dealing with these complexities of diseases 
would require
"thinking like a physiologist, and considering the mechanisms 
whereby the body generates these symptoms."
Computerising this ’pathophysiologic’ reasoning was seen as the way 
forward - an improvement on the method of merely considering 
associations between diseases and symptoms. Szolovits explained that this 
model was much more useful, but was difficult to operationalise in
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practice - much of medicine is not understood to that degree of detail, the 
programs could become enormously complex and
"a lot of stuff happens in medicine for which we just don’t have 
those models.”
In view of this, emphasis had then shifted to
"relatively self-contained domains in which you can do the job. My 
guess is that there are many such [domains] in medicine and I 
think a lot of such programs will come to the fore over time ... 
Remember, none of these [domains] is totally limited ... and the 
rules in the program may be inappropriate. But in the average case 
if there is some human pre-filtering to make sure that you don’t 
buy it in inappropriate circumstances then it is probably OK."
He used ECG interpretation machines as an example of a machine 
working in a domain where ’human pre-filtering’ allowed the machine to 
operate. He also recognised that human filtering was necessary after any 
mechanical interpretation, saying
"If its diagnosis is that a man is pregnant and that accounts for his 
problem, the user should say ’Gee, I wonder what has screwed up 
in this program.’"
Szolovits described another ’limited domain’ program he had been 
involved with, designed to advise on treatment for diabetic ketoacidosis - 
an acute and relatively isolated condition. This machine has undergone 
trials at a Boston hospital where it apparently performed as well as house
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physicians. But the staff stopped using it after the trial. His explanation 
for this was
"I think if you look at a big city hospital like this and ask them how 
often do they think that they badly blow a diabetic ketoacidosis 
case, they will tell you ’not very often’. It is very difficult to get 
people motivated for something that works in a narrow domain."
So could this kind of system be more usefully employed in environments 
staffed by less qualified personnel? He immediately suggested two 
problems with this. Firstly, the staff must recognise the basic nature of the 
main problem in order to decide to use the program. Secondly, many 
programs rely on the doctor inputting detailed information from tests and 
examinations. Both these points emphasise the need for a minimum level 
of skill and knowledge, without which the program is unusable.
In conclusion he suggested that machines and people often use different 
strategies and in some instances the program will do things better than a 
person. He used the example of
"trying to integrate some sort of complex probabilistic model 
where you have a lot of uncertainty based on tests that give 
uncertain results and you are trying to figure out if the patient has 
some heart disease or something. It is clear that programs are 
much, much better at that than people."
He felt that the optimum use of machines is in conjunction with staff 
where they serve as error detectors, and offer advice about what you
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shouldn’t be doing rather than what you should be doing. These machines 
would effectively say to the doctor
"I don’t know if this is really an error but it looks serious enough to 
me as a computer program that I thought I would bring it to your 
attention. You decide what to do about it."
Szolovits admitted that little practical success had been achieved in terms 
of producing large scale diagnostic programs. He was aware that
"If we were judged by a sort of corporate criteria of have we built 
the product and has it gone to market and has it made money, we 
would be in very deep trouble. [But] our score card is in terms of 
scientific progress and not in terms of deliverables ... our reviewers 
are other scientists who are used to working in the laboratory on 
fundamental questions that take a long time to answer."
To summarise, this researcher acknowledged the fundamental problems 
of designing and building large scale systems. The impracticalities of using 
pathophysiological reasoning that he talked about and the notion that
"If you learn medicine that doesn’t make you a good doctor. To be 
a good doctor you have to practice at it,"
show that he is aware of the philosophical difficulties involved in codifying 
the practices and the tacit skill used in everyday medical practice. He felt 
that systems working in smaller domains will be easier to build and 
deploy. But he recognises that it is in the more limited domains that 
doctors need least help (see above discussion of the ketoacidosis
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program). Szolovits advocated the use of systems as error detectors, with 
the human input and repair an essential part of a process, whereby the 
system ultimately says to the doctor "You decide what to do about it." This 
represents a substantial shift to the position he took twenty years ago.
However, in a recently published paper, Szolovits and Pauker (1993) 
present a slightly different picture. They acknowledge that the goals of 
expert system designers have evolved: Initially the designers had aimed at 
programs which "focussed on making a correct diagnosis and 
demonstrating expertise similar to that of experienced clinicians", (p. 177) 
in order to redistribute medical expertise. Szolovits and Pauker suggest 
that the change in aims is based on a change in medical consumers’ 
demands. Instead of demanding expert quality of care for all, consumers 
are now calling for uniform accessible care at affordable prices. 
Consequently, "The expert system developer may no longer be able just to 
simulate the behaviour of experienced clinicians" (p. 177), but must 
respond to these new consumer demands. This is the reason why 
"Narrower more specialised systems may have a more compelling, if 
limited impact." (p. 176) The authors recognise that limited domains are 
problematic in so far as they do not offer a solution to the broad needs of 
clinical medicine. In order to solve this dilemma, work is needed that will 
create common frameworks, so that specialized systems can work 
together to produce a usable useful whole (p. 176). The implication here 
is that tackling the broader problem of computerising bigger chunks of 
medicine can be achieved by creating lots of specialised ’narrow’ systems 
and linking them together.
In 1991 the philosophical and technological difficulties of the large scale 
approach were recognised as important. Now, Szolovits and Pauker are
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presenting a change in consumer needs as the reason that the large scale 
approaches were abandoned. In this paper, the inherent problems of 
creating artificial experts for use in the medical field are presented as 
soluble by the use of a different technological fix - the combination of 
specialized systems.
11. CONCLUSION
Rather than accepting the ’performance figures’ of computers as a 
starting point, and explaining why they are still sometimes rejected, I have 
approached the question from a different angle. The insider perspective 
presented here has highlighted the problems of using computers (which 
apparently work) in practical settings. This methodology has revealed 
features about the usefulness of computers, their performance in practice, 
the role of staff and the extent of deskilling, which other analyses (eg. 
Anderson, 1992) have ignored.
In order to be useful and usable, medical machines must be confined to 
microworlds where success can be accomplished using a rule based 
technique, or behaviour-specific action. But some areas of medicine 
cannot be reduced to microworld tasks. Much of medicine relies on tacit 
knowledge and the application of regular action in unanticipated 
circumstances. So, machines often produce results that do not fit into the 
world of regular action. Human ’repair’ is required to fit the microworld 
outputs into the real world setting. The role of an experienced human 
remains essential when computers are used.
In some environments where staff are less than expert, the repair 
required to fit machines’ output into the real world of medicine does not
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take place. The staff are happy to work with the machines. Evidently, the 
recognition of mechanical inadequacies that need repairing depends on 
the specific form of life of the workers in each department. In some cases, 
inappropriate hyper-digitization of a regular action task into a microworld 
format does not constitute a loss to the world of the human actor, because 
not all human actors operate in exactly the same form of life. They do not 
all have the same level of skill, or ability to recognise the inadequate 
mechanical performances that may result, because they do not perform 
the task in the ’optimum’ manner themselves. Some inexpert staff see no 
need to repair the results given by the machine. The acceptability of any 
device depends on the cultural context and form of life of the users. What 
is ’acceptable’ in one context is unacceptable in others.
Frequently the result is that some users reject the technology, others 
accept it because they themselves lack expertise in the field. If machines 
are to play a useful role, provide acceptable information to experienced 
staff, and provide safe information to less experienced staff, two options 
are open:
Either (1) we change the areas in which the machines are used, and 
confine their operation to tasks already positioned at the narrow section 
of the venturi where behaviour-specific action suffices, or,
(2) we change the way we use the machines, and insist that ’expert’ 
computers are used only by expert staff.
Both these suggestions depart from the images of a post-physician era: 
The first option means that machines will not embrace any of the 
reasoning and diagnostic tasks undertaken by medical staff working in
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normal practice. The second option means that the role of the qualified 
doctor, nurse or paramedic remains central. Neither course of action 
permits the replacement of expert staff by machines. Neither course of 
action allows machines to appropriate the entire spectrum of skilled 
human action. So, the implications for staff are not as extreme as they 
may have feared. Their role remains essential. The inarticulable nature of 
human knowledge, the unspecifiable nature of regular human action and 
the positioning of many tasks at the wide end of the venturi, ensure that 
the division between human actors and non-human artefacts remains 
intact and essential.
At this point it is useful to consider Collins’s prediction about the 
conditions under which we may come to think of machines as ’thinking’ 
and fulfilling Turing’s prophecy (Collins, 1990, p. 222). Collins says that 
there are four ways in which we might move toward such a state of affairs: 
Either (i) machines get better at mimicking us; (ii) we become more 
charitable to machines; (iii) we start to behave more like machines 
ourselves (iv) our image of ourselves becomes more like our image of 
machines.
Option i seems unlikely, given the inarticulable nature of much of 
medical knowledge. The regular action used cannot be pre-determined 
and programmed, and machines cannot achieve human action by 
reproducing more behaviours.
Option ii is increasing, as we repair machines’ output with little thought. 
However, in the case of medical machines I have shown that demanding 
more charity and repair from users can lead to the by-passing of the
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machines, or their inappropriate use by inexperienced staff. It does not 
lead to unconditional acceptance of machines by all users.
Option iv, whereby our image of ourselves becomes one of an inefficient 
machine, seems unlikely in this field. Differences between the way 
humans act and the way machines mimic those acts are evident, and 
usually recognised by users. However, this image of humans as inefficient 
machines is more likely amongst inexperienced staff who view the 
machine as an expert. This must be guarded against.
Option iii is the most likely means of increasing the level of 
computerisation of medical tasks. Only by reducing real world regular 
action to behaviour-specific microworld action, can computerisation 
progress.
This kind of computerisation can be useful to staff, as the BP machine, 
and the HELP system show. But combining microworlds in order to 
approach the bigger problems of computerisation is not feasible. Some 
parts of the real world outside the microworlds cannot be successfully 
reduced to a microworld format. GLADYS, SOLUBILE and the ECG 
machine show the difficulties that are involved. Szolovits and Pauker’s 
notion of creating frameworks of limited systems as a means of 
computerising bigger areas of medicine, is flawed.
The use of computers in medical environments does not challenge the 
SSK conception of knowledge as social. Neither do these computers 
challenge the essential role of tacit skill in the performance of medical 
tasks. The computers rely on human knowledge that has been gained in 
the social world, and human tacit skill, to fit them into the wider world of
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medicine. The divide between humans and non-humans (machines) 
remains clear. The challenge made by radical reflexive sociologists, to this 
demarcation is misplaced.
Computers in medicine achieve optimum usefulness in microworlds 
where behaviour-specific action produces the desired outcome. Tasks 
which can only be reduced to microworlds by unacceptable levels of 
hyper-digitization are unsuitable for computerisation. Designers need to 
concentrate on isolating ’naturally5 occurring microworld tasks, if they 
intend to advance the level of computerisation. They need to identify 
tasks - or parts of tasks - that already he in area B of the venturi. In these 
areas staff rejection is rare, inappropriate use is rare and computers 
provide most benefit to users. Technically, such systems are reliable and 
useful because the underlying philosophical problems which plague much 
of AI are avoided
12. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF EXPERT 
SYSTEMS INTO MEDICAL SETTINGS
This theoretical analysis explains why some medical machines are more 
acceptable than others. This analysis can be developed into a set of 
practical guidelines for deciding where medical systems will be most 
useful and where they may fail to meet expectations:
My research has shown that computers should ideally be applied to 
microworld tasks where behaviour-specific action is sufficient to achieve 
the intention of the person who previously performed the task. This is 
where the machines are most beneficial in the context of real medicine. 
But such microworld tasks are rare in medicine. Exceptions are the tasks
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performed by the automatic BP machine and the oxygen monitoring 
facility of HELP (11). These are narrow-section-of-the-venturi tasks. 
However, machines are also being designed for use in areas that do not fit 
the microworld model, ie. wide-end-of-the-venturi tasks. In these cases I 
have shown that hyperdigitization is required to reduce the medical world 
into microworld format, and substantial repair is required in order to fit 
the microworld output of the machines into the real world of medicine 
(12). The ’adequacy’ of the machines largely depends on the intervention 
and ability of the human user.
Two questions for a potential user of a computerised machine arise from 
this - firstly, what kind of task is the machine designed to perform? Is it a 
narrow part of the venturi task - a ready-made microworld where all the 
variables that the machine may encounter can be predicted in advance 
and responses to those variables pre-set? Or is it a wide end task which 
has to be hyperdigitized by fitting wide world variables into microworld 
categories?
Secondly, what kind of staff will be using the device? Will they be highly 
skilled experienced staff, familiar with the nuances of unusual cases and 
more mundane cases? Or will they be junior staff and paramedics with 
minimal experience? Will they be able to recognise when 
hyperdigitization has occurred, when it is acceptable or when it has 
changed the nature of the task, removed some relevant factors and 
created a situation whereby the machine is approaching a different task to 
the people? Will the users recognise an output that needs to be repaired? 
How well the machine will be seen to work - how ’useful’ it is perceived 
too be - depends largely on the skill and professional form of life of the 
users. At one end of the spectrum a machine may be seen as
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indispensable by novices, whilst other highly professional staff may view 
the same machine very differently. A potential purchaser or user of a 
computerised diagnostic machine has to decide whether the instances of 
’unacceptable’ performance are too frequent for the particular intended 
users to deal with (13).
A further consideration is the role that the users will play in the 
operation of the machine. Here the two issues of type of task and type of 
user must be considered in tandem:
First, consider wide end of the venturi tasks: If devices operating at this 
level are used by inexperienced staff they may not recognise that the 
output may be distorted because of the hyperdigitization, and that it often 
needs to be repaired in the light of the particular patient under scrutiny or 
the particular circumstances of the case. In these cases, inappropriate 
decisions made by the machine may be taken at face value. However, if 
these devices are used by experienced personnel they may by-pass the 
machine altogether because the hyperdigitization is too time consuming 
(14), the machine gives inaccurate, misleading results (15), the machine 
gives percentage possibilities that are considered to be clinically 
interesting but not useful (16), or because the machine operates in too 
narrow an area where they do not feel they require assistance (17).
On the other hand, consider narrow end of the venturi tasks: If machines 
operating at this level are used by inexperienced staff, they need to learn 
how to recognise cases that fall outside the machine’s microworld, and 
how to respond to them. They also need to learn how to perform all the 
digitization and repair required to embed the machine into the 
professional situation into which it is introduced (18). Similarly with
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experienced staff - they must act as overseers of the machines, and still 
perform many of the tasks they did prior to the introduction of the 
machine. Again in these cases, experienced staff may choose to by pass 
the machine and do the job themselves, unless the machine produces 
more consistent results than a group of people (19).
In all four scenarios above, a certain degree of expertise on the part of 
the staff is required. The human contribution to the functioning of the 
devices is unavoidable and essential.
The type of task the machine is to be applied to, the social/professional 
context in which the machine is to be deployed, the skill of the staff and 
the availability of alternatives to the machine are all important 
contributors to the social negotiations of adequacy and acceptability.
Each of these issues influences decisions about whether a machine will be 
useful, and whether or not to deploy a computerised device. All the 
machines in my study were felt to work well some of the time; some of 
them were believed to work well most of the time. Whether the machine 
is adequate in any specific case depends on the variety of factors outlined 
above in relation to the particular case under scrutiny, and so predicting 
where machines will be useful and where they will fail to meet 
expectations is fraught with difficulties. However, the guidelines in table 
2, (overleaf) may be useful to potential users attempting to estimate the 
potential usefulness and acceptability of a machine:
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TABLE2 -
Guidelines for potential users of medical expert systems
1. Does the task the machine is designed for exist in a microworld at 
the narrow section of the venturi diagram?
2. Or is the task situated at the wide end of the venturi where wider 
world influences apply?
3. How much digitization are the staff required to perform before the 
machine can approach its task?
4. How often will the staff be required to repair the output of the 
machine?
5. What environment and professional form of life is the machine 
targeted at?
6. How skilled do users need to be to operate the machines?
7. Will new training regimes be required in order for staff to offer the 
machine suitable input data, and in order for the staff to be able to 
repair outputs?
8. What benefits does the machine offer to the staff, and do these 
benefits outweigh disadvantages?
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In essence, do the machines offer ’logical benefits’ to their users? Evans 
(1991) explains that a logical benefit occurs when a process that is not 
efficient when performed by people becomes efficient through the use of 
a computer, and improvements in the process of care ensue (see chapter 
9). All medical machines should offer the user this kind of benefit (20) as 
there is little to be gained from computerising a task if the result is less 
efficiency. So, the major consideration of potential purchasers should be 
whether the machine will be perceived as offering logical benefits to each 
set of users in their particular context.
The optimum use scenario is for the machine to operate in a microworld, 
using behaviour-specific action, and improving the efficiency of a process 
or procedure. Deviations from this optimum need to be assessed in the 
light of prevailing circumstances, and in view of the available alternative. 
Clearly what is an ’acceptable’ situation for the deployment of a machine 
is different in a clinic staffed exclusively by auxiliary nurses, than in a 
teaching hospital staffed by experienced nurses, doctors and paramedics.
A vital point is that however ’useful’ a device proves to be, its output is 
still applied in practice by an experienced professional undertaking 
situated action in the real world of medical practice. The interaction of 
people and machines is the key to the ’adequate performance’ of 
mechanical artefacts.
312
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 10
1. They say that "although the economists are, in one sense, adopting the 
managers’ problem and producing a clear rational solution, they are also, 
at the same time, redefining and altering the nature of the problem itself." 
(Mulkay et al, 1987, p. 545)
2. Ashmore, Mulkay and Pinch suggest that in practice the research 
process and the act of measurement alters the parameters being 
measured, and that categories and real experiences do not then 
correspond.
3. Whereas Ashmore, Mulkay and Pinch suggest that respondents react to 
the socially defined data-gathering situation and their ’preferences’ alter. 
So, the relationship of what is elicited to what occurs in everyday life is 
not straightforward. This is similar to the notion that opinion polls reflect 
voters preferences. Critics suggest that what is elicited ’on the spot’ from 
voters is different to what occurs in everyday life when the real vote is 
made.
4. However, Ashmore, Mulkay and Pinch argue that QALYs do not 
reflect pre-existing values, but arise from the peculiar interaction of the 
economists and lay people, and the economists’ interpretation of that 
interaction, and their production of the QALY s.
5. Collins suggests that as sociologists we need to think as social realists - 
temporarily abandoning the relativist perspective and treating the social 
world as real and something about which we can have sound data (1981a, 
p. 216-217). He favours dismissal of the self critical line, as it stands in the 
way of progress.
6 .1 am using the term ’acceptable’ to refer to those interpretations, 
diagnoses and suggestions that the machines produce and which staff are 
in agreement with
7. Furthermore, this doctor felt that the prime objective of GLADYS, to 
reduce the number of referrals made by GPs, was misplaced.
8. In the course of the fieldwork it became clear that many of the 
decisions to test or use computerised machinery were made after 
’negotiation’ between designers and users. For example, the 
gastroenterology consultant became involved in the GLADYS trial after 
’persuasion’ by his friend and colleague on the Glasgow team. The 
Glasgow workers also provided a free word processor to the Cardiff team, 
and since the Cardiff consultant had delegated all GLADYS type tasks to 
his senior registrar, this proved to be persuasion enough. Similarly with 
interpretive ECG machines - it is recognised that manufacturers deals 
which offer the interpretive models at the non-interpretive price, 
combined with the glossy hi-tech output of the newer models, are reason 
enough to buy the new model. Another social factor is the ’slush’ money, 
which is often provided by public fundraising on condition that the most 
up-to-date, computerised model of machine is purchased. Clearly the 
social factors do, to a certain extent, influence the decisions made.
9. Whilst acknowledging the influence and usefulness of this work in SSK, 
a thorough analysis of the social construction of the adequacy of medical
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devices was not the objective of this study. Such an analysis would require 
a different methodology and a different thesis would have emerged.
10. Reproduced overleaf is the letter I received from William Schwartz 
when I suggested he met with me to discuss the developments in this field.
11. The intention of people doing these jobs is to measure the pressure of 
the blood in the brachial artery and to measure and suggest responses to a 
finate number of oxygen values. This is what the machines are also 
designed to do.
12. GLADYS, SOLUBILE and the ECG machines fit into this category of 
wide-end-of-the-venturi tasks, which have been moved into the narrow 
end by hyperdigitization.
13. For example, the interpretative ECG machine was deemed acceptable 
by most staff at the small Welsh hospital. Whereas the same machine was 
regarded with suspicion at the University teaching hospital. The 
differences arose from the different levels of skill of the users, and 
because the alternative at the smaller hospital was very often no expert 
ECG interpretation.
14. As is the case with GLADYS and SOLUBILE.
15. As the experienced ECG technicians found with the interpretative 
ECG machine.
16. As in GLADYS and SOLUBILE.
17. As was suggested by the users of SOLUBILE.
18. As the proxy strangers using the automatic BP machine illustrated, 
this ’embedding’ of the machine is by no means straightforward.
19. As the BP machine and the HELP protocols do.
20. A computer which searches large patient databases - eg. the infectious 
diseases and drug alerting programs of the HELP system, detailed in 
chapter 9, is a good example of a system providing ’logical benefits’.
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